Objective knowledge : an evolutionary approach

The Essays In This Volume Represent An Approach To Human Knowledge That Has Had A Profound Influence On Many Recent Thinkers. Popper Breaks With A Traditional Commonsense Theory Of Knowledge That Can Be Traced Back To Aristotle. A Realist And Fallibilist, He Argues Closely And In Simple Language That Scientific Knowledge, Once Stated In Human Language, Is No Longer Part Of Ourselves But A Separate Entity That Grows Through Critical Selection. 1. Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution Of The Problem Of Induction -- 2. Two Faces Of Common Sense: An Argument For Commonsense Realism And Against The Commonsense Theory Of Knowledge -- 3. Epistemology Without A Knowing Subject -- 4. On The Theory Of The Objective Mind -- 5. The Aim Of Science -- 6. Of Clouds And Clocks -- 7. Evolution And The Tree Of Knowledge -- 8. A Realist View Of Logic, Physics, And History -- 9. Philosophical Comments On Tarski's Theory Of Truth -- Appendix 1. The Bucket And The Searchlight: Two Theories Of Knowledge -- Appendix 2. Summplementary Remarks (1978). Karl R. Popper. Includes Bibliographies And Indexes. Title Copyright Dedication Preface Acknowledgements Contents 1. Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution of the Problem of Induction 1. The Commonsense Problem of Induction 2. Hume’s Two Problems of Induction 3. Important Consequences of Hume’s Results 4. My Way of Approaching the Problem of Induction 5. The Logical Problem of Induction: Restatement and Solution 6. Comments on My Solution of the Logical Problem 7. Preference for Theories and the Search for Truth 8. Corroboration: The Merits of Improbability 9. Pragmatic Preference 10. Background to My Restatement of Hume’s Psychological Problem of Induction 11. Restatement of the Psychological Problem of Induction 12. The Traditional Problem of Induction and the Invalidity of all Principles or Rules of Induction 13. Beyond the Problems of Induction and Demarcation 2. Two Faces of Common Sense: An Argument for Commonsense Realism and Against the Commonsense Theory of Knowledge 1. An Apology for Philosophy 2. The Insecure Starting-Point: Common Sense and Criticism 3. Contrast with Other Approaches 4. Realism 5. Arguments for Realism 6. Remarks on Truth 7. Content, Truth Content, and Falsity Content 8. Remarks on Verisimilitude 9. Verisimilitude and the Search for Truth 10. Truth and Verisimilitude as Aims 11. Comments on the Notions of Truth and Verisimilitude 12. The Mistaken Commonsense Theory of Knowledge 13. Criticism of the Commonsense Theory of Knowledge 14. Criticism of the Subjectivist Theory of Knowledge 15. The Pre-Darwinian Character of the Commonsense Theory of Knowledge 16. Sketch of an Evolutionary Epistemology 17. Background Knowledge and Problems 18. All Knowledge is Theory-Impregnated, Including Our Observations 19. Retrospect on Subjectivist Epistemology 20. Knowledge in the Objective Sense 21. The Quest for Certainty and the Main Weakness of the Commonsense Theory of Knowledge 22. Analytical Remarks on Certainty 23. The Method of Science 24. Critical Discussion, Rational Preference, and the Problem of the Analyticity of Our Choices and Predictions 25. Science: The Growth of Knowledge through Criticism and Inventiveness An Afterthought on Induction 26. Hume’s Problems of Causation and Induction 27. Why Hume’s Logical Problem of Induction is Deeper than his Problem of Causation 28. Kant’s Intervention: Objective Knowledge 29. The Solution of Hume’s Paradox: Restoration of Rationality 30. Muddles Connected with the Problem of Induction 31. What Remains from the Mistaken Problem of Justifying Induction? 32. Dynamic Scepticism: Confrontation With Hume 33. Analysis of an Argument from the Improbability of Accidents 34. Summary: Common Sense and Criticism 3. Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject 1. Three Theses on Epistemology and the Third World 2. A Biological Approach to the Third World 3. The Objectivity and the Autonomy of the Third World 4. Language, Criticism, and the Third World 5. Historical Remarks 6. Appreciation and Criticism of Brouwer’s Epistemology 7. Subjectivism in Logic, Probability Theory, and Physical Science 8. The Logic and the Biology of Discovery 9. Discovery, Humanism, and Self-Transcendence Select Bibliography 4. On the Theory of the Objective Mind 1. Pluralism and the Principle of the Three Worlds 2. The Causal Relations between the Three Worlds 3. The Objectivity of the Third World 4. The Third World as a Man-Made Product 5. The Problem of Understanding 6. Psychological Processes of Thought and Third-World Objects 7. Understanding and Problem-Solving 8. A Very Trivial Example 9. A Case of Objective Historical Understanding 10. The Value of Problems 11. Understanding (‘Hermeneutics’) in the Humanities 12. Comparison with Collingwood’s Method of Subjective Re-enactment 5. The Aim of Science Select Bibliography Bibliographical Note 6. Of Clouds and Clocks: An Approach to the Problem of Rationality and the Freedom of Man. 7. Evolution and the Tree of Knowledge 1. Some Remarks on Problems and the Growth of Knowledge 2. Remarks on Methods in Biology, and Especially in the Theory of Evolution 3. A Conjecture: ‘Genetic Dualism’ Addendum. The Hopeful Behavioural Monster 8. A Realist View of Logic, Physics, and History 1. Realism and Pluralism: Reduction versus Emergence 2. Pluralism and Emergence in History 3. Realism and Subjectivism in Physics 4. Realism in Logic 9. Philosophical Comments on Tarski’s Theory of Truth Addendum. A Note on Tarski’s Definition of Truth Appendix 1. The Bucket and the Searchlight: Two Theories of Knowledge Appendix 2. Supplementary Remarks (1978) Index of Names Index of Subjects