Norms, naturalism, and epistemology : the case for science without norms

Jonathan Knowles argues against theories that seek to provide specific norms for the formation of belief on the basis of empirical sources: the project of naturalized epistemology. He argues that such norms are either not genuinely normative for belief, or are not required for optimal belief formation. An exhaustive classification of such theories is motivated and each variety is discussed in turn. He distinguishes naturalized epistemology from the less committal idea of naturalism, which provides a sense in which we can achieve epistemic normativity without norms. Naturalism Is Winning Ever-increasing Popularity In Philosophy. In This Book, Concerning Epistemology, The Author Seeks To Argue That Naturalism Brings With It Certain Costs In The Form Of Limitations On Our Philosophical Ambitions. On The Conception Of Naturalism Defended, There Are And Can Be No A Priori Norms For Guiding Our Belief-formation: We Must Start Our Inquires In Situ, Assuming Some Beliefs And The General Reliability Of Our Basic Cognitive Practices To Justify Others. Naturalised Epistemology Seeks To Build On, But Also Goes Beyond Naturalism: To Motivate And Justify Specifiable Epistemic Norms Using Naturalistic Materials. The Author Argues That, Whilst Naturalism Must Be Embraced, This More Ambitious Project Is In Vain. A Systematic Taxonomy Of The Possible Varieties Of Naturalised Epistemology Is Presented, Followed By Critique Of Each In Turn. The Underlying Theme Of The Discussion Is That To The Extent One Can Genuinely Justify Naturalistic Norms, They Are Not Needed For Optimal Rational Belief-formation.--book Jacket. 1. Traditional Epistemology And Naturalism -- 2. Naturalised Epistemology -- 3. Anti-psychologism -- 4. Anti-foundationalism -- 5. Psychologistic Naturalised Epistemology -- Conclusion: Science Without Norms. Jonathan Knowles. Includes Bibliographical References. Naturalism is winning ever-increasing popularity in philosophy. In this book, concerning epistemology, the author seeks to argue that naturalism brings with it certain costs in the form of limitations on our philosophical ambitions. On the conception of naturalism defended, there are and can be no a priori norms for guiding our belief-formation: we must start our inquiries in situ, assuming some beliefs and the general reliability of our basic cognitive practices to justify others. Naturalised epistemology seeks to build on, but also go beyond naturalism: to motivate and justify specifiable epistemic norms using naturalistic material. The author argues that, whilst naturalism must be embraced, this more ambitious project is in vain. A systematic taxonomy of the possible varieties of naturalised epistemology is presented, followed by critique of each in turn. The underlying theme of the discussion is that to the extent one can genuinely justify naturalistic norms, they are not needed for optimal rational belief-formation In the field of epistemology, naturalism holds that there are no a priori norms for guiding our belief-formation: we must start our inquiries in situ , assuming some beliefs and the general reliability of our basic cognitive practices to justify others. Naturalized epistemology seeks to motivate norms for cognitive enquiry on such a naturalistic basis. The author argues that, whilst naturalism must be embraced, this more abmitious project is in vain: to the extent one can justify naturalistic norms, they are not needed for optimal rational belief-formation. My overarching thesis - as I will henceforth refer to it - is that, to the extent we can make sense of naturalistic epistemic norms, there is no need for such norms in the process of rational belief-formation.