Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness (Elements in Philosophy of Mind)

"Is consciousness a purely physical phenomenon? Most contemporary philosophers and theorists hold that it is, and take this to be supported by modern science. But a significant minority endorse non-physicalist theories such as dualism, idealism and panpsychism, among other reasons because it may seem impossible to fully explain consciousness, or capture what it's like to be in conscious states (such as seeing red, or being in pain), in physical terms. This Element will introduce the main non-physicalist theories of consciousness and explain the most important arguments for them, and consider how they each respond to the scientific and other arguments in support of physicalism. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core." - https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/nonphysicalist-theories-of-consciousness/BD11AFA6D1ABF9EAD3597880C7E15DDB Cover Title page Copyright page Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness Contents Introduction 1 Consciousness and Physicalism 1.1 Consciousness 1.2 Physicalism 1.3 Arguments for Physicalism 1.3.1 The Argument from Mind–Brain Correlations 1.3.2 The Argument from Physical Causal Closure 1.3.3 The Argument from Previous Explanatory Successes 1.4 Arguments against Physicalism 1.4.1 The Knowledge Argument 1.4.2 The Conceivability Argument 1.4.3 The Explanatory Argument 1.4.4 The Epistemic Gap – and Physicalist Responses 1.4.5 Arguments Based on Intentionality 1.4.6 Arguments Based on Unity 2 Dualism 2.1 Substance Dualism, Property Dualism, and Emergentism 2.2 The Interaction Problem 2.3 Dualism and the Arguments for Physicalism 2.3.1 Epiphenomenalist Dualism 2.3.2 Overdetermination Dualism 2.3.3 Interactionist Dualism 3 Subjective Idealism and Phenomenalism 3.1 Berkeleyan Idealism 3.2 Quantum Idealism 3.3 Subjective Idealism and the Arguments for and against Physicalism 3.4 Phenomenalism 3.5 Phenomenalism and the Arguments for and against Physicalism 4 Dual-Aspect Monism (or Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism) 4.1 The Background for Dual-Aspect Monism 4.2 Arguments for Dual-Aspect Monism 4.2.1 The Argument from the Intrinsic Nature of the Physical 4.2.2 The “Solving Two Problems at Once” Argument (or Dual-Aspect Monism and the Arguments for Physicalism) 4.2.3 The Argument from Non-emergence 4.2.4 The Argument from the Integrated Information Theory 4.4 Objections to Dual-Aspect Monism 4.4.1 The Incredulous Stare 4.4.2 Pure Dispositionalism and Ontic Structural Realism 4.4.3 The Combination Problem Conclusion – With a Word on Mysterianism References Acknowledgments