Phenomenological Aspects of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy (Synthese Library, 268)

In his writings around 1930, Wittgenstein relates his philosophy in different ways to the idea of phenomenology. He indicates that his main philosophical project had earlier been the construction of a purely phenomenological language, and even after having given up this project he believed that "the world we live in is the world of sense-data,,,l that is, of phenomenological objects. However, a problem is posed by the fact that he does not appear ever to have given a full, explicit account of what he means by his 'phenomenology', 'phenomenological language', or 'phenomenological problems'. In this book, I have tried to unravel the nature of Wittgenstein's phenomenology and to examine its importance for his entire work in philosophy. Phenomenology can be characterized as philosophy whose primary concern is what is immediately given in one's experience. This 'immediately given' is not merely impressions inside one's mind, but includes also the part of objective reality that impinges upon one's consciousness. Thus, an aim of phenomenological enterprise is to grasp this objective reality by attending to immediate experience. Husserl's phenomenology is in fact a case in point. Wittgenstein's philosophy is a puzzling subject mainly because Wittgenstein himself does not appear to have given a full, explicit account of what he means by his `phenomenology', `phenomenological language' or `phenomenological problems'. This book examines the idea of phenomenology throughout the different stages of Wittgenstein's philosophical development. The author argues that Wittgenstein's entire philosophical life was mainly concerned with what is immediately given in one's experience. Early interpretations of the phenomenological elements in Wittgenstein's philosophy usually emphasized the unique nature of his later work. However, the author here convincingly makes the case that Wittgenstein's concern with immediate experience and the way we describe it guided his philosophical journey through the phenomenological problems that pervade his work. The author offers many intriguing ideas and philosophical insights for Wittgenstein scholars and students, and philosophers interested in phenomenology who wish to study one of the most distinguished but least understood philosophers of the twentieth century. Audience: Philosophers, philosophers interested in phenomenology, Wittgenstein scholars In his writings around 1930, Wittgenstein relates his philosophy in different ways to the idea of phenomenology. He indicates that his main philosophical project had earlier been the construction of a purely phenomenological language, and even after having given up this project he believed that "the world we live in is the world of sense-data, l that is, of phenomenological objects. However, a problem is posed by the fact that he does not appear ever to have given a full, explicit account of what he means by his 'phenomenology', 'phenomenological language', or 'phenomenological problems'. In this book, I have tried to unravel the nature of Wittgenstein's phenomenology and to examine its importance for his entire work in philosophy. Phenomenology can be characterized as philosophy whose primary concern is what is immediately given in one's experience. This 'immediately given' is not merely impressions inside one's mind, but includes also the part of objective reality that impinges upon one's consciousness. Thus, an aim of phenomenological enterprise is to grasp this objective reality by attending to immediate experience. Husserl's phenomenology is in fact a case in point Front Matter....Pages i-xi Wittgenstein’s Phenomenology....Pages 1-24 Phenomenology of the Tractatus ....Pages 25-78 The Languages of Phenomenology....Pages 79-134 Wittgenstein on Color Concepts....Pages 135-161 Wittgenstein on Aspects....Pages 162-178 Is Phenomenology Possible for Wittgenstein?....Pages 179-214 Back Matter....Pages 215-260