Peace as Governance: Power-Sharing, Armed Groups and Contemporary Peace Negotiations (Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies)

this Book Is A Critical Study Of Incentives Commonly Used To Induce Non-state Armed Groups To Engage In Peace Negotiations. It Offers A Closer Analysis Of These Incentives, Which Offer Such Groups A Place Or A Stake In Governance, Suggesting That Not Only Are They Frequently Ineffective, But That They Can Have Unintended And Dangerous Side Effects. "In order to end armed conflict, and ensure that it does not recur, numerous tactics are used by national governments, the international community, and others engaged in conflict resolution. These tactics include amnesties, financial rewards, offers of inclusion in structures of power, and threats of reprisal and use of force, among myriad others. There is a thriving debate in the literature regarding the appropriate tactics and incentives for peace negotiations, as well as the peacebuilding processes promoted by the international community. This book critically analyzes one key set of negotiation incentives used in peace agreements: inclusion of armed groups in structures of power. Though I loosely term these incentives as 'power-sharing', they are much broader than traditional power-sharing, and rely on explicit institutionalization of the state and the use of state institutions. These negotiation incentives can involve inclusion of previously excluded or outlawed groups as legitimate political parties, sharing of resources with such groups, inclusion of former combatants in reformed military or police forces, and offers of partial or complete autonomy. This approach is largely used to bring non-state armed groups into negotiations, rather than as leverage on governments themselves. The book, drawing upon studies in Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Colombia, demonstrates the limitations and even dangers of using such strategies."--BOOK JACKET In order to end armed conflict, and ensure that it does not recur, numerous tactics are used by national governments, the international community, and others engaged in conflict resolution. These tactics include amnesties, financial rewards, offers of inclusion in structures of power, and threats of reprisal and use of force, among myriad others. There is a thriving debate in the literature regarding the appropriate tactics and incentives for peace negotiations, as well as the peacebuilding processes promoted by the international community. This book critically analyzes one key set of negotiation incentives used in peace agreements : inclusion of armed groups in structures of power. Though I loosely term these incentives as 1power-sharing2, they are much broader than traditional power-sharing, and rely on explicit institutionalization of the state and the use of state institutions. These negotiation incentives can involve inclusion of previously excluded or outlawed groups as legitimate political parties, sharing of resources with such groups, inclusion of former combatants in reformed military or police forces, and offers of partial or complete autonomy. This approach is largely used to bring non-state armed groups into negotiations, rather than as leverage on governments themselves. The book, drawing upon studies in Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Colombia, demonstrates the limitations and even dangers of using such strategies Front Matter....Pages i-vii Introduction The Promise and Limits of Governance Incentives....Pages 1-11 Conflict Resolution: Power-Sharing and Other Inclusion Strategies....Pages 12-43 Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution in Practice....Pages 44-71 Sri Lanka: The Repeated Failure of Inclusion Incentives....Pages 72-106 Sudan: The Dangerous Collateral Effects of Inclusion Incentives....Pages 107-142 Colombia: The Limited Appeal of Inclusion Incentives....Pages 143-180 Conclusion The Need for More Nuanced Governance Incentives....Pages 181-192 Back Matter....Pages 193-220