НЕЙРОПСИХОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ ДИАГНОСТИКА И КОРРЕКЦИЯ В ДЕТСКОМ ВОЗРАСТЕ

А.В.СЕМЕНОВИЧ/НЕЙРОПСИХОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ ДИАГНОСТИКА И КОРРЕКЦИЯ В ДЕТСКОМ ВОЗРАСТЕ КНИГИ ; ГУМАНИТАРНЫЕ НАУКИ ВЫСШЕЕ ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ А.В.СЕМЕНОВИЧНЕЙРОПСИХОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ ДИАГНОСТИКА И КОРРЕКЦИЯ В ДЕТСКОМ ВОЗРАСТЕМоскваACADEMA2002формат: DOCразмер rar архива: 3,56 Mb Рекомендовано Советом УМО университетов РФ по психологии в качестве учебного пособия для высших учебных заведений, ведущих подготовку кадров по психологическим направлениям и специальностям...Нейропсихологический метод действительно занимает особое место в ряду научных дисциплин, обращенных к проблеме онтогенеза в норме и патологии. Только он позволяет оценить и описать те системно-динамические перестройки, которые сопровождают психическое развитие ребенка с точки зрения его мозгового обеспечения. Но описать - это значит понять. Понять глубинные механизмы его психического статуса и спланировать адекватную онтогенезу именно этого, конкретного ребенка программу психолого-педагогического сопровождения....com uploadbox.com 68 1 2 3 4 5 Annotation After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and militarylessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case

After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.

" After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case. " "In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by driving 1.5 million Albanians from their homes and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them.". "In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win.". "The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case."--BOOK JACKET. Publisher Fact Sheet An in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis that explores the causes, conduct, & consequences of the war. Based largely on interviews with many of the key participants, this landmark retrospective is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be effective against genocide, mass killing, & the forceful expulsion of entire populations Based on interviews with many of the key participants in the Kosovo crisis of 1999, this book discusses the causes, conduct and consequences of the war. The authors conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned