Persian Interventions: The Achaemenid Empire, Athens, and Sparta, 450−386 BCE

Thirty years after Xerxes invaded Greece, the Achaemenid Persian Empire ended its long war with Athens. For the next four decades, the Persians tolerated Athenian control of their former tributaries, the Ionian Greek cities of western Anatolia. But during the Peloponnesian War, Persia reclaimed Ionia and funded a Spartan fleet to overthrow Athenian power. It took eight long years for Persia to triumph, and Sparta then turned on its benefactors, prompting Persia to transfer aid to Athens in the Corinthian War. The peace of 386 reiterated imperial control of Ionia and compelled both Sparta and Athens to endorse a Persian promise of autonomy for Greeks outside Asia. In __Persian Interventions__, John O. Hyland challenges earlier studies that assume Persia played Athens against Sparta in a defensive balancing act. He argues instead for a new interpretation of Persian imperialism, one involving long-term efforts to extend diplomatic and economic patronage over Greek clients beyond the northwestern frontier. Achaemenid kings, he asserts, were less interested in Ionia for its own sake than in the accumulation of influence over Athens, Sparta, or both, which allowed them to advertise Persia’s claim to universal power while limiting the necessity of direct military commitment. The slow pace of intervention resulted from logistical constraints and occasional diplomatic blunders, rather than long-term plans to balance and undermine dangerous allies. __Persian Interventions__ examines this critical period in unprecedented depth, providing valuable new insights for the study of Achaemenid Persia and classical Greece. Its conclusions will interest not only specialists in both fields but also students of ancient and modern comparative historical imperialism. Contents 6 List of Tables and Maps 8 Acknowledgments 10 Translations, Spelling, and Units of Measure 12 Chapter 1. Achaemenid Persia and the Greeks across the Sea 16 The Traditional Model: Balancing Athens and Sparta 20 The Image of Persian World Supremacy 22 A New Approach: Ambition and Restraint in Persia’s Greek Relations 25 Chapter 2. Artaxerxes I and the Athenian Peace 30 The Peace of Kallias: In Search of a Persian Perspective 31 The Costs of Peace: Ionia’s Loss and Possible Countermeasures 33 The Savings of Peace: Naval Reduction and Economic Gains 38 The Profits of Peace: Persia’s Athenian Trade 43 The Ideology of Peace: Persian Victory and the Athenian Client State 45 Adherence to Peace: The Cold War Model and the Samian Revolt 49 Chapter 3. The Peloponnesian War and the Road to Intervention 52 Artaxerxes I and the Peloponnesian War 53 Darius II and Athens: From Philia to Enmity 57 Sicily, Tribute, and Darius’s Intervention 60 Agents of Intervention: Darius’s New Satraps 62 Negotiating Intervention: The Satraps, Ionia, and Sparta 65 Chapter 4. Tissaphernes’s War and the Treaty of 411 68 The Ionian War and Athenian Resilience 69 Victory over Amorges 72 Revising the Terms of Alliance 75 Quarrel with Sparta and Contacts with Athens 81 The Treaty of 411 86 Chapter 5. The King’s Navy and the Failure of Satrapal Intervention 91 Darius’s Ships and Tissaphernes’s Wages 92 The Ionian Garrison Expulsions 96 The Royal Fleet’s Recall 101 The Satraps at the Hellespont 106 Pharnabazos’s Timbers 111 Chapter 6. Cyrus the Younger and Spartan Victory 113 The Satraps on the Defensive 114 Darius and the Embassy of Boiotios 119 Cyrus Takes Command 122 Cyrus and Spartan Disaster 126 Cyrus’s and Lysander’s Road to Victory 129 Persia’s Victory: Costs and Benefits 133 Chapter 7. Artaxerxes II and War with Sparta 137 Cyrus and the Second Loss of Ionia 138 Tissaphernes and Spartan Invasion 142 Naval Escalation and Tissaphernes’s Downfall 148 Tithraustes’s Truce and Pharnabazos’s Defense of the North 154 Artaxerxes’s Fleet and Victory at Knidos 158 Chapter 8. Persia, the Corinthian War, and the King’s Peace 163 Timokrates’s Mission to Greece 164 Pharnabazos’s Revenge 166 Konon and Persian Aid to Athens 169 Tiribazos’s Folly and the Peace Talks of 392 171 Strouthas and the Failure of Outreach to Athens 176 The King’s Peace 179 Conclusion 184 Notes 188 Bibliography 236 Index 262 A 262 B 264 C 264 D 264 E 265 G 265 H 265 I 266 J 266 K 266 L 267 M 267 N 268 O 268 P 268 R 269 S 269 T 271 W 272 X 272 Z 272 Persia's relations with Greek city-states provide a fascinating case study in ancient imperialism. Thirty years after Xerxes invaded Greece, the Achaemenid Persian Empire ended its long war with Athens. For the next four decades, the Persians tolerated Athenian control of their former tributaries, the Ionian Greek cities of western Anatolia. But during the Peloponnesian War, Persia reclaimed Ionia and funded a Spartan fleet to overthrow Athenian power. It took eight long years for Persia to triumph, and Sparta then turned on its benefactors, prompting Persia to transfer aid to Athens in the Corinthian War. The peace of 386 reiterated imperial control of Ionia and compelled both Sparta and Athens to endorse a Persian promise of autonomy for Greeks outside Asia. In Persian Interventions , John O. Hyland challenges earlier studies that assume Persia played Athens against Sparta in a defensive balancing act. He argues instead for a new interpretation of Persian imperialism, one involving long-term efforts to extend diplomatic and economic patronage over Greek clients beyond the northwestern frontier. Achaemenid kings, he asserts, were less interested in Ionia for its own sake than in the accumulation of influence over Athens, Sparta, or both, which allowed them to advertise Persia's claim to universal power while limiting the necessity of direct military commitment. The slow pace of intervention resulted from logistical constraints and occasional diplomatic blunders, rather than long-term plans to balance and undermine dangerous allies. Persian Interventions examines this critical period in unprecedented depth, providing valuable new insights for the study of Achaemenid Persia and classical Greece. Its conclusions will interest not only specialists in both fields but also students of ancient and modern comparative historical imperialism.

Thirty years after Xerxes invaded Greece, the Achaemenid Persian Empire ended its long war with Athens. For the next four decades, the Persians tolerated Athenian control of their former tributaries, the Ionian Greek cities of western Anatolia. But during the Peloponnesian War, Persia reclaimed Ionia and funded a Spartan fleet to overthrow Athenian power. It took eight long years for Persia to triumph, and Sparta then turned on its benefactors, prompting Persia to transfer aid to Athens in the Corinthian War. The peace of 386 reiterated imperial control of Ionia and compelled both Sparta and Athens to endorse a Persian promise of autonomy for Greeks outside Asia.

In Persian Interventions, John O. Hyland challenges earlier studies that assume Persia played Athens against Sparta in a defensive balancing act. He argues instead for a new interpretation of Persian imperialism, one involving long-term efforts to extend diplomatic and economic patronage over Greek clients beyond the northwestern frontier. Achaemenid kings, he asserts, were less interested in Ionia for its own sake than in the accumulation of influence over Athens, Sparta, or both, which allowed them to advertise Persia’s claim to universal power while limiting the necessity of direct military commitment. The slow pace of intervention resulted from logistical constraints and occasional diplomatic blunders, rather than long-term plans to balance and undermine dangerous allies.

Persian Interventions examines this critical period in unprecedented depth, providing valuable new insights for the study of Achaemenid Persia and classical Greece. Its conclusions will interest not only specialists in both fields but also students of ancient and modern comparative historical imperialism.

In This Book, Hyland Examines The International Relations Of The First Persian Empire (the Achaemenid Empire) As A Case Study In Ancient Imperialism. He Focuses In Particular On Persian's Relations With The Greek City-states And Its Diplomatic Influence Over Athens And Sparta. Previous Studies Have Emphasized The Ways In Which Persia Sought To Protect Its Borders By Playing The Often Warring Athens And Sparta Off Each Other, Prolonging Their Conflicts Through Limited Aid And Shifts Of Alliance. Hyland Proposes A New Model, Employing Persian Ideological Texts And Economic Documents To Contextualize The Greek Narrative Framework, That Demonstrates That Persian Kings Were Less Interested In Control Of The Ionian Region Where Greece Bordered The Empire Than In Displays Of Universal Power Through The Acquisition Of Athens Or Sparta As Client States. On The Other Hand, The Establishment Of Pax Persica Beyond The Aegean Was Delayed By Persian Efforts To Limit The Interventions' Expense, And Missteps In Dealing With Fractious Greek Allies. This Reevaluation Of Persia's Greek Relations Marks An Important Contribution To Scholarship On The Achaemenid Empire And Greek History, And Has Value For The Broader Study Of Imperialism In The Ancient World.--provided By Publisher. John O. Hyland. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. "In this book, Hyland examines the international relations of the First Persian Empire (the Achaemenid Empire) as a case study in ancient imperialism. He focuses in particular on Persian's relations with the Greek city-states and its diplomatic influence over Athens and Sparta. Previous studies have emphasized the ways in which Persia sought to protect its borders by playing the often warring Athens and Sparta off each other, prolonging their conflicts through limited aid and shifts of alliance. Hyland proposes a new model, employing Persian ideological texts and economic documents to contextualize the Greek narrative framework, that demonstrates that Persian Kings were less interested in control of the Ionian region where Greece bordered the empire than in displays of universal power through the acquisition of Athens or Sparta as client states. On the other hand, the establishment of "Pax Persica" beyond the Aegean was delayed by Persian efforts to limit the interventions' expense, and missteps in dealing with fractious Greek allies. This reevaluation of Persia's Greek relations marks an important contribution to scholarship on the Achaemenid empire and Greek history, and has value for the broader study of imperialism in the ancient world." ... Provided by publisher