Organisms And Personal Identity: Individuation And The Work Of David Wiggins (history And Philosophy Of Biology)

Over his philosophical career, David Wiggins has produced a body of work that, though varied and wide-ranging, stands as a coherent and carefully integrated whole. In this book Ferner examines Wiggins’ conceptualist-realism, his sortal theory ‘D’ and his human being theory in order to assess how far these elements of his systematic metaphysics connect. In addition to rectifying misinterpretations and analysing the relations between Wiggins’ works, Ferner reveals the importance of the philosophy of biology to Wiggins’ approach. This book elucidates the biological anti-reductionism present in Wiggins’ work and highlights how this stance stands as a productive alternative to emergentism. With an analysis of Wiggins’ construal of substances, specifically organisms, the book goes on to discuss how Wiggins brings together the concept of a person with the concept of a natural substance, or human being. An extensive introduction to the work of David Wiggins, as well as a contribution to the dialogue between personal identity theorists and philosophers of biology, this book will appeal to students and scholars working in the areas of philosophy, biology and the history of Anglophone metaphysics. Half Title Title Page Copyright Page Table of Contents Acknowledgements Introduction Personal identity The philosophy of biology Prospectus Overview of texts 1 An intellectual microcosm 1 Pre-history 2 Descriptive metaphysics 3 Heritable defects 4 Persisting problems 2 D 1 The bare bones of identity 2 The ‘epistemology of the relation’ 3 Principles of individuation 4 Sortal identity and relative identity 5 A metaphysical or a psychological thesis? 3 Natural substances and artefacts 1 The semantics of natural kind words 2 Artefact words and puzzles 3 The existence of artefacts? 4 The substancehood of artefacts 5 Substance 4 The Human Being Theory 1 Neo-Lockean or animalist? 2 Quasi-memory 3 Against an ‘animalist’ reading 4 Conceptual consilience: three arguments 5 A genealogy of the person concept 1 The notion of a person 2 ‘Person’ as a mask 3 ‘Person’ as a legal fact 4 ‘Person’ as moral fact and metaphysical entity 5 Critique of the semantic analysis 6 Biological models 1 Limits of living activity 2 A simple-minded worry? 3 ‘Pluralism’ and essentialism 7 Reduction and emergence 1 The reduction of the organism 2 ‘Reductionism’ and ‘emergence’ 3 An emergentist reading? 4 Reasons for doubt 8 Aristotelian organisms 1 Organic unities 2 Aristotelian biology 3 Teleology 4 Ontological dependence 5 Persistence conditions of organic substances 9 Brain transplantation 1 Changing perspectives 2 Methodological concerns 3 A suppressed assumption 4 Organic unity (again) 5 A shift in metaphysical focus: ‘human persons as artefacts?’ 6 Final worries and a recommendation for Wiggins Conclusion Appendix: a history of the brain transplantation story Index Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Personal identity -- The philosophy of biology -- Prospectus -- Overview of texts -- 1 An intellectual microcosm -- 1 Pre-history -- 2 Descriptive metaphysics -- 3 Heritable defects -- 4 Persisting problems -- 2 D -- 1 The bare bones of identity -- 2 The 'epistemology of the relation' -- 3 Principles of individuation -- 4 Sortal identity and relative identity -- 5 A metaphysical or a psychological thesis? -- 3 Natural substances and artefacts -- 1 The semantics of natural kind words David Wiggins's contribution to metaphysics, logic and ethics has been widely recognized, but the connections between his work and recent issues in the philosophy of biology have been overlooked. This study demonstrates how Wiggins's work can contribute to, as well as benefit from, contemporary debate in this field.