On Reference
معرفی کتاب «On Reference» نوشتهٔ Andrea Bianchi (editor)، منتشرشده توسط نشر IRL Press at Oxford University Press در سال 2015. این کتاب در فرمت pdf، زبان انگلیسی ارائه شده است. «On Reference» در دستهٔ بدون دستهبندی قرار دارد.
Most of the times we open our mouth to communicate, we talk about things. This can happen because (some of) the linguistic expressions we use have semantic properties that connect them to extra-linguistic entities. Thanks to these properties, they may be used by us to refer to things. Or, as we may also say, they themselves refer to things, though in certain cases they do so only relative to a context of use. But how can we characterize the semantic properties in question? What exactly is reference? Philosophers have been trying to answer these questions at least since Plato's Cratylus , but not until the last century, when language occupied center-stage in philosophy, did the problem come to be felt as really pressing. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, Gottlob Frege produced an account of reference that set the stage for the contemporary discussion. Nevertheless, around 1970 a number of powerful arguments against it were produced by Saul Kripke and others. As a result, many philosophers began to look at reference from a new perspective, which highlighted the crucial role played by wordly historical facts that may be unknown to the speakers. This semantic revolution, however, left us with a number of open problems. The eighteen original essays collected in this volume deal with many of these problems, thus contributing to our understanding of the nature of reference, its role in cognition, and the place it should be given in semantic theory. Most Of The Times We Open Our Mouth To Communicate, We Talk About Things. This Can Happen Because (some Of) The Linguistic Expressions We Use Have Semantic Properties That Connect Them To Extra-linguistic Entities. Thanks To These Properties, They May Be Used By Us To Refer To Things. Or, As We May Also Say, They Themselves Refer To Things, Though In Certain Cases They Do So Only Relative To A Context Of Use. But How Can We Characterize The Semantic Properties In Question? What Exactly Is Reference? Philosophers Have Been Trying To Answer These Questions At Least Since Plato's Cratylus, But Not Until The Last Century, When Language Occupied Center-stage In Philosophy, Did The Problem Come To Be Felt As Really Pressing. In The Last Decade Of The Nineteenth Century, Gottlob Frege Produced An Account Of Reference That Set The Stage For The Contemporary Discussion. Nevertheless, Around 1970 A Number Of Powerful Arguments Against It Were Produced By Saul Kripke And Others. As A Result, Many Philosophers Began To Look At Reference From A New Perspective, Which Highlighted The Crucial Role Played In Its Determination By Mundane Aspects That Are Not Under The Direct Control Of The Speaker. This Semantic Revolution, However, Left Us With A Number Of Open Problems. The Eighteen Original Essays Collected In This Volume Deal With Many Of These Problems, Thus Contributing To Our Understanding Of The Nature Of Reference, Its Role In Cognition, And The Place It Should Be Given In Semantic Theory.--dust Jacket. Edited By Andrea Bianchi. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Contents List of Contributors Introduction—Open Problems on Reference • Andrea Bianchi Part I. The Nature of Reference 1. The Illusion of Semantic Reference • Christopher Gauker 2. Reference and Theories of Meaning as Use • Diego Marconi 3. Speaker’s Reference and Cross-Cultural Semantics • Edouard Machery, Justin Sytsma, and Max Deutsch 4. Reference without Cognition • Genoveva Martí 5. Repetition and Reference • Andrea Bianchi 6. Should Proper Names Still Seem So Problematic? • Michael Devitt Part II. Reference and Cognition 7. Thinking about an Individual • Antonio Capuano 8. Drawing, Seeing, Referring: Reflections on Macbeth’s Dagger • Marga Reimer 9. The Cognitive Contribution of Names • John Perry Part III. Reference and Semantics 10. Names as Predicates? • Ernesto Napoli 11. Names Not Predicates • Robin Jeshion 12. “Literal” Uses of Proper Names • Delia G. Fara 13. A Rejoinder to Fara’s ‘“Literal” Uses of Proper Names’ • Robin Jeshion 14. Empty Names, Propositions, and Attitude Ascriptions • Marco Santambrogio 15. Millianism, Relationism, and Attitude Ascriptions • Ángel Pinillos 16. The Dilemma of Indefinites • Samuel Cumming 17. A Unified Treatment of (Pro-)Nominals in Ordinary English • Joseph Almog, Paul Nichols, and Jessica Pepp 18. Individuals Explained Away • Edward L. Ke Index
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