Political transition in Cambodia, 1991-99 : power, elitism, and democracy

This book illustrates the limits to the 1990s UNTAC peacekeeping intervention in Cambodia and raises a critical challenge to the assumptions underpinning key tenets of the 'Liberal Project' as a mechanism for resolving complex, severe struggles for elite political power in developing countries. The book highlights the limitations of externally imposed power-sharing. In the case of Cambodia, the imagined effect was a coalition that would share power democratically. However, this approach was appropriate only for resolving the superpower conflict that had created Cambodia's war. Rather than bringing long-term peace to Cambodia, Roberts argues, it created the temporary illusion of a democratic system that in fact recreated the military conflict and housed it in a superficial coalition. Failure or unwillingness to address the core issues represents a failure in western approaches and an inability to think beyond the power-sharing paradigm. It assumes that all systems will conform to the democratisation system without addressing cultural institutions and traditions. Because of the application of these assumptions to Cambodia, its political transition has been from a form of relatively benign authoritarianism to a superficial non-constitutional democracy. The book thus challenges assumptions regarding the inevitability of the globalization of liberalism as a means of ordering non-western societies. It explains the failure of democratic transition in terms of the impropriety and weakness of the plan which preceded it, and in terms of the elite's traditional reliance on absolutism and resistance to the concept of 'Opposition'. This Book Discusses The Limits To The 1990s Untac Peacekeeping Intervention In Cambodia And Raises A Critical Challenge To The Assumptions Underpinning Key Tenets Of The 'liberal Project' As A Mechanism For Resolving Complex, Severe Struggles For Elite Political Power In Developing Countries. The Book Highlights The Limitations Of Externally Imposed Power-sharing. In The Case Of Cambodia, The Imagined Effect Was A Coalition That Would Share Power Democratically. However, This Approach Was Appropriate Only For Resolving The Superpower Conflict That Had Determined Cambodia's War. Rather Than Bringing Long-term Peace To Cambodia, Roberts Argues, It Created The Temporary Illusion Of A Democratic System That In Fact Recreated The Military Conflict And Housed It In A Superficial Political Coalition. Failure Or Unwillingness To Address The Core Issues Represents A Failure In Western Approaches And An Inability To Think Beyond The Power-sharing Paradigm. It Assumes That All Systems Will Conform To The Democratisation System Without Addressing Cultural Institutions And Traditions. Because Of The Application Of These Assumptions To Cambodia, Its Elite Political Transition Has Been From A Form Of Relatively Benign Authoritarianism To A Superficial Veneer Of Modern Democracy In Reality Underpinned And Subverted By Traditional Structures That Have Resisted 'modernisation'.--jacket. South East Asia -- Cambodia -- Peace Seeking -- Assumptions Of Peace -- A Critical Overview Of The Operation -- Early Challenges To Transition -- Elite Challenges To Transition--the Khmer Rouge -- Elite Challenges To Transition--the Cpp -- From 'coalition' To Confrontation, 1993 To 1997 -- Peripheral Challenges To Transition, 1993 To 1997 -- Recreating Elite Stability, July 1997 To July 1998. David W. Roberts. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 248-255) And Index. To understand the nature of the Paris Peace Agreement of 1991 (PPA) and its propriety, one must understand the path by which the settlement was reached.