On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (The Seeley Lectures)

According to republican theory, we are free persons to the extent that we are protected and secured in the same fundamental choices, on the same public basis, as one another. But there is no public protection or security without a coercive state. Does this mean that any freedom we enjoy is a superficial good that presupposes a deeper, political form of subjection? Philip Pettit addresses this crucial question in On the People's Terms. He argues that state coercion will not involve individual subjection or domination insofar as we enjoy an equally shared form of control over those in power. This claim may seem utopian but it is supported by a realistic model of the institutions that might establish such democratic control. Beginning with a fresh articulation of republican ideas, Pettit develops a highly original account of the rationale of democracy, breathing new life into democratic theory. Cover 1 Contents 11 Tables 12 Acknowledgements 13 Introduction. The republic, old and new 15 The project 15 Three core ideas 19 The liberal opposition 22 The communitarian opposition 25 Building philosophically on republican history 32 Reflective equilibrium 34 The emerging view of democracy 35 Justice and democracy 38 Chapter 1 Freedom as non-domination 40 1. What has to be hindered to reduce freedom of choice? 42 Hobbes’s position 42 Berlin’s critique 44 Freedom, robustness and probability 47 2. Vitiating and invasive hindrances 49 The resources required for free choice 50 Two kinds of hindrance 51 The relevance of vitiating hindrances 55 The significance of invasive hindrances 57 The measurement of freedom 58 Revealed will and real will 61 3. No invasion without domination 63 The nature of interference 64 Interference is not sufficient for subjection 70 4. No domination without invasion 73 Invigilation and intimidation 74 Three theories of freedom 78 Freedom, robustness and probability, again 81 5. How can we ensure your freedom of choice? 83 Resourcing and protecting 83 The requirements of protection 85 Actions and omissions 87 Chapter 2 Social justice 89 1. Social justice and equality 91 The connection 91 The freedom goal of republican justice 96 The equality strategy of republican justice 101 2. The basic liberties 106 Two criteria 106 Co-exercisable choices 108 Co-satisfying choices 112 Towards a meaningful life 115 Variations in basic liberties 118 3. Sketch for a model of justice 121 Beyond Rawls 121 Infrastructural programmes 124 Insurance programmes 126 Insulation programmes: special protection 128 Insulation programmes: general protection 131 Q. 1. What is criminalization? 131 Q. 2. Why should the state criminalize any acts? 132 Q. 3. What acts should the state criminalize? 132 Q. 4. How should the state practise criminalization? 133 4. The character of republican justice 136 The principle of republican justice 137 The demands of republican justice 140 The role of law and norm in republican justice 141 Chapter 3 Political legitimacy 144 1. The legitimacy question 146 The source of the problem 146 What turns on legitimacy? 150 Legitimacy in its heyday 155 The eclipse of the legitimacy issue 156 Legitimacy in other senses 159 2. Legitimacy as popular control 160 A question of freedom 160 Legitimacy under freedom as non-interference 163 Legitimacy under freedom as non-domination 166 3. The nature of control 167 The idea of control 167 The varieties of influence 170 Control and consent 171 4. The requirements on popular control 174 Requirements on the domain of popular control 174 Requirements on the nature of popular control 180 An individualized system of popular control 182 An unconditioned system of popular control 184 An efficacious system of popular control 189 5. The democratic state 193 A theory of democracy 193 The appeal of the democratic state 195 Back to Rawls 198 Chapter 4 Democratic influence 201 1. The plenary assembly 202 The origin of the idea 202 The discursive dilemma 205 2. The responsively representative assembly 209 The indicative assembly 209 The responsive assembly 211 An indicative-cum-responsive assembly 213 In favour of the responsive assembly 215 Respresentative assemblies and assemblies of representatives 219 Remedying electoral shortfalls 221 3. An individualized system of influence 223 Individualizing electoral influence 223 The tyranny of the majority 225 Beyond the tyranny of the majority 227 Institutional implications 229 4. An unconditioned system of influence 232 The desideratum 232 The mixed constitution 234 The contestatory citizenry 239 5. An efficacious system of influence 243 The dimensions of popular influence 243 The danger from elected politicians 246 The danger from private lobbies 247 The danger from unelected authorities 249 Chapter 5 Democratic control 253 1. Two familiar models of directed influence 254 Influence without control 254 The intentional direction of government 257 The non-intentional direction of government 262 Starting afresh 265 2. A dual-aspect model of democracy 266 Games of acceptance and acceptability 266 The acceptability game in the public world 273 Deliberative regulation by policy-making norms 278 Dual-aspect democracy 283 Combining the attractions of existing models 289 3. The people, the state and the constitution 294 Government of the people, by the people, for the people 294 The role of the state under the dual-aspect model 296 The role of the people, constituting and constituted 299 Six principles of political ontology 302 The priority of the constituting people 303 The dependent sovereignty of the constituted people 303 The undominating will of the constituted people 304 The corporate will is not the general will 305 The replaceability of the constituted people 305 Beyond the paradox of constituent power 306 Conclusion. The argument, in summary 307 Introduction. the republic, old and new 307 Chapter 1. Freedom as non-domination 308 Chapter 2. Social justice 311 Chapter 3. Political legitimacy 313 Chapter 4. Democratic influence 317 Chapter 5. Democratic control 320 References 325 Name index 343 Subject index 347 "According to republican political theory, choosing freely requires being able to make the choice without subjection to another and freedom as a person requires being publicly protected against subjection in the exercise of basic liberties. But there is no public protection without a coercive state. And doesn't state coercion necessarily take from the freedom of the coerced? Philip Pettit addresses this question from a civic republican perspective, arguing that state interference does not involve subjection or domination if there is equally shared, popular control over government"-- Drawing on the work of historians like Quentin Skinner, neo-republican theory offers a new perspective on the theory of justice and democracy. This is the first extended statement of a republican theory of democracy. It gives a fresh account of the rationale of democracy and the institutions that democracy requires. Machine generated contents note: Introduction: the republic, old and new; 1. Freedom as non-domination; 2. Social justice; 3. Political legitimacy; 4. Democratic influence; 5. Democratic control; Conclusion: the argument, in summary.