Perils of judicial self-government in transitional societies : holding the least accountable branch to account

"Judicial councils and other judicial self-government bodies have become a worldwide phenomenon. Democracies are increasingly turning to them to insulate the judiciary from the daily politics, to enhance independence and ensure judicial accountability. This book investigates the different forms of accountability and the taxonomy of mechanisms of control to determine a best practice methodology. The author expertly provides a meticulous analysis, using over 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts from 1993 to 2010 and creates a systematic framework that can be applied to future cases"--Back cover Cover Half-title Series information Title page Copyright information Dedication Table of contents Acknowledgments Caveats Introduction I. The Puzzle II. The Approach III. Overview of the Argument IV. Plan of the Book Part One Judicial Accountability: Theoretical Framework 1 The Concept of Judicial Accountability I. Unpacking the Notion of Accountability II. Specifics of Judicial Accountability III. The Concept of Judicial Accountability A. Who Is Accountable? B. Accountability to Whom? C. Accountability for What? D. Through What Processes? E. By What Standards? F. With What Effect? G. Definition of Judicial Accountability IV. Why Judicial Accountability Matters? V. De Jure versus De Facto Judicial Accountability VI. Accountability Perversions 2 Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability I. What Do Judges Maximize? II. What Is “In”: Taxonomy of Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability A. Sticks B. Carrots C. Dual Mechanisms III. What Is “Out”: Contingent Circumstances of Judicial Accountability A. Ex Post Mechanisms That Do Not Affect Individual Judges B. Screening Mechanisms C. Transparency Mechanisms D. Appeals and Quasi-Appellate Mechanisms E. Criminal and Pathological Mechanisms of Influencing Judges IV. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Recognition and Career Judiciaries 3 Judicial Accountability and Judicial Councils I. The Rise of Judicial Councils and Their Effects II. The Judicial Council Euro-model of Court Administration III. The Impact of the Judicial Council Euro-model on Judicial Accountability Part Two Holding Czech and Slovak Judges Accountable 4 Prologue to the Case Studies: Methodology and Data Reporting I. Research Design of My Case Studies II. What Is Measured? III. Data Collection IV. Method and Evaluation V. Potential Inaccuracies 5 The Czech Republic I. The Czech Judiciary in Context A. Politics of the Czech Republic B. Consequences of the Division of Czechoslovakia C. The Impact of the EU Accession Process upon Czech Judicial Reforms D. Dealing with the Past within the Czech Judiciary E. “Superjudges” and Other Key Actors in Czech Judicial Politics II. Court Administration after the Split (1993–2010): Two Decades of Calibrating the Ministry of Justice Model A. Ministry of Justice Model Retained (1993–2002) B. Updating the Ministry of Justice Model (2003–2010) III. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 1993 to 2002 A. Contingent Circumstances B. Which Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability Were Used? C. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability on the Books D. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Action E. Brief Summary of Years 1993–2002 IV. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 2003 to 2010 A. Contingent Circumstances B. Which Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability Were Used? C. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability on the Books D. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Action E. Brief Summary of Years 2003–2010 V. Overall Conclusion on the Czech Case Study 6 Slovakia I. The Slovak Judiciary in Context A. Politics of the Slovak Republic B. Consequences of the Division of Czechoslovakia C. The Impact of the EU Accession Process upon Slovak Judicial Reforms D. Dealing with the Past within the Slovak Judiciary E. “Superjudges” and Other Key Actors in Slovak Judicial Politics II. Court Administration after the Split (1993–2010): The Road from... A. Ministry of Justice Model Retained (1993–2002) B. The Judicial Council Euro-model Takes Over (2003–2010) III. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 1993 to 2002 A. Contingent Circumstances B. Which Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability Were Used? C. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability on the Books D. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Action E. Brief Summary of Years 1993–2002 IV. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 2003 to 2010 A. Contingent Circumstances B. Which Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability Were Used? C. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability on the Books D. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Action E. Brief Summary of Years 2003–2010 V. Overall Conclusion on the Slovak Case Study 7 Evaluation: The Czech Republic and Slovakia Compared I. Comparing Results from Slovakia and the Czech Republic between 1993 and 2002 A. Who Held Judges to Account? B. How Much Were Judges Held to Account? C. Which Accountability Perversions Emerged? II. Comparing Results from Slovakia and the Czech Republic between 2003 and 2010 A. Who Held Judges to Account? B. How Much Were Judges Held to Account? C. Which Accountability Perversions Emerged? III. Effects of the Judicial Council Euro-model in Slovakia A. What Happened in Slovakia after the Introduction of the JCSR? Who Holds Judges to Account? How Much Are Judges Held to Account? Accountability Perversions B. What Changes Were Caused by the JCSR? IV. Alternative Explanations Part Three Conclusions and Implications 8 Perils of Judicial Self-Government I. Court Presidents: Invisible Masters of Central and Eastern European Judiciaries II. The Judicial Leadership Theory of Judicial Councils III. The Judicial Council Euro-model: Toward the System of Dependent Judges within an Independent Judiciary? IV. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Transitional Societies V. Oversight of Judges: Why Fire Alarms Do Not Work? VI. Judicial Virtues Matter Annex A: Court System of the Czech Republic Annex B: Court System of Slovakia Annex C: The Number of Judges in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (1993–2010) Bibliography Miscellaneous sources Index Judicial Councils And Other Judicial Self-government Bodies Have Become A Worldwide Phenomenon. Democracies Are Increasingly Turning To Them To Insulate The Judiciary From The Daily Politics, To Enhance Independence And Ensure Judicial Accountability. This Book Investigates The Different Forms Of Accountability And The Taxonomy Of Mechanisms Of Control To Determine A Best Practice Methodology. Introduction. Part I. Judicial Accountability: Theoretical Framework. 1. The Concept Of Judicial Accountability -- 2. Mechanisms Of Judicial Accountability -- 3. Judicial Accountability And Judicial Councils -- Part Ii. Holding Czech And Slovak Judges Accountable. 4. Prologue To The Case Studies: Methodology And Data Reporting -- 5. The Czech Republic -- 6. Slovakia -- 7. Evaluation: The Czech Republic And Slovakia Compared -- Part Iii. Conclusions And Implications. 8. Perils Of Judicial Self-government -- Annexes. A. Court System Of The Czech Republic -- B. Court System Of Slovakia -- C. The Number Of Judges In The Czech Republic And Slovakia (1993-2010). David Kosař. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 439-463) And Index. Judicial councils and other judicial self-government bodies have become a worldwide phenomenon. Democracies are increasingly turning to them to insulate the judiciary from the daily politics, to enhance independence and ensure judicial accountability. This book investigates the different forms of accountability and the taxonomy of mechanisms of control to determine a best practice methodology. The author expertly provides a meticulous analysis, using over 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts from 1993 to 2010 and creates a systematic framework the can be applied to future cases This book investigates the mechanisms of judicial control to determine an efficient methodology for independence and accountability. Using over 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts, the author creates a theoretical framework that can be applied to future case studies and decrease the frequency of accountability perversions.