On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay about Substance Concepts (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

Written By One Of Today's Most Creative And Innovative Philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, This Book Examines Basic Empirical Concepts; How They Are Acquired, How They Function, And How They Have Been Misrepresented In The Traditional Philosophical Literature. Millikan Places Cognitive Psychology In An Evolutionary Context Where Human Cognition Is Assumed To Be An Outgrowth Of Primitive Forms Of Mentality, And Assumed To Have 'functions' In The Biological Sense. Of Particular Interest Are Her Discussions Of The Nature Of Abilities As Different From Dispositions, Her Detailed Analysis Of The Psychological Act Of Reidentifying Substances, And Her Critique Of The Language Of Thought For Mental Representation. In A Radical Departure From Current Philosophical And Psychological Theories Of Concepts, This Book Provides The First In-depth Discussion On The Psychological Act Of Reidentification. Ch. 1. Introducing Substance Concepts -- Ch. 2. Substances: The Ontology -- Ch. 3. Classifying, Identifying, And The Function Of Substance Concepts -- Ch. 4. The Nature Of Abilities: How Is Extension Determined? -- Ch. 5. More Mama, More Milk And More Mouse: The Structure And Development Of Substance Concepts -- Ch. 6. Substance Concepts Through Language: Knowing The Meanings Of Words -- Ch. 7. How We Make Our Ideas Clear: Epistemology For Empirical Concepts -- Ch. 8. Content And Vehicle In Perception -- Ch. 9. Sames Versus Sameness In Conceptual Contents And Vehicles -- Ch. 10. Grasping Sameness -- Ch. 11. In Search Of Strawsonian Modes Of Presentation -- Ch. 12. Rejecting Identity Judgments And Fregean Modes. Ruth Garrett Millikan. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 239-246) And Indexes. Half-title......Page 3 Series-title......Page 5 Title......Page 7 Copyright......Page 8 Contents......Page 9 Preface......Page 13 1.1 ONE SPECIAL KIND OF CONCEPT......Page 17 1.2 WHAT ARE “SUBSTANCES”?......Page 18 1.3 KNOWLEDGE OF SUBSTANCES......Page 19 1.5 THE ABILITY TO REIDENTIFY SUBSTANCES......Page 21 1.6 FALLIBILITY OF SUBSTANCE REIDENTIFICATION......Page 23 1.7 FIXING THE EXTENSIONS OF SUBSTANCE CONCEPTS: ABILITIES......Page 24 1.8 SUBSTANCE TEMPLATES......Page 25 1.9 CONCEPTIONS OF SUBSTANCES......Page 26 1.10 IDENTIFYING THROUGH LANGUAGE......Page 29 1.11 EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE ACT OF REIDENTIFYING......Page 30 2.1 REAL KINDS......Page 31 2.2 KINDS OF REAL KINDS......Page 34 2.3 INDIVIDUALS AS SUBSTANCES......Page 39 2.4 KINDS OF BETTERNESS AND WORSENESS IN SUBSTANCES......Page 40 2.5 ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY (OF A NONQUINEAN SORT)......Page 42 2.6 SUBSTANCE TEMPLATES AND HIERARCHY AMONG SUBSTANCES......Page 44 3.1 ORIENTATION......Page 49 3.2 THE FUNCTIONS OF CLASSIFYING......Page 50 3.3 THE FUNCTIONS OF REIDENTIFYING......Page 54 3.4 UNDERSTANDING EXTENSIONS AS CLASSES VERSUS AS SUBSTANCES......Page 55 3.5 DESCRIPTIONISM IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE......Page 58 3.6 HOW THEN ARE THE EXTENSIONS OF SUBSTANCE CONCEPTS DETERMINED?......Page 64 4.1 ABILITIES ARE NOT DISPOSITIONS OF THE MOST COMMON SORT......Page 67 4.2 HAVING AN ABILITY TO VERSUS BEING ABLE TO......Page 70 4.3 WAYS TO IMPROVE ABILITIES......Page 71 4.4 AN ABILITY IS NOT JUST SUCCEEDING WHENEVER ONE WOULD TRY......Page 73 4.5 DISTINGUISHING ABILITIES BY MEANS OR ENDS......Page 75 4.6 ABILITIES ARE NOT DISPOSITIONS BUT DO IMPLY DISPOSITIONS......Page 77 4.7 WHAT DETERMINES THE CONTENT OF AN ABILITY?......Page 78 4.8 THE EXTENSIONS OF SUBSTANCE CONCEPTS......Page 80 5.1 EARLY WORDS FOR SUBSTANCES......Page 85 5.2 INITIAL IRRELEVANCE OF SOME FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES......Page 86 5.3 THE STRUCTURE COMMON TO ALL SUBSTANCE CONCEPTS......Page 89 5.4 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT BEGINS WITH PERCEPTUAL TRACKING......Page 92 5.5 CONCEPTUAL TRACKING USING PERCEPTUAL SKILLS......Page 93 5.6 CONCEPTUAL TRACKING USING INFERENCE......Page 96 5.7 DEVELOPING SUBSTANCE TEMPLATES......Page 98 6.1 PERCEIVING THE WORLD THROUGH LANGUAGE......Page 100 6.2 TRACKING THROUGH WORDS: CONCEPTS ENTIRELY THROUGH LANGUAGE......Page 104 6.3 FOCUSING REFERENCE AND KNOWING THE MEANINGS OF WORDS......Page 107 7.1 THE COMPLAINT AGAINST EXTERNALISM......Page 111 7.2 SIDESTEPPING HOLISM IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF CONCEPTS......Page 114 7.3 SEPARATING OFF THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF CONCEPTS......Page 117 7.4 REMAINING INTERDEPENDENCIES AMONG CONCEPTS......Page 121 8.1 INTRODUCTION......Page 125 8.2 THE PASSIVE PICTURE THEORY OF PERCEPTION......Page 126 8.3 INTERNALIZING, EXTERNALIZING, AND THE DEMANDS FOR CONSISTENCY AND COMPLETENESS......Page 129 8.4 INTERNALIZING AND EXTERNALIZING TEMPORAL RELATIONS......Page 131 8.5 INTERNALIZING AND EXTERNALIZING CONSTANCY......Page 132 8.6 IMPORTING COMPLETENESS......Page 134 9.1 SAMES, DIFFERENTS, SAME, AND DIFFERENT......Page 139 9.2 MOVES INVOLVING SAME AND DIFFERENT......Page 140 9.3 SAME/DIFFERENT MOVES IN THE LITERATURE......Page 142 9.4 SAME AND DIFFERENT IN THE FREGEAN TRADITION......Page 145 9.5 REPEATING IS NOT REIDENTIFYING......Page 149 10.1 INTRODUCTION: IMAGES OF IDENTITY......Page 152 10.2 LOCATING THE SAMENESS MARKERS IN THOUGHT......Page 156 10.3 SUBSTANCE CONCEPTS AND ACTS OF REIDENTIFYING......Page 160 11.2 NAIVE STRAWSON-MODEL MODES OF PRESENTATION......Page 163 11.3 STRAWSON-MODEL MODES OF PRESENTATION AS WAYS OF RECOGNIZING......Page 166 11.4 EVANS’ “DYNAMIC FREGEAN THOUGHTS”......Page 168 11.5 MODES OF PRESENTATION AS WAYS OF TRACKING......Page 171 12.1 INTRODUCTION......Page 175 12.2 DOES IT ACTUALLY MATTER HOW SAMENESS IS MARKED?......Page 176 12.3 FORMAL SYSTEMS AS MODELS FOR THOUGHT......Page 177 12.5 THE FIRST FREGEAN ASSUMPTION......Page 184 12.6 THE SECOND FREGEAN ASSUMPTION......Page 185 12.7 REJECTING IDENTITY JUDGMENTS......Page 187 12.8 REJECTING MODES OF PRESENTATION......Page 189 13.1 INTRODUCTION......Page 193 13.2 ISOLATING THE PROBLEM......Page 194 13.3 EVANS ON KNOWING WHAT ONE IS THINKING OF......Page 195 13.4 DIFFERING WITH EVANS ON KNOWING WHAT ONE IS THINKING OF......Page 198 13.5 HAVING AN ABILITY VERSUS KNOWING HOW TO ACQUIRE IT......Page 201 13.6 THE ABILITY TO REIDENTIFY, OR BEING ABLE TO REIDENTIFY?......Page 204 13.7 MISTAKING WHAT I’M THINKING OF......Page 206 14.1 WHAT DETERMINES THE EXTENSIONS OF NEW SUBSTANCE CONCEPTS?......Page 209 14.2 INTENTIONAL REPRESENTATION......Page 211 14.3 CONCEPTUAL AND NONCONCEPTUAL INTENTIONAL REPRESENTATIONS......Page 215 14.4 THE INTENTIONALITY OF MENTAL TERMS FOR SUBSTANCES......Page 217 15 Cognitive Luck: Substance Concepts in an Evolutionary Frame......Page 219 Appendix A Contrast with Evans on Information Based Thoughts......Page 229 Appendix B What Has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?......Page 233 References......Page 255 Names Index......Page 263 Index......Page 267 Written by one of today's most creative and innovative philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, this book examines basic empirical concepts; how they are acquired, how they function, and how they have been misrepresented in the traditional philosophical literature. In a radical departure from current philosophical and psychological theories of concepts, this book provides the first in-depth discussion on the psychological act of reidentification. It will be of interest to a broad range of students of philosophy, especially those interested in the application of evolutionary theory to analytic philosophy. One use of the word "concept" equates a concept with whatever it is one has to learn in order to use a certain word correctly.