ترجیح، باور و شباهت: نوشته‌های منتخب

Amos Tversky (1937--1996), a towering figure in cognitive and mathematical psychology, devoted his professional life to the study of similarity, judgment, and decision making. He had a unique ability to master the technicalities of normative ideals and then to intuit and demonstrate experimentally their systematic violation due to the vagaries and consequences of human information processing. He created new areas of study and helped transform disciplines as varied as economics, law, medicine, political science, philosophy, and statistics.This book collects forty of Tversky's articles, selected by him in collaboration with the editor during the last months of Tversky's life. It is divided into three sections: Similarity, Judgment, and Preferences. The Preferences section is subdivided into Probabilistic Models of Choice, Choice under Risk and Uncertainty, and Contingent Preferences. Included are several articles written with his frequent collaborator, Nobel Prize-winning economist Daniel Kahneman. Introduction and Biography......Page 10 Sources......Page 16 SIMILARITY......Page 18 Editor’s Introductory Remarks......Page 20 1 Features of Similarity......Page 24 2 Additive Similarity Trees......Page 64 3 Studies of Similarity......Page 92 4 Weighting Common and Distinctive Features in Perceptual and Conceptual Judgments......Page 114 5 Nearest Neighbor Analysis of Psychological Spaces......Page 146 6 On the Relation between Common and Distinctive Feature Models......Page 188 JUDGMENT......Page 204 Editor’s Introductory Remarks......Page 206 7 Belief in the Law of Small Numbers......Page 210 8 Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases......Page 220 9 Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment......Page 238 10 The Cold Facts about the ‘‘Hot Hand’’ in Basketball......Page 274 Editor’s Introductory Remarks to Chapter 11......Page 284 11 The ‘‘Hot Hand’’: Statistical Reality or Cognitive Illusion?......Page 286 12 The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Con.dence......Page 292 13 On the Evaluation of Probability Judgments: Calibration, Resolution, and Monotonicity......Page 318 14 Support Theory: A Nonextensional Representation of Subjective Probability......Page 346 15 On the Belief That Arthritis Pain Is Related to the Weather......Page 394 16 Unpacking, Repacking, and Anchoring: Advances in Support Theory......Page 400 PREFERENCE......Page 420 Editor’s Introductory Remarks......Page 422 Probabilistic Models of Choice......Page 428 17 On the Optimal Number of Alternatives at a Choice Point......Page 430 18 Substitutability and Similarity in Binary Choices......Page 436 19 Intransitivity of Preferences......Page 450 20 Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice......Page 480 21 Preference Trees......Page 510 22 Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk......Page 566 23 On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies......Page 600 24 Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions......Page 610 25 Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice......Page 638 26 Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice under Uncertainty......Page 662 27 Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty......Page 690 28 Thinking through Uncertainty: Nonconsequential Reasoning and Choice......Page 720 29 Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective......Page 746 30 Weighing Risk and Uncertainty......Page 764 31 Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance......Page 794 32 A Belief-Based Account of Decision under Uncertainty......Page 812 33 Self-Deception and the Voter’s Illusion......Page 842 34 Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice......Page 862 35 Anomalies: Preference Reversals......Page 892 36 Discrepancy between Medical Decisions for Individual Patients and for Groups......Page 904 37 Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model......Page 912 38 Endowment and Contrast in Judgments of Well-Being......Page 934 39 Reason-Based Choice......Page 954 40 Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making......Page 980 Amos Tversky’s Complete Bibliography......Page 1012 Index......Page 1018 Amos Tversky (1937–1996), a towering figure in cognitive and mathematical psychology, devoted his professional life to the study of similarity, judgment, and decision making. He had a unique ability to master the technicalities of normative ideals and then to intuit and demonstrate experimentally their systematic violation due to the vagaries and consequences of human information processing. He created new areas of study and helped transform disciplines as varied as economics, law, medicine, political science, philosophy, and statistics. This book collects forty of Tversky's articles, selected by him in collaboration with the editor during the last months of Tversky's life. It is divided into three sections: Similarity, Judgment, and Preferences. The Preferences section is subdivided into Probabilistic Models of Choice, Choice under Risk and Uncertainty, and Contingent Preferences. Included are several articles written with his frequent collaborator, Nobel Prize-winning economist Daniel Kahneman. Similarity -- Judgment -- Preference. By Amos Tversky ; Edited By Eldar Shafir. A Bradford Book. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [995]-1000) And Index.