Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle's Rhetoric (Oxford Aristotle Studies Series)

For Aristotle, arousing the passions of others can amount to giving them proper grounds for conviction. On that basis a skill in doing so can be something valuable, an appropriate constituent of the kind of expertise in rhetoric that deserves to be cultivated and given expression in a well-organised state. Such are Jamie Dow's principal claims in __Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle's Rhetoric__. He attributes to Aristotle a normative view of rhetoric and its role in the state, and ascribes to him a particular view of the kinds of cognitions involved in the passions. In the first sustained treatment of these issues, and the first major monograph on Aristotle's Rhetoric in twenty years, Dow argues that Aristotle held distinctive and philosophically interesting views of both rhetoric and the nature of the passions. In Aristotle's view, he argues, rhetoric is exercised solely in the provision of proper grounds for conviction (__pisteis__). This is rhetoric's valuable contribution to the proper functioning of the state. Dow explores, through careful examination of the text of the __Rhetoric__, what normative standards must be met for something to qualify in Aristotle's view as 'proper grounds for conviction', and how he supposed these standards could be met by each of his trio of 'technical proofs' (__entechnoi pisteis__)--those using reason, character and emotion. In the case of the passions, Dow suggests, meeting these standards is a matter of arousing passions that constitute the reasonable acceptance of premises in arguments supporting the speaker's conclusion. Dow then seeks to show that Aristotle's view of the passions is compatible with this role in rhetorical expertise. This involves taking a stand on a number of controversial issues in Aristotle studies. In __Passions and Persuasion__, Dow rejects the view that Aristotle's __Rhetoric__ expresses inconsistent views on emotion-arousal. Aristotle's treatment of the passions in the __Rhetoric__ is, he argues, best understood as expressing a substantive theory of the passions as pleasures and pains. This is supported by a new representationalist reading of Aristotle's account of pleasure (and pain) in __Rhetoric__ 1. Dow also defends a distinctive understanding of how Aristotle understood the contribution of __phantasia__ ('appearance') to the cognitive component of the passions. On this interpretation, Aristotelian passions must involve the subject's affirming things to be the way that they are represented. Thus understood, the passions of an emotionally-engaged audience can constitute a part of their reasonable acceptance of a speaker's argument. Cover 1 Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle ́s Rhetoric 4 Copyright 5 Dedication 6 Contents 8 Acknowledgements 9 Introduction 12 Principal Claims of the Book 12 The Significance of the Conclusions 13 Synopsis 14 Part: 1 18 1: Rhetoric and the State-Aristotle and His Predecessors 20 1.1 The Background to Aristotle ́s Rhetoric on Rhetoric 22 1.2 Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and the Handbook Writers 24 1.3 Plato 30 2: Proof-reading Aristotle ́s Rhetoric 45 2.1 Introduction 45 2.2 Aristotle ́s Arguments in Rhetoric 1.1 46 2.3 Rhetoric 1.1, 1354a11-18 47 2.3.1 Argument (i) 48 2.3.2 Argument (ii) 49 2.3.3 The nature of rhetoric and the sense of πστiota between 1.1 and the rest of the Rhetoric 52 2.3.4 Aristotle ́s overall characterization of rhetoric 58 2.4 Aristotle ́s Theory of Proof (1355a3-18) 61 2.4.1 A theory of pistis: what constitutes proper grounds for conviction? 62 2.4.2 Proposed characterization of Aristotelian pistis: 62 2.5 Rhetorical, Dialectical Expertise, and the Nature of Pisteis: 1355a3-14 63 2.6 Apparent Enthymemes 69 2.7 The Proposed Characterization of Pistis and the Use of Premises Not Believed By the Speaker 71 2.8 Conclusion 74 3: Rhetoric and the State 75 3.1 Aristotle ́s Justification of his Proof-centred View of Rhetoric 75 3.2 A Sketch of Aristotle ́s View of the Relationship between Rhetorical Expertise and the Proper Functioning of the State 76 3.3 Rhetoric ́s Purpose and the Justification of Aristotle ́s Proof-centred View 78 3.3.1 The Areopagus Argument 78 3.3.2 The Carpenter ́s Rule simile (1354a24-6) 81 3.3.3 The brief argument from the speaker ́s role: 1354a26-31 82 3.3.4 Aristotle ́s conclusion (1354b16-22) 83 3.4 Conclusion: the Implications of Rhetoric ́s Political Function 85 4: Aristotle against His Rivals 87 4.1 Comparing Aristotle, Plato, and Gorgias and Thrasymachus on Rhetoric 87 4.2 Aristotle and Plato ́s Gorgias 88 4.3 Aristotle and Plato ́s Phaedrus 90 4.4 Is Aristotle ́s Rhetoric about Rhetoric? 93 5: The Interpretation of Aristotle ́s Rhetoric 96 Part: 2 104 6: How Can Emotion-Arousal Provide Proof? 106 6.1 Aristotle ́s Three Kinds of Proof 106 6.2 Proofs in the Character of the Speaker 106 6.3 How Character-Proofs Fit the Proposed Account of Pistis 110 6.3.1 Êthos- (Character-) Proofs 111 6.3.2 Pathos- (emotion-) proofs 112 6.4 How This then Sets a Challenge for Pathos-Proofs 112 6.4.1 An apparent problem solved 113 6.4.2 A constraint arising from the claim that arousing passions is a way of providing proof 115 7: A Supposed Contradiction about Emotion-Arousal in Aristotle ́s Rhetoric 118 7.1 Introduction 118 7.2 The Contradiction Problem and the `Contradiction View ́ 119 7.3 `Slander, Pity, Anger and Similar Passions of the Soul ́ 122 7.4 Who Are the Targets of Aristotle ́s Criticism? 127 7.4.1 Ancient rhetorical set-pieces in general 127 7.4.2 Thrasymachus 127 7.4.3 Gorgias 131 7.5 `Accessories ́ and the Elements of Rhetoric 133 7.6 Some Objections 135 7.7 Conclusion 137 Part: 3 140 8: The Passions in Aristotle ́s Rhetoric 142 8.1 Introduction 142 8.2 The Definition of the Passions in Aristotle ́s Rhetoric 144 8.3 Context and Structure 145 8.4 Pain and Pleasure 146 8.5 Difference in Relation to Judgements 148 8.6 The Adequacy of Aristotle ́s Definition of the Passions 153 9: Aristotle ́s Theory of the Passions-Passions as Pleasures and Pains 156 9.1 Introduction 156 9.2 Claim 1: Emotions as Pleasures and Pains 157 9.2.1 Pi (`Accompanies ́) in Aristotle 158 9.2.2 Pleasure and pain in the individual accounts of types of passion 161 9.2.3 Aristotle ́s general position on emotions and pleasure and pain 161 9.2.4 Summary of how the proposed view fits the evidence of Rhetoric 2.2-11 166 9.3 The Representational Pain and Pleasure Involved in the Passions 166 9.3.1 Rhetoric 2 on the pains and pleasures involved in emotions 167 9.4 Aristotle on Pleasure and Pain 172 9.5 Pleasure and Pain in Rhetoric 1.11 174 9.5.1 The account of pleasure (and pain) in Rhetoric 1.11 175 9.5.2 The restoration of nature view 176 9.5.3 Problems with a `restoration of nature ́ view 177 9.5.4 Aristotle ́s `contents of experience ́ view of pleasure in Rhetoric 1.11 184 9.5.5 The `activity view ́ and the `features view ́ 187 9.5.6 Exegetical reasons (from elsewhere in Aristotle) for preferring the features view 187 9.6 Philosophical Advantages of Understanding the Emotions as Pleasures and Pains 188 9.7 Conclusion 191 10: Feeling Fantastic Again-Passions, Appearances, and Beliefs in Aristotle 193 10.1 Introduction 193 10.2 What Is the Significance of These Claims? 196 10.3 Aristotelian Passions Involve Exercising Phantasia 200 10.3.1 Passions and parts of the soul 201 10.3.2 Passions, pleasure, and pain 203 10.3.3 Arguments appealing to visual illusions 205 10.4 What Kind of Attitude Do Aristotelian Passions Involve towards their Representational Contents? 209 10.4.1 Affirming the representational contents of phantasia 209 10.4.2 Aristotle ́s use of phantasia and phainesthai in the Rhetoric 212 10.4.3 Phantasia, passions, and paintings in De Anima 3.3 214 10.4.4 Limitations to the use of visual illusions in De Anima 3.3 as a model for Aristotle ́s understanding of the passions 215 De Anima 3.3: Phantasia, Doxa and the size of the sun 216 The sun example and the problem of belief 216 Applying the De Anima 3.3 arguments about phantasia to the passions 222 10.5 Phantasia and the Regulation of the Passions 224 10.5.1 Two features of phantasia 224 10.5.2 The `covering-over ́ of reason 226 10.5.3 Phantasia and `listening to reason ́ 227 10.6 Resources for Explaining Conflict between Passions and Reason 229 10.7 Some Philosophical Merits of Aristotle ́s View 234 10.8 Conclusion 236 Conclusions 237 Bibliography 240 Index Locorum 248 General Index 255 For Aristotle, arousing the passions of others can amount to giving them proper grounds for conviction. On that basis a skill in doing so can be something valuable, an appropriate constituent of the kind of expertise in rhetoric that deserves to be cultivated and given expression in a well-organised state. Such are Jamie Dow's principal claims in Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle's Rhetoric . He attributes to Aristotle a normative view of rhetoric and its role in the state, and ascribes to him a particular view of the kinds of cognitions involved in the passions. In the first sustained treatment of these issues, and the first major monograph on Aristotle's Rhetoric in twenty years, Dow argues that Aristotle held distinctive and philosophically interesting views of both rhetoric and the nature of the passions. In Aristotle's view, he argues, rhetoric is exercised solely in the provision of proper grounds for conviction ( pisteis ). This is rhetoric's valuable contribution to the proper functioning of the state. Dow explores, through careful examination of the text of the Rhetoric , what normative standards must be met for something to qualify in Aristotle's view as 'proper grounds for conviction', and how he supposed these standards could be met by each of his trio of 'technical proofs' ( entechnoi pisteis )--those using reason, character and emotion. In the case of the passions, Dow suggests, meeting these standards is a matter of arousing passions that constitute the reasonable acceptance of premises in arguments supporting the speaker's conclusion. Dow then seeks to show that Aristotle's view of the passions is compatible with this role in rhetorical expertise. This involves taking a stand on a number of controversial issues in Aristotle studies. In Passions and Persuasion , Dow rejects the view that Aristotle's Rhetoric expresses inconsistent views on emotion-arousal. Aristotle's treatment of the passions in the Rhetoric is, he argues, best understood as expressing a substantive theory of the passions as pleasures and pains. This is supported by a new representationalist reading of Aristotle's account of pleasure (and pain) in Rhetoric 1. Dow also defends a distinctive understanding of how Aristotle understood the contribution of phantasia ('appearance') to the cognitive component of the passions. On this interpretation, Aristotelian passions must involve the subject's affirming things to be the way that they are represented. Thus understood, the passions of an emotionally-engaged audience can constitute a part of their reasonable acceptance of a speaker's argument. For Aristotle, Arousing The Passions Of Others Can Amount To Giving Them Proper Grounds For Conviction. On That Basis A Skill In Doing So Can Be Something Valuable, An Appropriate Constituent Of The Kind Of Expertise In Rhetoric That Deserves To Be Cultivated And Given Expression In A Well-organised State. Such Are Jamie Dow's Principal Claims In Passions And Persuasion In Aristotle's Rhetoric. He Attributes To Aristotle A Normative View Of Rhetoric And Its Role In The State, And Ascribes To Him A Particular View Of The Kinds Of Cognitions Involved In The Passions. In The First Sustained Treatment Of These Issues, And The First Major Monograph On Aristotle's Rhetoric In Twenty Years, Dow Argues That Aristotle Held Distinctive And Philosophically Interesting Views Of Both Rhetoric And The Nature Of The Passions. Rhetoric Is Expertise In Contributing To The Proper Functioning Of The State By Providing In Proofs (pisteis), Or Proper Grounds For Conviction, To Aid Citizens In Their Deliberations. Passions Are Representational Pleasures And Pains, Felt In Response To How The World Is Taken To Be. Dow Defends A Distinctive Understanding Of How Aristotle Understood The Contribution Of Appearance (phantasia) To The Cognitive Component Of The Passions. On This Interpretation, Aristotelian Passions Must Involve The Subjects Affirming Things To Be The Way They Are Represented. Thus Understood, The Passions Of An Emotionally-engaged Audience Can Constitute A Part Of Their Reasonable Acceptance Of A Speaker's Argument, And Hence Proper Grounds For Conviction.--jacket. Rhetoric And The State -- Aristotle And His Predecessors -- Proof-reading Aristotle's Rhetoric -- Rhetoric And The State -- Aristotle Against His Rivals -- The Intepretation Of Aristotle's Rhetoric -- How Can Emotion-arousal Provide Proof? -- A Supposed Contradiction About Emotion-arousal In Aristotle's Rhetoric -- The Passions In Aristotle's Rhetoric -- Aristotle's Theory Of The Passions -- Passions As Pleasures And Pains -- Feeling Fantastic Again -- Passions, Appearances, And Beliefs In Aristotle. Jamie Dow. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. For Aristotle, arousing the passions of others can amount to giving them proper grounds for conviction. That skill can be valuable, and expertise in 'rhetoric' has an important role to play in a well-organized state. Such are Jamie Dow's principal claims in Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle's Rhetoric. He attributes to Aristotle a normative view of rhetoric and its role in the state, and ascribes to him a particular view of the kinds of cognitions involved in the passions. In the first sustained treatment of these issues, and the first major monograph on Aristotle's Rhetoric in over twenty years, Dow argues that Aristotle held distinctive and philosophically interesting views of both rhetoric and the nature of the passions. Rhetoric is expertise in contributing to the proper functioning of the state by providing 'proofs' (pisteis), or proper grounds for conviction, to aid citizens in their deliberations. Passions are representational pleasures and pains, felt in response to how the world is taken to be. Dow defends a distinctive understanding of how Aristotle understood the contribution of 'appearance' (phantasia) to the cognitive component of the passions. On this interpretation, Aristotelian passions must involve the subject's affirming things to be the way that they are represented. Thus understood, the passions of an emotionally-engaged audience can constitute a part of their reasonable acceptance of a speaker's argument, and hence proper grounds for conviction. Book jacket