Peace at What Price? : Leader Culpability and the Domestic Politics of War Termination

Why do some leaders stay in wars they are unlikely to win? Why do other leaders give in to their adversaries' demands when continued fighting is still possible? Peace at What Price? strives to answer these questions by offering a new theoretical concept: leader culpability. Culpable leaders - those who can be credibly linked to the decision to involve the state in the war - face a significantly higher likelihood of domestic punishment if they fail to win a war than non-culpable leaders who do the same. Consequently, culpable leaders will prosecute wars very differently from their non-culpable counterparts. Utilizing a large-N analysis and case illustrations, the book's findings challenge the conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between war outcomes and leader removal and demonstrate the necessity of looking at individual leader attributes, instead of collapsing leaders by regime type. The book also offers new insights on democracies at war and speaks to the American experience in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.-- Provided by Publisher Cover Half-title Title page Copyright information Dedication Epigraph Table of contents List of tables List of figures Acknowledgments 1 Introduction Lacunae the Existing Literature Culpability and Leaders' Incentives to Gamble for Resurrection Culpability and Leaders' Reactions to Information and Commitment Problems Culpability and the Relationship between Leaders and Citizens Culpability and Wartime Leadership Changes in Democracies Outline of the Book 2 A Theory of Leader Culpability Part 1: Theoretical Assumptions about Leaders and Citizens Leaders Citizens. Part 2: Attributing Culpability in Times of WarLeaders' Reactions to Their Own Culpability Part 3: The Importance of Leader Culpability Part 4: Hypotheses for Citizen and Leader Behavior Leader Behavior Hypotheses Punishment Hypotheses Part 5: Implications from the Theory A Rationale for "Irrational" Leaders The Importance of Domestic Politics Culpability and Democracies at War Conclusion 3 Culpability and Domestic Punishment Part 1: Measuring Major Concepts Measuring Culpability First Leaders Associates Nonculpable Leaders Measuring Leader Punishment. Part 2: Quantitative ResultsConditional Factors Regime Type Length of Conflict Involvement Postaccession Adversary War Aims Part 3: Italy in World War I Conclusion 4 Culpability and Leader Behavior Part 1: War Outcomes Testing the Basic Relationship The Joint Effect of Culpability and Regime Type Part 2: The Downside of Culpability Part 3: Australia in Vietnam Conclusion 5 Culpability in the Legislature Part 1: Culpability and Legislator Voting Behavior Part 2: Culpability and Legislator Punishment Punishing Associates Punishing Supporters. Part 3: Implications for the Legislature's Ability to Check a Culpable ExecutiveCosts for Supporting Antiwar Legislation: Associates Costs for Supporting Antiwar Legislation: Supporters Consequences of Congressional Culpability: The War in Iraq Conclusion 6 Conclusion Culpability and Recent U.S. Foreign Policy Implications for Theory Implications for Policy Effective Accountability? A Graceful Exit? Appendix to Chapter 3 Other Paths to Culpability: War Supporters Voluntary Participation Understanding the Bias of "One-Leader" Designs. Measurement of Control Variables and Associated Robustness ChecksAdversary War Aims Casualties Prewar Tenure Length Wartime Performance Regime Type Using Three Regime Types Instead of Two Circumstances Surrounding Leader Changes Recoding Nonculpable Leaders Who Stay in the War for More Than a Year after Coming to Office Appendix to Chapter 4 Appendix to Chapter 5 Understanding How Culpability Attenuates the Response of Legislators List of Bills Used in Roll Call Analysis Works Cited Index. Peace at What Price? explains why some leaders stay in wartime quagmires by introducing the theoretical concept of leader culpability.;Cover; Half-title; Title page; Copyright information; Dedication; Epigraph; Table of contents; List of tables; List of figures; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; Lacunae the Existing Literature; Culpability and Leaders' Incentives to Gamble for Resurrection; Culpability and Leaders' Reactions to Information and Commitment Problems; Culpability and the Relationship between Leaders and Citizens; Culpability and Wartime Leadership Changes in Democracies; Outline of the Book; 2 A Theory of Leader Culpability; Part 1: Theoretical Assumptions about Leaders and Citizens; Leaders; Citizens. Peace at What Price? explains why some leaders voluntarily stay in wartime quagmires by introducing the theoretical concept of leader culpability. Sarah E. Croco includes analyses on wars from 1816 to 2007, several case illustrations, and a discussion of the American experience in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.