Paradoxes of War: On the Art of National Self-Entrapment (Routledge Library Editions: Security and Society)

Why do reasonable people lead their nations into the tremendously destructive traps of international conflict? Why do nations then deepen their involvement and make it harder to escape from these traps? In __Paradoxes of War__, originally published in 1990, Zeev Maoz addresses these and other paradoxical questions about the war process. Using a unique approach to the study of war, he demonstrates that wars may often break out __because__ states wish to prevent them, and continue __despite__ the desperate efforts of the combatants to end them. __Paradoxes of War__ is organized around the various stages of war. The first part discusses the causes of war, the second the management of war, and the third the short- and long-term implications of war. In each chapter Maoz explores a different paradox as a contradiction between reasonable expectations and the outcomes of motivated behaviour based on those expectations. He documents these paradoxes in twentieth century wars, including the Korean War, the Six Day War, and the Vietnam War. Maoz then invokes cognitive and rational choice theories to explain why these paradoxes arise. __Paradoxes of War__ is essential reading for students and scholars of international politics, war and peace studies, international relations theory, and political science in general. This 12-volume set contains titles, originally published between 1934 and 1995. An eclectic mix of titles, this collection draws from anthropology, economics, ethics, politics, psychology and sociology. Exploring security in both war and peacetime it includes volumes looking at: the causes of war and its effect on society as a whole; the soldiers themselves and their place in society; the portrayal of war in the press, both in words and photographs and the politics behind them. Why do reasonable people lead their nations into the tremendously destructive traps of international conflict? Why do nations then deepen their involvement and make it harder to escape from these traps? In this title, originally published in 1990, Zeev Maoz addresses these and other paradoxical questions about the war process.