Political Economy of the Swiss National Bank (Contributions to Economics)

**Political Economy of the Swiss National Bank** examines whether there exists any systematic political influence on Swiss monetary policy. A partial adjustment model is used to derive the reaction functions. Models of political business cycles and the theory of legislative control are for the first time applied to the Swiss institutional setting. The inflationary performance of the National Bank is not explained with the legal relationship between the executive branch of government and the central bank. It is interpreted as the result of the structure of the executive (commission government) and the characteristics of the Swiss political market for monetary policy. In empirical tests no indirect political influence, defined as a systematic relationship between fiscal and monetary policy, and no direct political influence from elections, the executive and the legislature can be detected. Front Matter....Pages i-xiv Introduction....Pages 1-6 A Reaction Function Study for the Swiss National Bank....Pages 7-92 Deficits and Money Growth: Empirical Evidence for Switzerland....Pages 93-124 Elections and Monetary Policy: Is There a Political Monetary Cycle for Switzerland?....Pages 125-146 The Executive Central Bank Relationship: The Case of Switzerland....Pages 147-188 Legislative Influence on Monetary Policy? The Case of Switzerland....Pages 189-248 Back Matter....Pages 249-271 Ch. 1. A Reaction Function Study For The Swiss National Bank -- Ch. 2. Deficits And Money Growth: Empirical Evidence For Switzerland -- Ch. 3. Elections And Monetary Policy: Is There A Political Monetary Cycle For Switzerland? -- Ch. 4. The Executive Central Bank Relationship: The Case Of Switzerland -- Ch. 5. Legislative Influence On Monetary Policy? The Case Of Switzerland. Bruno Jeitziner. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [255]-270).