Opting Out: Conscience and Cooperation in a Pluralistic Society:Conscience and Cooperation in a Pluralistic Society

We live in a liberal, pluralistic, largely secular society where, in theory,there is fundamental protection for freedom of conscience generally andfreedom of religion in particular. There is, however, both in statute andcommon law, increasing pressure on religious believers and conscientiousobjectors (outside wartime) to act in ways that violate their sincere,deeply held beliefs. This is particularly so in health care, whereconscientious objection is coming under extreme pressure. I argue thatfreedom of religion and conscience need to be put on a sounder footingboth legislatively and by the courts, particularly in health care. I examinea number of important legal cases in the UK and US, where freedom ofreligion and conscience have come into conflict with governmentmandates or equality and anti-discrimination law. In these and other caseswe find one of two results: either the conscientious objector loses outagainst competing rights, or the conscientious objector succeeds, but dueto what I consider unsound judicial reasoning. In particular, casesinvolving cooperation in what the objector considers morally impermissibleaccording to their beliefs have been wrongly understood by someAmerican courts. I argue that a reasonable theory of cooperationincorporated into judicial thinking would enable more acceptable resultsthat gave sufficient protection to conscientious objectors without risking ajudicial backlash against objectors who wanted to take their freedoms toofar.I also venture into broader, more controversial waters concerning whatI call freedom of dissociation – the fundamental right to withdraw fromassociating with people, groups, and activities. It is no more than theconverse of freedom of association, which all free societies recognise as abasic right. How far should freedom of dissociation go? What mightsociety be like if freedom of dissociation were given more protection inlaw than it currently has? It would certainly give freedom of religion andconscience a... Should people with deeply held objections to certain practices be allowed to opt out of involvement with them? Should a Christian baker who objects to homosexuality be allowed to deny service to a customer seeking a cake for a gay wedding? Should a Catholic nurse be able to refuse to contribute to the provision of abortions without losing her job? The law increasingly answers no to such questions. But David Oderberg argues that this is a mistake. He contends that in such cases, opting out should be understood as part of a right of dissociation – and that this right needs better legal protection than it now enjoys.