Preemption Choice : The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism's Core Question

This book examines the theory, law, and reality of preemption choice. The Constitution's federalist structures protect states' sovereignty but also create a powerful federal government that can preempt and thereby displace the authority of state and local governments and courts to respond to a social challenge. Despite this preemptive power, Congress and agencies have seldom preempted state power. Instead, they typically have embraced concurrent, overlapping power. Recent legislative, agency, and court actions, however, reveal a newly aggressive use of federal preemption, sometimes even preempting more protective state law. Preemption choice fundamentally involves issues of institutional choice and regulatory design: should federal actors displace or work in conjunction with other legal institutions? This book moves logically through each preemption choice step, ranging from underlying theory to constitutional history, to preemption doctrine, to assessment of when preemptive regimes make sense and when state regulation and common law should retain latitude for dynamism and innovation. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Contents......Page 7 Contributors......Page 9 Acknowledgments......Page 17 Introduction......Page 19 THE BOOK’S STRUCTURE AND CHAPTERS......Page 22 PART ONE: FEDERALISM THEORY, HISTORY, AND PREEMPTION VARIABLES......Page 29 INTRODUCTION......Page 31 PREEMPTION AND THE CONGRESS......Page 33 PREEMPTION AND THE COURTS......Page 39 SPECIAL CASES......Page 42 Who Is Preempting?......Page 43 What Is Being Preempted?......Page 46 What Do ‘‘Savings Clauses’’ Save?......Page 48 CONCLUSION......Page 50 2: From Dualism to Polyphony......Page 51 DUAL FEDERALISM......Page 52 THE DEMISE OF DUALISM......Page 55 POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM......Page 60 VALUES OF POLYPHONY......Page 61 PITFALLS OF POLYPHONY......Page 62 RETURN OF DUALISM......Page 64 CONCLUSION......Page 70 INTRODUCTION......Page 72 MEDICAL DEVICES AND JOSHUA OUKROP......Page 76 PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND JAMIE GREGG......Page 82 DEFECTIVE VEHICLES AND MAJOR BARRY MUTH......Page 90 CONCLUSION......Page 95 PART TWO: THE LAYERED GOVERNMENT NORM......Page 97 4: The State Attorney General and Preemption......Page 99 FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY......Page 100 THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL......Page 102 STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL UNDER CURRENT PREEMPTION DOCTRINE......Page 106 TOWARD CONGRESSIONAL AND AGENCY SOLICITUDE FOR STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL......Page 110 AN OBJECTION: THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY PROBLEM......Page 113 CONCLUSION......Page 115 INTRODUCTION......Page 116 FLOORS AND CEILINGS: TWO DISTINCTIVE CHOICES......Page 118 THE NEW EMBRACE OF CEILING PREEMPTION......Page 120 DISTINGUISHING THE IMPLICATIONS OF FLOORS AND CEILINGS......Page 122 THE COUNTERARGUMENTS FOR CEILINGS......Page 132 CONCLUSION......Page 133 PART THREE: JUDICIAL TREATMENT AND INTERPRETIVE CHOICE......Page 135 6: Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine......Page 137 PREEMPTION’S TOUCHSTONE: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT......Page 138 EXPRESS PREEMPTION......Page 140 IMPLIED PREEMPTION......Page 142 FIELD PREEMPTION......Page 143 CONFLICT PREEMPTION......Page 149 FUTURE CONTROVERSIES......Page 153 CONCLUSION......Page 161 INTRODUCTION......Page 162 SAVING STATE COMMON LAW......Page 164 POLLUTION......Page 165 WORKPLACE SAFETY......Page 168 NUCLEAR ENERGY......Page 169 MEDICAL DEVICES, DRUGS, AND CIGARETTES......Page 170 PESTICIDES......Page 172 HARMONIZING COMMON LAW REMEDIES WITH SAVINGS CLAUSES......Page 174 NUCLEAR POWER......Page 175 WORKPLACE SAFETY......Page 177 POLLUTION......Page 178 MEDICAL DEVICES AND DRUGS......Page 181 SAVING SAVINGS CLAUSES......Page 182 8: Federal Preemption by Inaction......Page 185 GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION BY INACTION......Page 186 EXPRESS PREEMPTION......Page 189 RATIONALES FOR PREEMPTION AND THE NEED FOR CLEAR STATEMENT......Page 190 NARROW JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EXPRESS PREEMPTION PROVISIONS......Page 193 IMPLIED PREEMPTION......Page 196 OCCUPATION OF THE FIELD PREEMPTION......Page 197 CONFLICT AND OBSTACLE PREEMPTION......Page 200 THE RELEVANCE OF THE AGENCY’S JUDGMENT......Page 201 THE IMPACT OF THE LACK OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AUTHORITY......Page 206 CONCLUSION......Page 208 INTRODUCTION......Page 210 THE DUAL FUNCTION OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE......Page 212 OBJECTIONS TO PRESUMPTIONS AND CLEAR STATEMENT RULES......Page 217 A PROCESS-BASED APPROACH......Page 221 CONCLUSION......Page 231 10: Preemption by Federal Agency Action......Page 232 PREEMPTION AND AGENCY ACTION......Page 233 THE FEDERALISM EXECUTIVE ORDER......Page 242 THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S ATTACK ON STATE TORT LAW......Page 244 CONCLUSION......Page 248 PART FOUR: PREEMPTION TALES FROM THE FIELD......Page 251 11: The Regulation–Common Law Feedback Loop in Nonpreemptive Regimes......Page 253 FEEDBACK FROM AGENCIES TO COURTS......Page 255 FEEDBACK FROM COURTS TO AGENCIES......Page 259 FEEDBACK IN THE REAL WORLD: THE CASE OF PFOA......Page 263 PRESERVING THE VALUE OF FEEDBACK......Page 270 PREEMPTION AS A THREAT TO THE FEEDBACK LOOP......Page 271 CONCLUSION......Page 274 12: Delegated Federalism Versus Devolution: Some Insights from the History of Water Pollution Control......Page 275 THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S APPROACH TO DELEGATED FEDERALISM......Page 276 THE STATES AS LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY......Page 278 DEVOLUTION?......Page 280 A CLOSER LOOK AT THE 1974 EPA REPORT......Page 283 AN EVALUATION OF PROGRESS IN THE DECADE PRIOR TO ENACTMENT OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT......Page 286 THE IMPACT OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT ON WATER QUALITY......Page 290 CONCLUSION......Page 292 INTRODUCTION......Page 295 STATIC MODELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM......Page 298 DYNAMIC, INTERACTIVE, AND ‘‘POLYPHONIC’’ FEDERALISM......Page 299 DEVELOPING AN ADAPTIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM......Page 302 PRIMER ON COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS......Page 303 THE VIRTUES OF AN ADAPTIVE MODEL......Page 305 ADAPTIVE FEDERALISM AND THE DEBATE OVER ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM......Page 307 IMPLICATIONS OF AN ADAPTIVE MODEL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM......Page 309 THE ASYMMETRY OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION......Page 310 THE MERITS OF OVERLAPPING FEDERAL AND STATE JURISDICTION......Page 311 THE UNIQUE THREAT OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION TO ADAPTIVE FEDERALISM......Page 313 CLIMATE CHANGE CASE STUDY......Page 314 CONCLUSION......Page 317 Conclusion: The Menu of Preemption Choice Variables......Page 319 Index......Page 323 The Constitution's Federalist Structures Protect States' Sovereignty But Also Create A Powerful Federal Government That Can Preempt And Thereby Displace The Authority Of State And Local Governments And Courts To Respond To A Social Challenge. ... Recent Legislative, Agency, And Court Actions, However, Reveal A Newly Aggressive Use Of Federal Preemption, Sometimes Even Preempting More Protective State Law--provided By Publisher. Preemption And Theories Of Federalism / Robert R.m. Verchick And Nina Mendelson -- From Dualism To Polyphony / Robert A. Schapiro -- Preemption And Regulatory Failure Risks / David C. Vladeck -- The State Attorney General And Preemption / Trevor W. Morrison -- Federal Floors, Ceilings, And The Benefits Of Federalism's Institutional Diversity / William W. Buzbee -- Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine / Christopher H. Schroeder -- When Congress Goes Unheard : Savings Clauses' Rocky Judicial Reception / Sandy Zellmer -- Federal Preemption By Inaction / Robert L. Glicksman -- Process-based Preemption / Bradford R. Clark -- Preemption By Federal Agency Action / William Funk -- The Regulation - Common Law Feedback Loop In Non-preemptive Regimes / Thomas O. Mcgarity -- Delegated Federalism Versus Devolution : Some Insights From The History Of The Water Pollution Control / William L. Andreen -- Adaptive Environmental Federalism / David E. Adelman And Kirsten H. Engel -- Conclusion : The Menu Of Preemption Choice Variables / William W. Buzbee. Edited By William W. Buzbee. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Also Available Online. This book examines the theory, law, and reality of preemption choice. It moves logically through each preemption choice step, ranging from underlying theory to constitutional history, to preemption doctrine, and to assessment of when preemptive regimes make sense and when state regulation and common law should retain latitude for dynamism and innovation.