Partisan Investment in the Global Economy : Why the Left Loves Foreign Direct Investment and FDI Loves the Left

Pinto develops a partisan theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) arguing that left-wing governments choose policies that allow easier entry by foreign investors more than right-wing governments, and that foreign investors prefer to invest in countries governed by the left. To reach this determination, the book derives the conditions under which investment flows should be expected to affect the relative demand for the services supplied by economic actors in host countries. Based on these expected distributive consequences, a political economy model of the regulation of FDI and changes in investment performance within countries and over time is developed. The theory is tested using both cross-national statistical analysis and two case studies exploring the development of the foreign investment regimes and their performance over the past century in Argentina and South Korea. Develops A Partisan Theory Of Foreign Direct Investment (fdi) To Explain Variance In The Regulation Of Foreign Investment And In The Amount Of Fdi Inflows That Countries Receive-- The Territorial State Which Dominated The Industrial Era Is Increasingly Becoming Obsolete, And Is Gradually Being Replaced By New Forms Of Global Governance (ohmae, 1995; Strange, 1996, 1998; Rosecrance, 1999). Moreover, The Pressure From Global Markets Have Blurred The Ideological Differences Among Political Parties Not Only Among Developed Countries, But Particularly In The Developing World: To Stay Competitive In The Global Marketplace Governments Of The Left And The Right Alike Have Become Fanatical Advocates Of The Neo-liberal Cause (see, Among Others, Edwards (1995); Williamson (1990); Garrett (2000)). The Conclusion Is That When Dealing With Global Market Forces Politics Does Not Matter Any More, If It Ever Did. On The Opposing Side Of The Debate We Find Claims That The Incentives And Constraints Created By Global Economic Forces Lead To Policy Divergence Rather Than Convergence (tiebout, 1956; Vogel, 1996; Berger And Dore, 1996; Kahler, 1998; Kahler And Lake, 2003). The Patterns Of Divergence Are Systematic: They Depend As Much On The Preferences Of The Actors As They React To The Constraints And Opportunities Created By Global Forces (cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997). Scholars Ascribing To This Tradition Argue That Governments Have Ample Room To Maneuver, And Make Policy Choices That Are A Clear Reflection Of Their Types (swank, 1998; Hall And Soskice, 2001; Garrett And Mitchell, 2001; Swank And Steinmo, 2002). The Heated Debate On The Consequences Of Globalization, Present In Politics, Journalism And Academia, Is Far From Settled. Changes In Global Production Spearheaded By Multinational Corporations Are A Central Characteristic Of The Current Era Of Globalization (bordo Et Al., 1999)-- Machine Generated Contents Note: 1. Fdi And Coalitions; 2. The Politics Of Investment; 3. Partisanship And Commitment; 4. Cross-country Analysis; 5. Fdi In Argentina; 6. Business Influence And Fdi; 7. Conclusion. Pablo M. Pinto. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 265-284)and Index. "The territorial state which dominated the industrial era is increasingly becoming obsolete, and is gradually being replaced by new forms of global governance (Ohmae, 1995; Strange, 1996, 1998; Rosecrance, 1999). Moreover, the pressure from global markets have blurred the ideological differences among political parties not only among developed countries, but particularly in the developing world: to stay competitive in the global marketplace governments of the left and the right alike have become fanatical advocates of the neo-liberal cause (see, among others, Edwards (1995); Williamson (1990); Garrett (2000)). The conclusion is that when dealing with global market forces politics does not matter any more, if it ever did. On the opposing side of the debate we find claims that the incentives and constraints created by global economic forces lead to policy divergence rather than convergence (Tiebout, 1956; Vogel, 1996; Berger and Dore, 1996; Kahler, 1998; Kahler and Lake, 2003). The patterns of divergence are systematic: they depend as much on the preferences of the actors as they react to the constraints and opportunities created by global forces (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997). Scholars ascribing to this tradition argue that governments have ample room to maneuver, and make policy choices that are a clear reflection of their types (Swank, 1998; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Swank and Steinmo, 2002). The heated debate on the consequences of globalization, present in politics, journalism and academia, is far from settled. Changes in global production spearheaded by multinational corporations are a central characteristic of the current era of globalization (Bordo et al., 1999)"-- Provided by publisher This book develops a partisan theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) to explain cross-country and temporal variance in the regulation of foreign investment and in the amount of FDI inflows that countries receive. The author explores the host governments' partisan alignment, whether pro-labor or pro-capital, to determine if they will be more open or closed to FDI. To reach this determination, the book derives the conditions under which investment flows should be expected to affect the relative demand for the services supplied by economic actors in host countries. Based on these expected distributive consequences, a political economy model of the regulation of FDI and changes in investment performance within countries and over time is developed. The theory is tested using both cross-national statistical analysis and two case studies exploring the development of the foreign investment regimes and their performance over the past century in Argentina and South Korea.