Objectivity in Law

This book addresses a central topic in contemporary jurisprudence, namely, whether it is possible for legal interpretations to be objective. The author argues that objectivity is possible in law, and grounds this possibility firmly in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and language, and meta-ethics. He then systematically explores the philosophical prejudices that have operated as sources of resistance to this possibility. These prejudices, once identified, help to illuminate fundamental debates in jurisprudence. The question of objectivity in legal interpretation has emerged in recent years as a highly important topic in contemporary jurisprudence. This original book addresses the issue of how and in what sense legal interpretation can be objective. The author supports the possibility of objectivity in law and spells out the content of objectivity involved. He then provides a comprehensive defence against the classical, as well as less well-known, objections to the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation. The discussion is firmly grounded in metaphysics, which sets the book apart from other similar discussions in jurisprudence. Stavropoulos identifies an important source of resistance to acceptance of the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation: a widely-held but faulty semantic. He then develops an alternative semantic framework which draws on influential theories in contemporary philosophy. The book shows that objectivism is a natural, commonsensical position, and rejects the currently popular notion that objectivism requires extravagant or bizarre metaphysics. Furthermore, the discussion presents the opportunity to reinterpret major debates in jurisprudence and to show how influential theories, notably H. L. A. Hart's and Ronald Dworkin's, bear on that central issue. The question of objectivity in legal interpretation has emerged in recent years as an important topic in contemporary jurisprudence. This book addresses the issue of how and in what sense legal interpretation can be objective. It supports the possibility of objectivity in law and spells out the content of objectivity involved. It then provides a defence against the classical, as well as the less well-known, objections to the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation. The discussion is thoroughly grounded in metaphysics, which sets the book apart from other similar discussions in jurisprudence. The book identifies an important source of resistance to the acceptance of the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation; a widely held but faulty semantic. It then develops an alternative semantic framework, drawing on influential theories in contemporary philosophy. The book shows that objectivism is a natural, commonsensical position, and rejects the currently popular notion that objectivism requires extravagant or bizarre metaphysics. Furthermore, the discussion presents the opportunity to re-interpret major debates in jurisprudence and to show how influential theories, notably H. L. A. Hart's and Ronald Dworkin's, bear on that issue This Treatise Addresses A Central Topic In Contemporary Jurisprudence, Namely Whether It Is Possible For Legal Interpretations To Be Objective. The Author Claims That Objectivity Is Possible In Law, Offering Arguments Based On Metaphysics, Philosophy And Meta-ethics To Reinforce His Theory. 1. Introduction -- 2. The Semantic Framework -- 3. Empirical Counterparts And Hart's Semantics -- 4. Mind-dependence And Cognitivism -- 5. Substantive Disagreement And Indeterminacy -- 6. Conceptions Of Practice. Nicos Stavropoulos. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [202]-207) And Index.