Perception and Reason

Bill Brewer sets out an original view of the role of conscious experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind-independent world for granted and goes on to ask what further conditions these beliefs must meet if they are to be cases of knowledge. Brewer argues that this approach is completely mistaken. Perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs at all about particular objects in the world. The crucial epistemological role of experience lies in its essential contribution to the subject's understanding of certain perceptual demonstrative contents, simply grasping which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. Brewer explains in detail how this is so, defends his position against a wide range of objections, and compares and contrasts it with a number of influential alternative views in the area. He brings out its connection with Russell's Principle of Acquaintance, and examines its conseqences for the compatibility of content externalism with an adequate account of self-knowledge. Perception and Reason offers a fresh approach to epistemology, turning away from the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge and working instead from a theory of understanding in a particular area. 0198235674......Page 1 Contents......Page 12 Introduction......Page 14 PART I. PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES PROVIDE REASONS......Page 20 1 Historical–Epistemological Context......Page 22 2 Belief and Experience......Page 37 2.1 Preliminaries......Page 38 2.2 The Strawson Argument......Page 44 2.3 Refinements......Page 48 3 Experience and Reason......Page 68 3.1 The Switching Argument......Page 69 3.2 Knowledge by Description......Page 79 3.3 Conceptual Redeployment......Page 82 3.4 Natural Kinds and Proper Names......Page 86 3.5 Are There Unitary Concepts of Mind-Independent Things?......Page 105 4.1 Reliabilism......Page 111 4.2 Classical Foundationalism......Page 131 4.3 Classical Coherentism......Page 148 4.4 Conclusion......Page 163 PART II. THE RATIONAL ROLE OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES......Page 166 5 Reasons Require Conceptual Contents......Page 168 5.1 The Basic Argument......Page 169 5.2 Possible Counterexamples......Page 171 5.3 Non-Conceptual Experiential Content Is Unmotivated......Page 188 6 The Rational Role of Perceptual Experiences......Page 203 6.1 Objective Demonstratives......Page 205 6.2 Epistemic Openness......Page 222 6.3 Clarifications......Page 226 7.1 Foundationalism and Coherentism......Page 235 7.2 Imagination......Page 242 7.3 Error and Scepticism......Page 246 7.4 Further Objections......Page 255 8.1 Non-Demonstrative Perceptual Knowledge......Page 261 8.2 Russell's Principle of Acquaintance......Page 270 8.3 Externalism and A Priori Knowledge......Page 281 Bibliography......Page 288 C......Page 296 G......Page 297 N......Page 298 R......Page 299 W......Page 300 Oxford University Press, USA ISBN-13:,9780198235675 ISBN-13: 9780198235675 0198235674 1 Contents 12 Introduction 14 PART I. PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES PROVIDE REASONS 20 1 Historical–Epistemological Context 22 2 Belief and Experience 37 2.1 Preliminaries 38 2.2 The Strawson Argument 44 2.3 Refinements 48 3 Experience and Reason 68 3.1 The Switching Argument 69 3.2 Knowledge by Description 79 3.3 Conceptual Redeployment 82 3.4 Natural Kinds and Proper Names 86 3.5 Are There Unitary Concepts of Mind-Independent Things? 105 4 Epistemological Consequences and Criticisms 111 4.1 Reliabilism 111 4.2 Classical Foundationalism 131 4.3 Classical Coherentism 148 4.4 Conclusion 163 PART II. THE RATIONAL ROLE OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES 166 5 Reasons Require Conceptual Contents 168 5.1 The Basic Argument 169 5.2 Possible Counterexamples 171 5.3 Non-Conceptual Experiential Content Is Unmotivated 188 6 The Rational Role of Perceptual Experiences 203 6.1 Objective Demonstratives 205 6.2 Epistemic Openness 222 6.3 Clarifications 226 7 The Epistemological Outlook 235 7.1 Foundationalism and Coherentism 235 7.2 Imagination 242 7.3 Error and Scepticism 246 7.4 Further Objections 255 8 Developments and Consequences 261 8.1 Non-Demonstrative Perceptual Knowledge 261 8.2 Russell's Principle of Acquaintance 270 8.3 Externalism and A Priori Knowledge 281 Bibliography 288 Index 296 A 296 B 296 C 296 D 297 E 297 F 297 G 297 H 298 I 298 J 298 K 298 L 298 M 298 N 298 O 299 P 299 R 299 S 300 T 300 U 300 V 300 W 300 Bill Brewer Sets Out An Original View Of The Role Of Conscious Experience In The Acquisition Of Empirical Knowledge. Most Epistemology Of Perception Takes A Person's Possession Of Beliefs About The Mind-independent World For Granted And Goes On To Ask What Further Conditions These Beliefs Must Meet If They Are To Be Cases Of Knowledge. Brewer Argues That This Approach Is Completely Mistaken. Perceptual Experiences Must Provide Reasons For Empirical Beliefs If There Are To Be Any Determinate Beliefs At All About Particular Objects In The World. The Crucial Epistemological Role Of Experience Lies In Its Essential Contribution To The Subject's Understanding Of Certain Perceptual Demonstrative Contents, Simply Grasping Which Provides Him With A Reason To Endorse Them In Belief. Brewer Explains In Detail How This Is So, Defends His Position Against A Wide Range Of Objections, And Compares And Contrasts It With A Number Of Influential Alternative Views In The Area. Pt. I. Perceptual Experiences Provide Reasons. 1. Historical-epistemological Context. 2. Belief And Experience. 3. Experience And Reason. 4. Epistemological Consequences And Criticisms -- Pt. Ii. The Rational Role Of Perceptual Experiences. 5. Reasons Require Conceptual Contents. 6. The Rational Role Of Perceptual Experiences. 7. The Epistemological Outlook. 8. Developments And Consequences. Bill Brewer. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [269]-276) And Index. Annotation Bill Brewer sets out an original view of the role of conscious experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind-independent world for granted and goes on to ask what further conditions these beliefs mustmeet if they are to be cases of knowledge. Brewer argues that this approach is completely mistaken. Perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs at all about particular objects in the world. The crucial epistemological role ofexperience lies in its essential contribution to the subject's understanding of certain perceptual demonstrative contents, simply grasping which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. Brewer explains in detail how this is so, defends his position against a wide range of objections, and compares and contrasts it with a number of influential alternative views in the area. He brings out its connection with Russell's Principle of Acquaintance, and examines its conseqences for the compatibility of content externalism with an adequate account of self-knowledge. Perception and Reasonoffers a fresh approach to epistemology, turning away from the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge and working instead from a theory of understanding in a particular area Bill Brewer presents an original view of the role of conscious experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. He argues that perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs at all about particular objects in the world. This fresh approach to epistemology turns away from the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge and works instead from a theory of understanding in a particular area