North Korea, Nuclear Risk-Taking, and the United States: Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un (Lexington Studies on Korea's Place in International Relations)

Jihwan Hwang analyzes Pyongyang’s nuclear policy changes over the last three decades under Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un. Why did a weaker North Korea take the risk of standing up against the much stronger U.S. with its nuclear weapons program, even escalating the crisis to the point of a war? Later, why did North Korea change its course of action amid the crisis even though the security environment remained essentially the same? Hwang draws on the main tenets of prospect theory in international relations and argues that Pyongyang becomes either risk-acceptant or risk-averse toward the U.S., depending on the situation it faces. When Pyongyang perceived the status quo to be deteriorating, it framed its situation as a loss and chose a risk-acceptant of confrontation to restore the status quo. Equally, when Pyongyang perceived the situation to be improving, it chose a risk-averse engagement in the domain of gain. In contrast, when Pyongyang perceived an extreme loss such as military confrontation against the United States, it would rather choose a risk-averse policy to avoid the catastrophic outcome of war. The issues of risk are central to an understanding of Pyongyang’s nuclear policy decision-making. Cover Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page List of Tables Acknowledgments Introduction Overview Pyongyang’s Policy Changes Pyongyang’s Initial Framing Policy Question Definition of Risk Research Methodology Within-Case Method Case Study of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis Causal Mechanism Three Leaders and Multiple Observations Outline of the Book Notes Chapter 1: Realism and Liberalism on the North Korean Nuclear Crisis Realist Approach Determined to Seek Nuclear Deterrence Pursuing Expansionist Ambitions Resolving Security Concerns Criticism Liberal Approaches Reciprocal Behavior Pyongyang’s Changed Nature Criticism Explanations by Domestic Determinants Domestic Political Structure History and Culture Criticism Explanation by Prospect Theory Summary Points of Agreement Points of Disagreement Where Does This Book Go from Here? Notes Chapter 2: Theorizing the North Korean Nuclear Risk-Taking: Prospect Theory Prospect Theory and Decision-Making Under Risk Reference Dependence Risk-Taking Tendency: Risk-Aversion versus Risk-Acceptance Loss-Aversion Shifts of Reference Probability Weighting Function and the Certainty Effect Framing and Evaluation Prospect Theory, Weaker States, and Foreign Policy Framing Strategic Interaction Domestic–International Interactions Weaker States Dynamic Change in Framing Evaluation: Choosing a Foreign Policy Option Loss-Aversion and Status Quo Bias in the International Domain Catastrophic Outcome and Preference Reversal Domestic Loss-Aversion and International Risk-Taking Summary Notes Chapter 3: Kim Il Sung: From Confrontation to Engagement Framing North Korea’s Post–Cold War Domain of Action Pyongyang’s Situation during the Cold War Pyongyang’s Perception during the Cold War Change of Situation and the Reference Point after the Cold War The Soviet Union China North Korea’s Economic Situation Pyongyang’s External Perception Evaluating North Korea’s Policy Options after the Cold War Relative Riskiness of Each Policy Option Confronting the United States with a Nuclear Program Engaging the United States Relative Riskiness of Two Policy Options Pyongyang’s Policy Decision Reframing North Korea’s Domain of Action: June 1994 Change in Pyongyang’s International Situation UN Sanctions U.S. Military Strikes Change of Pyongyang’s Perception and Risk-Taking Attitude Pyongyang Changed Its Course of Action: June 1994 From Confrontation to Engagement Domestic Situation and Nuclear Policy: 1989–1994 Domestic Stability Leadership Succession Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Summary Notes Chapter 4: Kim Jong Il: From Engagement to Confrontation The Agreed Framework, the Clinton Administration, and North Korea: Post-June 1994 Pyongyang’s Improving International Situation The Agreed Framework Improving Relations between Pyongyang and Washington Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy: Engaging the United States Implementation of the Agreed Framework Missile Moratorium Reaching out to Washington Avoiding Losses and Seeking Gains The Agreed Framework, the Bush Administration, and North Korea: Pre-October 2002 Pyongyang’s Changing Situation: Returning to Losses Pyongyang’s Increasing Threat Perception The Bush Administration’s Perception of North Korea September 11 and the “Axis of Evil” Pyongyang’s Nuclear Policy: From Engagement to Restraint The Collapse of the Agreed Framework: October 2002 Reframing Pyongyang’s Domain of Action: Losses The Kelly Visit and the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Program Pyongyang’s Subsequent Perception of the United States Pyongyang Changes Its Course of Action: From Restraint to Confrontation The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Post-October 2002 Pyongyang’s Domain of Action: Growing Losses The Iraq War Six-Party Talks Deepening Crisis Pyongyang’s Nuclear Policy: Deepening Nuclear Confrontation The Six-Party Talks Agreements and Nuclear Tests: 2005–2011 Pyongyang’s Perception of Threat The Six-Party Talks Agreements and U.S. Policy toward North Korea The Obama Administration and Pyongyang’s Perception Pyongyang’s Nuclear Policy: Conducting Two Nuclear Tests amid Six-Party Talks Domestic Situation and Nuclear Policy: 1995–2011 Food Crisis and “Arduous March”: Seeking Help and Saving the Regime Regime Stability under Kim Jong Il Leadership Succession to Kim Jong Un Summary Notes Chapter 5: Kim Jong Un: Between Confrontation and Engagement The “Byungjin” and Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: 2012–2017 Pyongyang’s Perception: A New Leadership and the Need for Nuclear Deterrence China and Kim Jong Un Regime The Obama Administration and Kim Jong Un Regime Pyongyang’s Threat Perception Pyongyang’s Nuclear Policy: Byungjin and Acquiring Nuclear Deterrence Capability Byungjin and Nuclear Tests Acquiring Nuclear Deterrence Capability Inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korean Summits: 2018–2019 Pyongyang’s Perception: Self-Confidence in Nuclear Deterrence Self-Confidence in Nuclear Deterrence Capability The Trump Administration and “America First” Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy: Summits with South Korea and the United States The Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity, and Unification of the Korean Peninsula Trump-Kim Summit in Singapore Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 The Collapse of Summits and “Head-on Breakthrough”: After 2020 Pyongyang’s Perception: Returning to the Past Between Denuclearization and Peace Regime Pyongyang’s Perception at Hanoi and After Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy: Returning to Confrontation Domestic Situation and Nuclear Policy in the Kim Jong Un Era Regime Stability under Kim Jong Un COVID-19 and the Kim Jong Un Regime Summary Notes Conclusion Competing Explanations Some Implications for Future Study The Current North Korean Nuclear Crisis Implications for Other Cases Theoretical Implications Note Bibliography Index About the Author