No Clear And Present Danger : A Skeptical View Of The UNited States Entry Into World War II

From the Preface to the Twenty-fifth Anniversary Edition:This was a controversial book, and likely remains so. The world 25 years later looks quite different. With the end of the Cold War, the United States is now the world’s only superpower. If this country cannot shape the international system and bring peace and stability to much of the world, surely no other state can. Yet the will to a broadly internationalist foreign policy cannot currently be found in the United States. The near-consensus that ranged across foreign policy elites before the Vietnam War has never been restored. Maybe that’s just as well. But I hold to much of the basic perspective of this book as offering some guidance for fellow “cooperative internationalists.” The power to shape international affairs is limited; military intervention is a costly, blunt, and dangerous instrument. The five questions I ask on page 108 of this book remain appropriate. I do believe there are appropriate circumstances for military action in international affairs. In most circumstances I do not believe that it is desirable, effective, or just to try to spread democracy or other American values by force of arms. Much more could be done by way of financial assistance as well as consistent ideological and technical support to create a more democratic and interdependent environment within which peace can be secured. If the Vietnam War derived in substantial part from an overconfident and unilateral interpretation of history, that is a mistake from which we can still learn. There is, in a post-Cold War climate, a great need for an active, engaged U.S. foreign policy. Isolationism is not a viable solution. Yet given the limits of American power and wisdom, an engaged policy has to be conducted in a multilateral framework, informed by criticisms as well as agreement from other countries, and carried out with their active cooperation in multilateral institutions. Published at the height of the Vietnam War, No Clear and Present Danger argues that if the Vietnam War derived in substantial part from an overconfident and unilateral interpretation of history, that is a mistake from which we can still learn. Contents Preface to the Twenty-fifth Anniversary Edition Preface 1 Isolationism Old and New 2 The Impending Stalemate in Europe 3 A Hobson's Choice for Japan 4 From the North Atlantic to the Tonkin Gulf 5 Force and Choice in the Environment of International Politics Index First published at the height of the Vietnam War, this book argues that America's involvement in the conflict arose substantially from an over-confident and unilateral interpretation of history, and that the mistake is one from which lessons can still be learned. Whatever criticisms of twentieth-century American foreign policy are put forth, United States participation in World War II remains almost entirely immune.