Philosophy of the Social Sciences : Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice

This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the field. It will appeal to all scholars and students interested in the interplay between philosophy and the social sciences. Cover Half-title Title Copyright Contents Contributors Acknowledgements Introduction Part I Basic Problems of Sociality 1 Language and Social Ontology 1 What Is Language? 2 Meaning, Conventions and Syntax 3 Commitments and Other Forms of Deontology 4 The Extension of Deontology 5 The Creation of Institutional Facts: "X Counts as Y in C" 6 Free-standing Y Terms and the Expansion of the Theory 7 The General Logical Form of Status Functions 8 Conclusion References 1 – Comment De Rerum Natura: Dragons of Obliviousness and the Science of Social Ontology References 2 Shared Agency 1 Shared Intention 2 Constructivism about Shared Intention 3 Building Blocks 3.1 I Intend that We J, and Circularity 3.2 Interlocking Intentions 3.3 Intended Mesh 3.4 Disposition to Help If Needed 3.5 Common Knowledge 4 I Intend that We J, and Further Building Blocks 5 The Basic Thesis 6 Putting Obligation in its Place References 2 – Comment Where Is the Social? 3 The Reality of Group Agents Introduction 1 The Requirements of Agency 1.1 Agential Behavior 1.2 Agential Behavior and Agency 1.3 Systematic Perturbability 1.4 Contextual Resilience 1.5 Variable Realization 2 Candidate Group Agents 2.1 The Transparent Group 2.2 The Majoritarian Assembly 2.3 The Sequential-Priority Assembly 2.4 The Straw-Vote Assembly 3 The Real Agency of the Straw-Vote Assembly 3.1 The General Question 3.2 Systematic Perturbability 3.3 Contextual Resilience 3.4 Variable Realization 4 Conclusion References 3 – Comment A Note on Group Agents References Part II Laws and Explanation in the Social Sciences 4 Physicalism and the Human Sciences 1 Introduction 2 Laws Without Reduction 3 Reduction Required 4 Kinds of Kinds 5 Dilemma for Fodor 6 Methodological Consequences 7 Selectional Laws 8 The Limits of Selection 9 Human Sciences References 4 – Comment Reductionism in the Human Sciences: A Philosopher’s Game 1 Papineau’s Overestimation of Reductive Achievements 2 Papineau’s Misguided Reductive Expectations References 5 Complexity and Explanation in the Social Sciences 1 Introduction 2 Laws: the Traditional Account 3 Laws and Contingencies in Biology 4 The Ceteris Paribus Alternative References 5 – Comment Conditional Knowledge: An Oxymoron? 1 Laws, Contingency, and Modeling in the Social Sciences 2 Good Practices in Political Science: Bringing Together Theory and Data References 6 The Heterogeneous Social: New Thinking About the Foundations of the Social Sciences 1 Introduction: Reconsideration of the Foundations of Social Science Research 2 A Role for the Philosophy of Social Science? 3 Current Discussions of the Social Sciences in the United States 3.1 Assessment 4 A Philosophy for the Social Sciences 4.1 Methodological Localism 4.2 The Centrality of Causal Mechanisms in Social Explanations 4.3 Generalizations and Predictions 5 Conclusions References 6 – Comment Causal Mechanisms and Generalizations References 7 What Is This Thing Called "Efficacy"? 1 The Topic 2 Why It Matters 3 Efficacy and Effectiveness 4 Capacities 5 Alternatives to Capacities 5.1 Causal Claims and Inductions from Them 5.2 A Casual Law and its Analogues 5.3 Probabilities and Inductions from Them 5.4 Econometrics 6 What Makes a Concept Legitimate? 7 Return to Efficacies as Capacities 8 Speaking Realistically 9 A Brief but Important Warning 10 In Sum References 7 – Comment Randomized Controlled Trials and Public Policy 1 Randomized Controlled Trials on the Efficacy of Early Detection 2 Do These Results Generalize to the Field? 3 Is There a Theory to Bridge the Gap? 4 Do Policymakers Pay Attention to RCTs? 5 Evidence Not Wanted: Germany 6 Evidence Not Wanted: United States 7 Evidence-based Medicine as Science Fiction References Part III How Philosophy and the Social Sciences Can Enrich Each Other: Three Examples 8 Why Do People Cooperate as Much as They Do? 1 Introduction 1.1 Self-interest in Repeated Games 1.2 Theory 1.3 Empirical Evidence 1.4 Social Preferences? 1.5 Challenges to the Existence of Social Preferences 2 Conditional Cooperation 2.1 Conditional Cooperation as an Alternative to Self-interest 2.2 Evidence for Conditional Cooperation 2.3 Heterogeneity of Types and Endogenous Grouping 2.4 Repeated Public Goods Games with Punishment 2.5 Restart Effects 2.6 Field Studies 2.7 The Role of Intentions 3 Models of Cooperative Behavior 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Social Preferences: Inequity Aversion as an Illustration 3.3 The Structure of Reciprocity 3.4 Property Rights 4 Norms and Institutions 4.1 Implications for Modeling Conditional Cooperators 4.2 Norms as a Solution to the Problem of Unpredictability 4.3 Normative Guidance 4.4 The Psychology Behind Conformity to Norms 4.5 Empirical Implications 5 Conclusion References 8 – Comment Putting the Problem of Social Order Into Perspective 1 Cooperation and the Classical Social Order Problem 2 Woodward on Cooperation References 9 Situations Against Virtues:The Situationist Attack on Virtue Theory 1 The Attack Presented 1.1 The Milgram Experiments 1.2 The Good Samaritan Experiment 1.3 Harman's Case 1.4 Doris's Case 2 The Attack Assessed References 9 – Comment Do People Have Character Traits? References 10 What Kind of Problem is the Hermeneutic Circle? 1 The Problem of the Hermeneutic Circle 1.1 Is the Hermeneutic Circle an Ontological Problem? 1.2 Is the Hermeneutic Circle a Logical Problem? 1.3 Is the Hermeneutic Circle an Empirical Problem? 2 The Solution to the Problem 2.1 Why the Hermeneutic Circle is Not an Ontological Problem 2.2 Why the Hermeneutic Circle is Not a Logical Problem 2.3 Why the Hermeneutic Circle Is an Empirical Phenomenon 3 Conclusion References 10 – Comment Going in Circles References Epilogue Name Index Subject Index Introduction / C. Mantzavinos Part I : basic problems of sociality Language and social ontology / John R. Searle Comment : de rerum natura : dragons of obliviousness and the science of social ontology / Mark Turner Shared agency / Michael E. Bratman Comment : where is the social? / Pierre Demeulenaere The reality of group agents / Philip Pettit Comment : a note on group agents / Diego Rios Part II : laws and explanation in the social sciences Pysicalism and the human sciences / David Papineau Comment : reductionism in the human sciences : a philosopher's game / Robert Shulman and Ian Shapiro Complexity and explanation in the social sciences / Sandra Mitchell Comment : conditional knowledge : an oxymoron? / James Alt The heterogeneous social : new thinking about the foundations of the social sciences / Daniel Little Comment : causal mechanisms and generalizations / Jack Knight What is this thing called "efficacy"? / Nancy Cartwright Comment : randomized controlled trials and public policy / Gerd Gigerenzer Part III : how philosophy and the social sciences can enrich each other : three examples Why do people cooperate as much as they do? / James Woodward Comment : putting the problem of social order into perspective / Werner Güth and Hartmut Kliemt Situations against virtues : the situationist attack on virtue theory / Ernest Sosa Comment : do people have character traits? / Steven Lukes What kind of problem is the hermeneutic circle? / C. Mantzavinos Comment : going in circles / David-Hillel Ruben Epilogue / C. Mantzavinos.

this Volume Is A Unique Contribution To The Philosophy Of The Social Sciences, Presenting The Results Of Cutting-edge Philosophers' Research Alongside Critical Discussions By Practising Social Scientists. The Book Is Motivated By The View That The Philosophy Of The Social Sciences Cannot Ignore The Specific Scientific Practices According To Which Social Scientific Work Is Being Conducted, And That It Will Be Valuable Only If It Evolves In Constant Interaction With Theoretical Developments In The Social Sciences. With Its Unique Format Guaranteeing A Genuine Discussion Between Philosophers And Social Scientists, This Thought-provoking Volume Extends The Frontiers Of The Field. It Will Appeal To All Scholars And Students Interested In The Interplay Between Philosophy And The Social Sciences.

This book presents the results of cutting-edge philosophers` research alongside critical discussions by practising social scientists. With its unique format guaranteeing a genuine discussion between philosophers and social scientists, this thought-provoking volume extends the frontiers of the philosophy of the social sciences. This volume presents the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practising social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted