Political Economy of Reform in China (Kobe University Social Science Research Series)

This book contains four research papers that clarify the issues behind China's rapid economic growth, using empirical studies. The book makes two distinctive points. First, it elucidates the unique economic development of China from a different perspective than the "state capitalism" theory, based on empirical research on the Chinese economy and politics with the cooperation of leading scholars. Second, the book paints a total picture of China through an interdisciplinary analysis of economics, politics, and history. Each chapter focuses on the political–economic context of China's rapid economic growth on the following basis. First, the authors analyze whether there is a clear difference in the labor distribution rate between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises, using data from industrial enterprises. Second, they focus on Shenzhen as an innovation hub and examine sustainable innovation and its institutional context in China. Third, there is empirical clarification of questions by matching the databases of industrial enterprises and information on elected representatives of the Local People's Congress of Yangzhou City, Jiangsu Province. Finally, the authors focus on the competition by local governments to attract companies by auctioning land usage rights. Preface Contents About the Authors 1 Introduction: The Future of Chinese Economy Under the U.S.–China Economic Conflict 1.1 The U.S.–China Economic Conflict 1.2 Chinese Economy and "Another Capitalist Economy" 1.3 Structure of This Book References 2 Ownership Structures and Disparities in the Labor Share of Chinese Industrial Enterprises 2.1 The Guojin-Mintui Phenomenon and the Decline of the Wage Share 2.2 Previous Research on Disparities in Wages and Wage Share at SOEs and Non-SOEs 2.3 Analysis of Wage Share Differentials Using Propensity Scores 2.4 Analysis Methodology, Data, and Analysis Results 2.5 Conclusion References 3 Evaluating the Sustainability of Innovation in China from the Perspective of Institutional Economics 3.1 Is China’s Innovation Sustainable? 3.2 Shenzhen’s Innovation Ecosystem 3.2.1 The Three Groups of Companies Based on Their Consideration of Intellectual Property Rights 3.2.2 Ignoring Intellectual Property Rights and Vertical Disintegration 3.2.3 Protection Through Patents 3.2.4 Innovations Through the Open-Source Concept 3.3 The Institutional Background of the Shenzhen Ecosystem 3.3.1 Coexistence of Shanzhai and Innovations 3.3.2 Shenzhen’s Ecosystem and Independent Design Houses 3.3.3 Solving the Prisoner’s Dilemma 3.4 Institutional Background of Innovation in China 3.4.1 Brokerage Economy as the Traditional Economic Order of the Market 3.4.2 Brokerage as a Form of an Incomplete Contract 3.4.3 Nash Equilibrium and the Prisoner’s Dilemma 3.4.4 Historical Institution of the Brokerage Economy 3.5 Contemporary Significance of the Brokerage Economy 3.6 Conclusion References 4 Political Capital and Enterprise Performance in China: Empirical Analysis Using Data from the People’s Congress of Yangzhou City and Industrial Enterprise 4.1 Introduction: Local People’s Congress as “Chinese-Style Democracy” 4.2 The Methodology of Empirical Studies 4.3 Results and Discussion 4.4 Robustness Check 4.5 Conclusion References 5 Land Market Competition Among Local Governments: A Spatial Analysis of Zhejiang Province 5.1 Land and Real Estate System Reform and Price Restraint Policies 5.2 Land and Real Estate Markets and Regional Governments’ Fiscal Revenue 5.3 Land Market Structure and Rent-Seeking 5.4 Empirical Studies on the Fiscal Competition by the Local Governments 5.5 Data and Empirical Method 5.5.1 Data 5.5.2 Empirical Method 5.6 Results of the Empirical Analysis 5.7 Conclusion References