Peter van Inwagen: Materialism, Free Will and God (Mnster Lectures in Philosophy Book 4)

This book discusses the philosophy of influential contemporary philosopher Peter van Inwagen. Looking at perennial philosophical problems from a modern point of view, Peter van Inwagen’s philosophy masterfully combines positions that have been considered irreconcilable: incompatibilism concerning free will, materialism, organicism, theism and realism concerning fictional entities. As readers will discover, his arguments are witty, surprising and deep. The book includes Peter van Inwagen’s Münster Lecture of 2015 on free will, as well as eleven papers from the Münster colloquium discussing central themes of his philosophy, and a reply to each paper by Peter van Inwagen himself. Introducing his philosophy and relating his work to other contemporary views, this book is of interest to graduate students and professionals in philosophy alike. Preface 6 Contents 9 About the Editors 11 Chapter 1: The Problem of Free Will Revisited 12 1.1 Four Theses 16 1.2 The Dialectical Situation 18 1.3 The Statement of the Problem 20 References 26 Chapter 2: Rational Peer Disagreement upon Sufficient Evidence: Leaving the Track to Truth? 27 2.1 Introduction 27 2.2 Revealed Peer Disagreement: The Puzzle According to van Inwagen 28 2.2.1 The Situation in General 28 2.2.2 Viewing RPD in a Schematic Way 30 2.2.3 Disagreement for Real: How to React Rationally? 32 2.3 Four Attempts to Solve the Puzzle 33 2.4 Two Hidden Assumptions and a Decisive Tension 39 2.4.1 A First Way Out? Philosophical Exceptionalism 39 2.4.2 A Second Hidden Assumption: Fallibilism vs. Truth-Tracking Intuitions 41 2.5 Rational Peer Disagreement Upon Sufficient Evidence 45 2.6 Conclusion 47 References 48 Chapter 3: Ontological Commitments, Ordinary Language and Theory Choice 50 3.1 Van Inwagen’s Proposed Meta-Ontology 50 3.1.1 The Semantic Question 51 3.1.2 The Methodological/Epistemic Question 56 3.1.3 Meta-Ontologists 61 3.2 Challenging the Proposed Meta-Ontology 62 3.2.1 Ontological Commitments and Ordinary Language 62 3.2.2 Theory Choice in Ontology 66 3.3 Conclusion 70 References 71 Chapter 4: Physical Composition by Bonding 73 4.1 Introduction 73 4.2 Van Inwagen’s Dismissal of Bonding 76 4.3 A Scientific Ontology 79 4.4 Bonding Implies Spatial Confinement 80 4.5 Bonding Is not Just Interaction 82 4.6 Bonding as a Relation Between Kinetic and Potential Energy 86 4.7 Composition by Bonding 90 4.8 Discussion 97 4.8.1 Comparison with Van Inwagen’s Concepts of Bonding 97 4.8.2 Advantages of Bonding as a Criterion for Physical Composition 99 4.8.3 Some Non-obvious Consequences 100 4.8.4 Combining the Criteria: Physical Bodies and Living Organisms 101 References 103 Chapter 5: Why It Would Not Be Better Not to Believe in Material Artifacts – Even If One Could Get Away With It 105 5.1 Introduction 105 5.2 Van Inwagen’s Arguments Against Material Artifacts 106 5.2.1 The Gollyswoggle Argument 106 5.2.2 The Living Hammock Argument 107 5.2.3 The House of the Wise Pig Argument 108 5.3 Why It Is Better to Believe in Artifacts 110 5.3.1 An Adequate Conception of Artifactuality 110 5.3.2 The Anthropological Significance of Artifacts 111 5.3.3 Explanatory Power of Functional Talk 111 5.3.4 Copyright Law Acknowledges the Importance of Creation 112 5.4 Conclusion 113 References 113 Chapter 6: Theoretical Entities of Literary Criticism and Science: What Mrs. Gamp and Electrons Do Not Have in Common 115 6.1 Introduction 115 6.2 Van Inwagen’s Theory of Fictional Characters 116 6.3 The That-Claim 117 6.3.1 The Criterion of Ontological Commitment 117 6.3.2 Against Paraphrase 118 6.4 The What-Claim 119 6.4.1 Van Inwagen’s Taxonomy of Theoretical Entities 120 6.4.2 What Mrs. Gamp and Electrons Have in Common 121 6.4.3 Having and Holding: The Stipulative Strategy 122 6.5 Theoretical Entities of Literary Criticism and Science: Problems with van Inwagen’s Analogy 123 6.5.1 Out of Nowhere? The Problematic Ontological Status of Fictional Characters 123 6.5.2 Fictional Characters and Literary Discourse 126 6.6 Conclusion 128 References 128 Chapter 7: Creating Creatures of Fiction: A Fictional Dialogue 130 References 143 Chapter 8: Free Will in an Indeterministic World? 144 8.1 Introduction 144 8.2 How Exactly Does Free Will Work? 146 8.3 A Mental Description of Volition 147 8.4 Peter van Inwagen’s Answers to the Mind-Argument 152 8.5 Is Agent-Causation a Viable Rejection of the Mind-Argument? 153 8.6 A Physical Approach 155 8.7 Other Possible Solutions? 157 8.8 Discussion of van Inwagen’s Answers to the ‘Scientistic’ Critique 158 8.9 Free Will as a Mystery? 160 References 161 Chapter 9: Embracing Life Without Free Will: A Fatalistic Proposal 162 9.1 Introduction 162 9.2 Two Varieties of Incompatibilism 162 9.2.1 What About Free Will? 162 9.2.2 Van Inwagen’s Rejection of Incompatibilism 2 164 9.3 Practical Fatalism Defended 165 9.3.1 The Epistemic Consistency of Fatalism 165 9.3.2 The Consolation Argument 170 References 173 Chapter 10: The Strange Cases of Henry T. and Walter B.: Van Inwagen on Personal Identity, Accountability and Mitigating Circumstances 174 10.1 Diachronic Personal Identity and Moral Responsibility 174 10.2 Henry T. 176 10.3 Walter B. 178 10.3.1 Two Dichotomies 179 10.3.2 Three Uncontroversial Cases 179 10.3.3 Four Societies 180 10.3.4 External Factors as Mitigating Circumstances 181 10.3.5 Internal Factors as Mitigating Circumstances 183 10.3.6 Original Sin and Moral Accountability 184 References 185 Chapter 11: Van Inwagen on the Problem of Evil: Is His Defense Story Reasonable? 186 11.1 A Hideous World Full of Evil 186 11.2 Van Inwagen’s Defense of the Existence of Evil 187 11.2.1 Van Inwagen’s Perfect Being 187 11.2.2 The Global and the Local Problem of Evil 188 11.3 Problems for van Inwagen’s Defense of Evil 191 11.3.1 A Mere Means to an End... 193 11.3.2 The Love of a Mother 196 11.3.3 Love and Freedom 199 11.3.4 Pragmatic Problems of van Inwagen’s Theism 202 11.3.4.1 Hope 202 11.3.4.2 Consolation 203 11.3.4.3 Individual and Public Autonomy 203 11.4 Summary 204 References 204 Chapter 12: Replies 205 12.1 Rational Peer Disagreement: Reply to F. Bögner, T. Meyer, K. Schnieder and M. Seidel 205 12.2 Meta-Ontology: Reply to J. F. Göhner and L. Steinbrink 208 12.2.1 The Imaginary Dispute 208 12.2.2 A Schematic Generalization of the Imaginary Dispute About Nominalism 211 12.2.3 Comments on Some Specific Passages in the Paper 213 12.3 Physical Composition: Reply to J. Husmann and P. M. Näger 217 12.3.1 Counterexamples as Arguments 217 12.3.2 Fastening 218 12.3.3 Science Is Mereologically Neutral 219 12.3.4 Against Composition by Bonding 221 12.4 Artifacts: Reply to A. Bahr, C. Fischer, T. Kater and N. Kleinschmidt 224 12.4.1 Non-existence of Artifacts and Common Sense 224 12.4.2 The Dialectical Structure of Material Beings 225 12.4.3 Clarifying the Conclusions of the “Arguments Against Artifacts” 227 12.4.4 The Merits of an Answer That Assumes the Existence of Artifacts 228 12.4.5 Collective Functions 229 12.5 Fictional Entities: Reply to E.-M. Jung and F. Pellet 230 12.5.1 Different Kinds of Theoretical Entities 230 12.5.2 Having vs Holding Properties 231 12.5.3 Creationism Concerning Theoretical Entities 233 12.5.4 Two Further Points 235 12.6 Fictional Entities: Reply to K. Gregor, J. G. Michel and S. Neuß 236 12.6.1 Creation of Abstract Entities 236 12.6.2 Vulcan 237 12.6.3 “Sherlock Holmes Does Not Exist” 237 12.6.4 Some Answers to Questions in the Dialogue 238 12.6.5 Implicit Characters 243 12.7 Free Will: Reply to A. Savarino and A. Sock 244 12.7.1 Reformulating the Third Strand of the Mind Argument 244 12.7.2 How Exactly Does Free Will Work? 249 12.7.3 The Problem of Free Will for Dualists 250 12.7.4 Free Actions and Probabilities 250 12.8 Fatalism: Reply to M. Reinhart 255 12.8.1 The Consequences of a Person’s Believing that We Human Beings Are Never Doubly Able 255 12.8.2 The Logical Implications of “No One Is Ever Doubly Able” 257 12.9 Accountability: Reply to A. Strickmann and C. Weidemann 258 12.9.1 The Strange Case of Henry T. 258 12.9.2 The Strange Case of Walter B. 261 12.9.3 Original Sin 265 12.10 Evil: Reply to B. P. Göcke, C. Schneider and A. Sindermann 266 12.10.1 Object and Meaning of “Defense” 266 12.10.2 Free Will in the Defense 267 12.10.3 God’s Morality in the Defense 268 12.10.4 Probability in the Defense 272 References 273 Front Matter ....Pages i-xi The Problem of Free Will Revisited (Peter van Inwagen)....Pages 1-15 Rational Peer Disagreement upon Sufficient Evidence: Leaving the Track to Truth? (Frieder Bögner, Thomas Meyer, Konstantin Schnieder, Markus Seidel)....Pages 17-39 Ontological Commitments, Ordinary Language and Theory Choice (Julia Friederike Göhner, Lukas Steinbrink)....Pages 41-63 Physical Composition by Bonding (Julian Husmann, Paul M. Näger)....Pages 65-96 Why It Would Not Be Better Not to Believe in Material Artifacts – Even If One Could Get Away With It (Amrei Bahr, Christoph Fischer, Thomas Kater, Nicolas Kleinschmidt)....Pages 97-106 Theoretical Entities of Literary Criticism and Science: What Mrs. Gamp and Electrons Do Not Have in Common (Eva-Maria Jung, François Pellet)....Pages 107-121 Creating Creatures of Fiction: A Fictional Dialogue (Kerstin Gregor, Jan G. Michel, Steffen Neuß)....Pages 123-136 Free Will in an Indeterministic World? (Alfonso Savarino, Annegret Sock)....Pages 137-154 Embracing Life Without Free Will: A Fatalistic Proposal (Monja Reinhart)....Pages 155-166 The Strange Cases of Henry T. and Walter B.: Van Inwagen on Personal Identity, Accountability and Mitigating Circumstances (Andrea Strickmann, Christian Weidemann)....Pages 167-178 Van Inwagen on the Problem of Evil: Is His Defense Story Reasonable? (Benedikt Paul Göcke, Cristina Schneider, Anna Sindermann)....Pages 179-197 Replies (Peter van Inwagen)....Pages 199-268 Annotation This book discusses the philosophy of influential contemporary philosopher Peter van Inwagen. Looking at perennial philosophical problems from a modern point of view, Peter van Inwagen's philosophy masterfully combines positions that have been considered irreconcilable: incompatibilism concerning free will, materialism, organicism, theism and realism concerning fictional entities. As readers will discover, his arguments are witty, surprising and deep. The book includes Peter van Inwagen's M nster Lecture of 2015 on free will, as well as eleven papers from the M nster colloquium discussing central themes of his philosophy, and a reply to each paper by Peter van Inwagen himself. Introducing his philosophy and relating his work to other contemporary views, this book is of interest to graduate students and professionals in philosophy alike