Neuroscience and Legal Responsibility (Oxford Series in Neuroscience, Law, and Philosophy)

How should neuroscience, psychology and behavioral genetics impact legal responsibility practices? Recent findings from these fields are sometimes claimed to threaten the moral foundations of legal responsibility practices by revealing that determinism, or something like it, is true. On this account legal responsibility practices should be abolished because there is no room for such outmoded fictions as responsibility in an enlightened and scientifically-informed approach to the regulation of society. However, the chapters in this volume reject this claim and its related agenda of radical legal reform. Embracing instead a broadly compatibilist approach - one according to which responsibility hinges on psychological features of agents not on metaphysical features of the universe - this volume's authors demonstrate that the behavioral and mind sciences may impact legal responsibility practices in a range of different ways, for instance: by providing fresh insight into the nature of normal and pathological human agency, by offering updated medical and legal criteria for forensic practitioners as well as powerful new diagnostic and intervention tools and techniques with which to appraise and to alter minds, and by raising novel regulatory challenges. Science and law have been locked in a philosophical dialogue on the nature of human agency ever since the 13th century when a mental element was added to the criteria for legal responsibility. The rich story told by the 14 essays in this volume testifies that far from ending this philosophical dialogue, neuroscience, psychology and behavioral genetics have the potential to further enrich and extend this dialogue. ## Abstract How should neuroscience, psychology and behavioural genetics impact on legal responsibility practices? Recent findings from these fields are sometimes claimed to threaten the moral foundations of legal responsibility practices by revealing that determinism, or something like it, is true. On this account legal responsibility practices should be abolished because there is no room for such outmoded fictions as responsibility in an enlightened and scientifically-informed approach to the regulation of society. However, the chapters in this volume reject this claim and its related agenda of radical legal reform. Embracing instead a broadly compatibilist approach – one according to which responsibility hinges on psychological features of agents not on metaphysical features of the universe – this volume’s authors demonstrate that the behavioural and mind sciences may impact on legal responsibility practices in a range of different ways. For instance, by providing fresh insight into the nature of normal and pathological human agency, by offering updated medical and legal criteria for forensic practitioners as well as powerful new diagnostic and intervention tools and techniques with which to appraise and to alter minds, and by raising novel regulatory challenges. Science and law have been locked in a dialogue on the nature of human agency ever since the 13th century when a mental element was added to the criteria for legal responsibility. The rich story told by the authors in this volume testifies that far from ending this dialogue, neuroscience, psychology and behavioural genetics have the potential to further enrich and extend this dialogue. Cover 6 Contents 6 Contributors 8 1. Law and Neuroscience: Historical Context 10 PART 1 Responsibility and Mental Capacity 34 2. Common Criminal Law Compatibilism 36 3. What Can Neurosciences Say About Responsibility? Taking the Distinction Between Th eoretical and Practical Reason Seriously 62 4. Irrationality, Mental Capacities, and Neuroscience 94 PART 2 Reappraising Agency 120 5. Skepticism Concerning Human Agency: Sciences of the Self Versus “Voluntariness” in the Law 122 6. The Implications of Heuristics and Biases Research on Moral and Legal Responsibility: A Case Against the Reasonable Person Standard 144 7. Moral Responsibility and Consciousness: Two Challenges, One Solution 172 PART 3 Assessment 190 8. Translating Scientific Evidence into the Language of the “Folk”: Executive Function as Capacity-Responsibility 192 9. Neuroscience, Deviant Appetites, and the Criminal Law 214 PART 4 Disease and Disorder 236 10. Is Psychopathy a Mental Disease? 238 11. Addiction, Choice, and Disease: How Voluntary Is Voluntary Action in Addiction? 266 12. How May Neuroscience Affect the Way that the Criminal Courts Deal with Addicted Offenders? 288 PART 5 Modification 312 13. Enhancing Responsibility 314 14. Guilty Minds in Washed Brains? Manipulation Cases and the Limits of Neuroscientific Excuses in Liberal Legal Orders 344 Index 384 A 384 B 386 C 387 D 390 E 391 F 392 G 392 H 392 I 393 J 394 K 394 L 394 M 395 N 398 O 399 P 399 R 401 S 402 T 403 U 403 V 403 W 404 Law and neuroscience : historical context / Nicole A. Vincent Common criminal law compatibilism / Stephen J. Morse What can neurosciences say about responsibility? Taking the distinction between theoretical and practical reason seriously / Anne Ruth Mackor Irrationality, mental capacities and neuroscience / Jillian Craigie and Alicia Coram Skepticism concerning human agency : sciences of the self vs. "voluntariness" in the law / Paul Sheldon Davies The implications of heuristics and biases research on moral and legal responsibility : a case against the reasonable person standard / Leora Dahan-Katz Moral responsibility and consciousness : two challenges, one solution / Neil Levy Translating scientific evidence into the language of the "folk" : executive function as capacity-responsibility / Katrina L. Sifferd Neuroscience, deviant appetites and the criminal law / Colin Gavaghan Is psychopathy a mental disease? / Thomas Nadelhoffer and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong Addiction, choice, and disease : how voluntary is voluntary action in addiction? / Jeanette Kennett How may neuroscience affect the way that the criminal courts deal with addicted offenders? / Wayne Hall and Adrian Carter Enhancing responsibility / Nicole A. Vincent Guilty minds in washed brains? Manipulation cases, excuses and the limits of neuroscientific excuses in liberal legal orders / Christoph Bublitz and Reinhard Merkel. Introduction / Nicole A. Vincent -- Criminal common law compatibilism / Stephen J. Morse -- What can neurosciences say about responsibility? : taking the distinction between theoretical and practical reason seriously / Anne Ruth Mackor -- Irrationality, mental capacities and neuroscience / Jillian Craigie and Alicia Coram -- Skepticism concerning human agency : sciences of the self vs. "voluntariness" in the law / Paul Sheldon Davies -- The implications of heuristics and biases research on moral and legal responsibility : a case against the reasonable person standard / Leora Dahan-Katz -- Moral responsibility and consciousness : two challenges, one solution / Neil Levy -- Translating scientific evidence into the language of the "folk" : executive function as capacity-responsibility / Katrina L. Sifferd -- Neuroscience, deviant appetites and the criminal law / Colin Gavaghan -- Is psychopathy a mental disease? / Thomas Nadelhoffer & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong -- Addiction, choice, and disease : how voluntary is voluntary action in addiction? / Jeanette Kennett -- How may neuroscience affect the way that the criminal courts deal with addicted offenders? / Wayne Hall & Adrian Carter -- Enhancing responsibility / Nicole A. Vincent -- Guilty minds in washed brains? : manipulation cases, excuses and the normative prerequisites of liberal legal orders / Christoph Bublitz & Reinhard Merkel "How should neuroscience, psychology, and behavioral genetics impact legal responsibility practices? Recent findings from these fields are sometimes claimed to threaten the moral foundations of legal responsibility practices by revealing that determinism, or something like it, is true. On this account legal responsibility practices should be abolished because there is no room for such outmoded fictions as responsibility in an enlightened and scientifically informed approach to the regulation of society. However, the chapters in this volume reject this claim and its related agenda of radical legal reform. Embracing instead a broadly compatibilist approach - one according to which responsibility hinges on psychological features of agents, not on metaphysical features of the universe - this volume's authors demonstrate that the behavioral and mind sciences may impact legal responsibility practices in a range of different ways: by providing fresh insight into the nature of normal and pathological human agency, by offering updated medical and legal criteria for forensic practitioners as well as powerful new diagnostic and intervention tools and techniques with which to appraise and to alter minds, and by raising novel regulatory challenges"--Jacket Adopting a broadly compatibilist approach, this volume's authors argue that the behavioral and mind sciences do not threaten the moral foundations of legal responsibility. Rather, these sciences provide fresh insight into human agency and updated criteria as well as powerful diagnostic and intervention tools for assessing and altering minds.