Phenomenalism : A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience

J.S. Mill famously equated physical things with "permanent possibilities of sensation." This view, known as phenomenalism, holds that a rock is a tendency for experiences to occur as they do when people perceive a rock, and similarly for all other physical things. In Phenomenalism , Michael Pelczar develops Mill's theory in detail, defends it against the objections responsible for its current unpopularity, and uses it to shed light on important questions in metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of mind. Identifying physical things with possibilities of sensation establishes a transparent connection between the world of physics and the world of sense, provides an attractive alternative to currently fashionable structuralist and panpsychist metaphysics, offers a fresh perspective on the problem of consciousness, and yields a satisfying theory of perception, all by taking two things notoriously resistant to reduction, chance and experience, and constructing everything else out of them. Title page Copyright page Dedication page Contents Acknowledgements Preface List of Figures 1. The World as Hypertext 2. Mill’s Metaphysics 2.1 The genealogy of phenomenalism 2.2 Kant without noumena 2.3 Mill misunderstood 2.4 Legacy issues 3. A Signal in the Noise 3.1 Physical reality as explanatory posit 3.2 “Real things” vs. noumena 3.3 Noumena vs. possibilities of sensation 3.4 The superfluity of Substance 3.5 The ultimate sin in metaphysics? 4. Possibilities for What? 4.1 The challenge of intersubjectivity 4.2 Physical spacetime 4.3 Ideal spacetime 4.4 Ideal events 4.5 Reduction or elimination? 5. What Kind of Possibility? 5.1 Counterfactual possibility 5.2 Phenomenal probabilities 5.3 The phenomenalist worldview 6. A Revealing Correspondence 6.1 A thing for every possibility 6.2 A possibility for every thing 6.3 An explanation by identification 7. Phenomenalism and Science 7.1 Physics and experience 7.2 Phenomenalism and scientific language 7.3 Phenomenalism and structuralism 8. Phenomenalism and Consciousness 8.1 The mystery of consciousness 8.2 Orthodox phenomenalism 8.3 Materialistic phenomenalism 8.4 Panpsychist phenomenalism 8.5 Panoptic phenomenalism 9. A Phenomenalist Theory of Perception 9.1 Three questions about perception 9.2 Representationalism and naive realism 9.3 The phenomenalist theory 9.4 Phenomenalists, Berkeley, and the folk 10. Choose Your Own Adventure Appendix: Defining Spacetime Relations References Index of Names Subject Index ## Abstract J.S. Mill famously equates physical things with “permanent possibilities of sensation.” In this view, known as phenomenalism, a rock is a tendency for experiences to occur as they do when people perceive a rock, and similarly for all other physical things. Phenomenalism develops Mill’s theory in detail, defends it against the objections responsible for its current unpopularity, and uses it to shed light on important questions in metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of mind. Identifying physical things with possibilities of sensation establishes a transparent connection between the world of physics and the world of sense, provides an attractive alternative to currently fashionable structuralist and panpsychist metaphysics, offers a fresh perspective on the problem of consciousness, and yields a satisfying theory of perception, all by taking two things notoriously resistant to reduction---chance and experience---and constructing everything else out of them. 'Phenomenalism' develops the claim that physical objects are constructions out of possible sensations. Michael Pelczar defends this view against objections and uses it to illuminate topics in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics