Plight of the power sector in India : inefficiency, reform, and political economy

An unfortunate historical coincidence that strengthened the TINA premise came from the infamous dysfunctioning and the decay of the public sector. This in terms of operational inadequacy and financial infirmity had its origin in the x-inefficiency that permeated the whole pyramid of the functioning and in the political economy of uncompensating populism and unmitigated corruption. It goes without saying that economic incentives in conjunction with contractual coercion would take care of xinefficiency problem that in general crops up in the vacuum of a sense of oneness and ownness. On the other hand, measures that make up populism, despite its derogatory connotation, as it is aimed at enlarging the popular support base of the political leadership of the government at a social cost, have an undisputable content of social welfare and thus stand above any rational censure. These measures have a desirable practical value provided they involve a corresponding compensatory mechanism. The free/subsidised power supply to targeted sections of consumers or rural electrification is a case in point here. If the government could financially compensate the Electricity Board (EB) in full and in time for the loss involved in such subsidisation, imposed on the Board as a part of the socio-economic policies (read pork barrel politics) of the government, the system could remain healthy. The political economy of corruption, the scope of which is much larger under the new liberalism, requires, on the other hand, an ever-watchful civic platform of checks and balances as a counter-force of public praxis against the rentseeking pursuits of the political leadership at social cost. With Special Reference To Kerala State. K.p. Kannan, N. Vijayamohanan Pillai. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [463]-486) And Indexes.