Politics, Paradigms, and Intelligence Failures: Why So Few Predicted the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Why So Few Predicted the Collapse of the Soviet Union

Washington's failure to foresee the collapse of its superpower rival ranks high in the pantheon of predictive failures. The question of who got what right or wrong has been intertwined with the deeper issue of "who won" the Cold War. Like the disputes over "who lost" China and Iran, this debate has been fought out along ideological and partisan lines, with conservatives claiming credit for the Evil Empire's demise and liberals arguing that the causes were internal to the Soviet Union. The intelligence community has come in for harsh criticism for overestimating Soviet strength and overlooking the symptoms of crisis; the discipline of "Sovietology" has dissolved into acrimonious irrelevance. Drawing on declassified documents, interviews, and careful analysis of contemporaneous literature, this book offers the first systematic analysis of this predictive failure at the paradigmatic, foreign policy, and intelligence levels. Although it is focused on the Soviet case, it offers lessons that are both timely and necessary. Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- List of Abbreviations -- Preface -- Introduction: The Theory and Practice of Predicting Political Change -- 1. Theories of Political Change and Prediction of Change: Methodological Problems -- Methodological Problems of Tracking Changes in a Collective Belief System -- The Dimensions of a Collective Belief System: Existential Imperatives as Validity Claims -- Changing the Collective Belief System: The Process of Delegitimation -- Activating the Process of Delegitimation: Trigger Conditions of Change -- The Durability of Legitimacy: Personal and Systemic Factors of Maintenance -- Legitimacy of the Soviet Union: The Theory and Politics of a Concept -- Rational Choice Theory and Soviet Legitimacy: Coercion and Preference Falsification -- 2. Oligarchic Petrification or Pluralistic Transformation: Paradigmatic Views of the Soviet Union in the 1970s -- The Totalitarian Model: Oligarchic Petrification and Final Doom -- The Revisionist Model: Pluralistic Transformation and Final Convergence -- Revising the Revisionist View of the Soviet Union: Oligarchic Degeneration and Ideological Assertion in the Late Brezhnev Period -- 3. Paradigms and the Debate on Relations with the Soviet Union: Détente, New Internationalism, and Neoconservatism -- The Realpolitik View of Détente: Securing American National Interests from a Declining Position of Power -- The New Internationalist View of Détente: Superpowers Working Together for a Moral Universe -- The Soviet View of Détente: Improving the "Correlation of Forces -- The Neoconservative View of Détente: Outmaneuvering the United States -- Afghanistan and the Triumph of Neoconservatism -- 4. The Reagan Administration and the Soviet Interregnum: Accelerating the Demise of the Communist Empire Theories Of Political Change And Prediction Of Change : Methodological Problems -- Oligarchic Petrification Or Pluralistic Transformation : Paradigmatic Views Of The Soviet Union In The 1970s -- Paradigms And The Debate On Relations With The Soviet Union : Détente, New Internationalism, And Neoconservatism -- The Reagan Administration And The Soviet Interregnum : Accelerating The Demise Of The Communist Empire -- Acceleration : Tinkering Around The Edges, 1985-1986 -- Perestroika : Systemic Change, 1987-1989 -- The Unintended Consequences Of Radical Transformation : Losing Control Of The Revolution And The Collapse Of The Soviet Union, 1990-1991 -- Reflections On Predictive Failures. Ofira Seliktar. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 226-262) And Index. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the close of the Cold War took many in Washington by surprise. In this study, Seliktar (Gratz College and Temple University) analyzes this major predictive failure at the paradigmatic, foreign policy, and intelligence levels. The focus is on how the paradigms developed by Sovietologists were crucial in informing perceptions of political change in the Soviet Union, and how these perceptions affected American foreign policy. Annotation ©2004 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR Washington's failure to foresee the collapse of its superpower rival ranks high in the pantheon of predictive failures. Drawing on declassified documents, interviews, and contemporaneous literature, this book analyses this predictive failure at the paradigmatic, foreign policy, and intelligence levels