New order in the Gulf : the rise of the UAE

Gulf region in 2003, the region was firmly split into two poles, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Yet Saudi Arabia's long-standing rivalry with Iran was not the only relationship shaping the Persian Gulf region, even if it was the dominant one. Riyadh's -at times turbulent -relation with its allies and smaller neighbours was also a major factor. In general terms, from their birth in the early 1970s (except Oman, which gained its independence from Britain in 1951 and Kuwait in 1961), the other Arab Gulf states -Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and the UAEfit into and indeed reinforced this regional duality, largely deferring to Riyadh on policy decisions affecting the region. This conformity was due to several factors. First, independence from the UK occurred in a rapid time frame -between 1971 and 1972 -and went against the wishes of the sheikhdoms, who wanted the UK to remain to protect them from overbearing neighbours like Iran. 4 Second, the smaller Gulf Arab countries feared Saudi hegemony and reprisals, especially in light of some of the small territorial disputes that existed among them. Third, their newly independent status meant that the political elites focused on managing their own internal dynamics and setting up state institutions. Internal threats to the leadership of the Gulf sheikhdoms were common during this early period. The sheikhdoms that would eventually come together to form the UAE, for example, could not agree on the form their country would take, 5 and after the federation's formation in 1971, internal political wrangling continued for the country's first two decades of existence. 6 In Oman, Qaboos bin Said al Said overthrew his father and became sultan in 1970, while an internal rebellion was underway in the Dhofar region. 7 In Qatar, six months after independence, Khalifa bin Hamad al Thani deposed his cousin, Ahmad bin Ali al Thani, the then emir of Qatar, in February 1972. 8 As a result, defaulting to Riyadh for major regional policy decisions and leadership was a convenient path to follow. The need for the smaller Gulf Arab states to guard against foreign threats from bigger and more capable neighbouring countries reinforced this trend of deference to Saudi Arabia. The arrival of Iranian troops on the disputed island of Tunbs on 30 November 1971, just as British troops left, only served to highlight the Iranian threat, which further worsened with the advent of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Despite this, relations between Saudi Arabia and its smaller neighbours were not without problems. The UAE and its neighbours feared that Saudi Arabia would impose its vision for the region, including its perception of regional threats and its policies, on them. "For over a decade now, thinking on regional relations in the Gulf has focused on the competition for regional hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Today, this perspective is outdated. The smaller Gulf Arab states, led by the United Arab Emirates, are calling for their own goals and interests to be considered and a new regional order has emerged. This book assesses the UAE's increasing power and the future challenges to security it poses. It is a contemporary history and analysis of the changing role of the UAE. Dina Esfandiary argues that the UAE has become more assertive in the pursuit of its own interests in the region and beyond - even when this puts it at odds with its regional allies. This behavior includes the build-up of its military and non-military capabilities, the diversification of its partners, and its willingness to use these resources. The book examines the regional causes of the UAE's growing assertiveness - especially the 2011 Arab Uprisings - as well as the international context such as the impact of the US-announced 'Pivot to Asia', the perceptions of waning US power in the Middle East, and the 2015 nuclear deal. The UAE's changing role in the region will profoundly affect regional security. This book points towards how smaller states in the region will interact with regional hegemons in the long term, as they learn from the UAE's assertiveness and seek to imitate it." --Publisher's description Contents Introduction 1 A critical moment: The 2011 Arab Spring 2 The US ‘Pivot to Asia’ 3 The 2015 Iran nuclear deal 4 The UAE’s growing assertiveness 5 The perception of success 6 What this means for the Persian Gulf Conclusion Notes Select Bibliography Index