Переходный период: анализ и уроки первого десятилетия для стран Восточной Европы и бывшего Советского Союза. Исследование Всемирного банка

Annotation The Wide Variation In Transition Economies Raises Questions About Differences In Economic Growth, The Applicability Of Transition Policies, And The Advantages Of Economic Reform. This Report Seeks To Answer These Questions. The Quest For Growth: Promoting Discipline And Encouragement Xv -- The Flipside: Protection And Discouragement Xvii -- Shading The Classification Xvii -- New Enterprises Spur Economic Growth Xviii -- When Is Transition Over? Xix -- Do Central Europe And The Baltics Point The Way Forward? Xix -- Can We Have It Both Ways: Encouragement Without Discipline? Xx -- Learning From China? Xxi -- Institutions Are Important, But So Are Policies Xxi -- The Political Economy Of Discipline And Encouragement Xxii -- Shifting Policy Priorities To Account For Experience And New Conditions Xxiv -- Annex 1. Discipline And Encouragement: The Reform Agenda Xxix -- Part 1. The First Decade In Transition 1 -- 1. How Did Transition Economies Perform? 3 -- Output Fell Sharply 3 -- Industry Shrank -- Services Grew 5 -- Private Enterprises Overtook The State Sector 6 -- Exports Rose -- Moving Toward Industrial Countries 6 -- Poverty Increased Sharply 6 -- 2. Explaining Variation In Output Performance 11 -- Did Initial Conditions Affect Performance? 11 -- External Economic Shocks Delayed Recovery 13 -- Policies -- Do They Matter? 13 -- What Initial Conditions Matter And When Do They Matter? 15 -- What If Policies Themselves Are Endogenous? 16 -- Does The Speed Of Reform Matter? 16 -- Annex 2.1. Summary Of Cross-country Empirical Literature On Growth In Transition Economies 16 -- Annex 2.2. Additional Empirical Analysis 19 -- Part 2. Policy And Institutional Challenges Ahead 21 -- 3. The Quest For Growth 23 -- A Tale Of Two Approaches 26 -- The Associated Fiscal Adjustment 29 -- ... And The Role Of Labor Markets 30 -- 4. Discipline And Encouragement 33 -- New Enterprises Drive The Transition 39 -- A Small Number Of High-productivity Small Enterprises Is Not Enough 41 -- Can We Have It Both Ways, That Is, Protecting Old Inherited Enterprises And Encouraging New Enterprises? 45 -- Annex 4.1. Assumptions For Small And New Enterprises 48 -- Annex 4.2. Implications Of The Higher Productivity Of Smes 50 -- 5. Imposing Discipline 53 -- Soft Budget Constraints Can Create Macroeconomic Crises 53 -- Nonpayments Weaken The Incentives For Efficiency And Restructuring 54 -- Exit Mechanisms -- Implement Now, Revise Later 56 -- Competition Is Linked To Innovation And Growth 56 -- 6. Extending Encouragement 59 -- Corruption And Anticompetitive Practices Mar The Investment Climate 59 -- Enterprises Lack Confidence In Legal And Judicial Institutions 61 -- Financial Deepening Is Slow But Progressing 62 -- Privatization Attracts Foreign Direct Investment, And Positive Spillovers Follow 67 -- Tax Reform: Broadening The Base And Lowering Rates 67 -- Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Supporting Discipline And Encouragement 68 -- 7. Privatization: Lessons And Agenda For The Future 71 -- Traditional Privatization Or Rapid Privatization? 73 -- Why Countries Did What They Did 73 -- Were Vouchers A Mistake And Other What Ifs 78 -- Summarizing Lessons 79 -- 8. Supportive Social Policies 81 -- Reforming Pension Systems 81 -- Social Assistance Should Protect Children And The Most Destitute, Adding More As Budgets Allow 83 -- Severe Cuts Have Compromised The Quality Of Education 84 -- Containing Costs Will Make Health Care Affordable For Those Who Need It Most 86 -- Part 3. The Political Economy Of Discipline And Encouragement 89 -- 9. The Winners And Losers From Discipline And Encouragement 91 -- Who Wins And Who Loses? 92 -- The Government Must Be Credible And Able To Constrain Oligarchs And Insiders 94 -- 10. Classifying Political Systems In Transition 97 -- Competitive Democracies Have High Political Contestability 99 -- ... And High Government Turnover 101 -- 11. Political Systems Influence The Choice Of Economic Reforms 103 -- Political Systems Create Rent-seeking Opportunities 105 -- How Do Political Systems Affect Economic Reform? 107 -- 12. Confronting The Political Challenge 111 -- For Concentrated Political Regimes, Mobilizing Potential Winners 112 -- For War-torn Political Systems, Restoring Stability And Reducing Uncertainty 114 -- For Noncompetitive Political Systems, Taking Advantage Of State Capacity 115 -- For Competitive Democracies, Using Momentum To Build Coalitions For Reform 115 -- Selected Bibliographic Guide To The Political Economy Of Transition 117 -- Boxes -- 1 Increased Inequality Xiv -- 1.1 Limits Of Gdp Statistics For Transition Economies 8 -- 2.1 The Regional Impact Of The Global Financial Crisis And Recovery 13 -- 3.1 The Business Environment And Enterprise Performance Survey 24 -- 3.2 The Problem Of Tunneling 27 -- 4.1 Can The Cis Learn From China's Reform Experience? 35 -- 4.2 The German Experience 37 -- 4.3 Belarus 46 -- 5.1 External Debt And Fiscal Sustainability In The Low-income Cis Countries 55 -- 6.1 Reducing The Cost Of Entry And Doing Business In Armenia 60 -- 7.1 Historical Counterfactuals: Mass Privatization In Russia 76 -- 1 Winners And Losers From Reform Xxii -- 1.1 Changes In Real Output, 1990-2001 4 -- 1.2 Output Growth Rates, 1990-2001 4 -- 2.1 Progress In Policy Reform, 1990s 14 -- 3.1 Productivity Distribution Of Old, Restructured, And New Enterprises 24 -- 3.2 Performance Of Old And New Enterprises, 1996-99 26 -- 4.1 Private Sector Share In Gdp, 1999 40 -- 4.2 Share Of Employment In Small Enterprises, 1989-98 41 -- 4.3 Share Of Value Added In Small Enterprises, 1989-98 41 -- 4.4 Value Added Per Employee In Small Enterprises, 1998 42 -- 4.5 Index Of Gdp And Shares Of Value Added And Employment Accounted For By Small Enterprises, 1989-98 43 -- 4.6 Employment And Gdp, 1990-98 44 -- 4.7 Soft Budget Constraints And Employment In Small Enterprises, 2000 48 -- A4.1 Factor Price Frontier: Smes And The Rest Of The Economy 50 -- A4.2 Efficiency Gain From 10 Percent Factor Reallocation To The Sme Sector 51 -- 6.1 Insecurity Of Property Rights In Transition Economies, 1999 61 -- 6.2 Quality Of Legal Drafting In Transition Economies, 1999 62 -- 6.3 Quality Of Judiciary In Transition Economies 63 -- 6.4 Domestic Credit By Deposit Money Banks To The Private Sector, 1998 64 -- 6.5 Stock Market Capitalization And Per Capita Income, 1998 65 -- 6.6 Operating Costs To Total Assets In The Banking Sector, 1997 65 -- 6.7 Interest Rate Spreads, 1998 66 -- 6.8 Cumulative Foreign Direct Investment Per Capita And Employment In Small Enterprises, 1998 68 -- 8.1 Public Expenditures On Education In Transition Economies, 1998 85 -- 8.2 Health Expenditures, 1998 86 -- 9.1 Winners And Losers From Reform 93 -- 10.1 Classifying Political Systems In Transition Economies, 1990-99 98 -- 10.2 Veto Points Index, 1989-99 100 -- 10.3 Main Political Executive Turnovers, 1989-99 102 -- 11.1 Political Systems And Economic Reform Outcomes, 2000 104 -- 11.2 State Capture Index, 1999 106 -- 1.1 The Transition Recession -- 1.2 Composition Of Output, 1990-91 And 1997-98 -- 1.3 Private Sector Growth, 1990s -- 1.4 Export Growth And Destination, 1990s -- 1.5 Main Recipients Of Foreign Direct Investment, 1992-99 -- 1.6 Average Poverty Rates, 1990 And 1998 -- 1.7 Changes In Inequality During The Transition, Various Years -- A2.1 Regression Of Average Growth On Initial Conditions, 1990-99 -- A2.2 Regression Of Annual Output Growth On Policies And Initial Conditions Allowing For Differential Effects Early In Transition, 1990-99 -- 4.1 Smes Have Higher Labor Productivity, 1998 -- A4.1 Differences Between New Enterprises And Small Enterprises, 1995 And 1998 -- 7.1 Methods Of Privatization Of Medium-sized And Large Enterprises -- 8.1 Reform Options For Social Protection Programs -- 8.2 Student-teacher Ratios In Basic Education, 1990 And 1997. This Report Was Undertaken By A Team Led By Pradeep Mitra And Marcelo Selowsky. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 125-128). Why has economic growth in some transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soveit Union been stronger than in others? If economic reforms bring clear benefits for countries in transition, why have some governments been so reluctant to accept them? How should policy advice offered to these countries be modified in the light of experience and today's conditions? Transition--The First Ten Years draws on the World Bank's operational experience and the extensive literature on transition to help address these questions. This report looks at the policy and institutional conditions that encourage the growth of new firms in transition economies while imposing financial discipline on the old firms inherited from the socialist past, without granting special favors to either. While emphasizing the importance of market-oriented policy reforms, the report also examines political strategies to push the reform process forward in different transition countries. This book is aimed at policymakers and think tanks in transition countries, external donors and advisors, and all those in the international development community interested in the policy and institutional challenges facing the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.