Patronage at Work : Public Jobs and Political Services in Argentina

In countries around the world, politicians distribute patronage jobs to supporters in exchange for a wide range of political services – such as helping with campaigns and electoral mobilization. Patronage employees (clients) engage in these political activities that support politicians (patrons) because their fates are tied to the political fate of their patrons. Although conventional wisdom holds that control of patronage significantly increases an incumbent's chance of staying in power, we actually know very little about how patronage works. Drawing on in-depth interviews, survey data, and survey experiments in Argentina, Virginia Oliveros details the specific mechanisms that explain the effect of patronage on political competition. This fascinating study is the first to provide a systematic analysis of the political activities of mid and low-level public employees in Latin America. It provides a novel explanation of the enforcement of patronage contracts that has wider implications for understanding the functioning of clientelist exchanges. "During the Argentine winter of 2009, I was returning from a two-hour interview with Pablo and José, sharing a taxi as we headed back to Buenos Aires from La Plata. As soon as we got into the car, both men started making phone calls. One of those conversations went as follows: "How many?" asked José; someone replied on the other end of the line. "Great! Thanks!" he responded in excitement and hung up. Then Pablo asked, "So? How many?" "Fifteen!" replied José, with obvious satisfaction. He continued, naming potential recipients, "María, Cecilia, Susana ..., " while counting on his fingers. Then, looking in my direction, he added, "You see? This is political activism - live! (¿Ves? Esto es militancia ¡En vivo y en directo!)" In my most innocent voice, I asked, "How many what?" While Pablo seemed quite uncomfortable to disclosure the information in my presence, José quickly replied, "Social welfare benefits! (¡Planes sociales!)""-- Provided by publisher Contents Tables Figures Acknowledgments 1 Introduction 2 A Theory of Self-Enforcing Patronage 3 Getting the Job 4 Patronage Contracts and Political Services: Evidence from List Experiments 5 Patronage, Favors, and the Personalization of Public Administration 6 Self-Enforcing Patronage Contracts 7 Beyond the Argentine Case 8 Conclusions and Broader Implications Appendix References Index