Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy): An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of ourselves as animals whose behavior, however highly evolved, conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the skepticism of many philosophers who have argued that "free will" is impossible under "scientific determinism." This skepticism is best overcome according to the author, by defending a causal theory of action, that is by establishing that actions are constituted by behavioral events with the appropriate kind of mental causal history. He sets out a rich and subtle argument for such a theory and defends it against its critics. Thus the book demonstrates the importance of philosophical work in action theory for the central metaphysical task of understanding our place in nature. Introduction NOTES 1 The problem of natural agency I. A THEORY IN SEARCH OF ITS PROBLEM The Standard Answer: Accounting for the Action/Behavior Distinction Locating Agency in Context: Our Ethical Perspective What is Philosophically Puzzling About Agency? The Natural Perspective on Action Skepticism About Natural Agency: A First Statement Is Skepticism About Action Out of Date? II. COMMITMENTS OF THE ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE What Kind of Freedom of Action Does Moral Responsibility Entail? Freedom as Satisfaction of the ”Could Have Done Otherwise” Condition The Frankfurt Counterexamples Moral Luck and the Condition of Control The Condition of Control as a CDO Condition Actions as Exercises of Control III. COMMITMENTS OF THE NATURAL PERSPECTIVE The ”Containment of Indeterminism” Response Restating the Problem of Natural Agency as Independent of Determinism The ”Dilemma” Formulation of the Problem of Natural Agency A Radical Separation of the Problem of Natural Agency from the Question of Determinism The ”Clash of Explanation-Types” Formulation Assessment of the Clash of Explanation-Types Formulation The Dennett-MayKay Complementarity Thesis Limits of the Complementarity Thesis An Emphatic Aside: Realism About Action IV. THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL AGENCY — AND A PLAUSIBLE SOLUTION The Agent-Causation Formulation of the Problem of Natural Agency Further Advantages to the Agent-Causation Formulation The Causal Theory of Action as a Solution to the Problem of Natural Agency NOTES 2 The value of a causal theory of action I. A TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL AGENCY II. IS ACTION POSSIBLE UNDER DETERMINISM? The Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism Questioning the Main Modal Principle: Slote’s Implicit Appeal to CTA Additional Note: Earlier Criticisms of the Consequence Argument The Place of CTA in Compatibilist Responses to the Consequence Argument A CTA Sufficient to Defeat the Consequence Argument Will Need to Be Deterministic The Case Against a Specifically Deterministic Causal Theory of Action Should Incompatibilists Seek to Reject CTA Altogether? III. IS ACTION POSSIBLE UNDER INDETERMINISM? Agent-Causation Is a Probabilistic Causal Theory of Action Possible? IV. A COMPARISON WITH DENNETT’S ELBOW ROOM Dennett’s Negative Case for Reconciliatory Naturalism Reconstructing the Natural Evolution of Agency: Its Independence of the Metaphysical Problem Dennett’s Epistemologizing of the Free Will Problem Does Intentional Systems Theory Alone Resolve the Problem of Natural Agency V. THE CONDITIONAL ANALYSIS ARGUMENT Problems for the Conditional Analysis Argument Revising the CAA Strategy The Impotence of CAA without CTA NOTES 3 Developing a causal theory of action I. CAUSAL ANALYSES OF ACTION A First Approach to a CTA Analysis Is a CTA Analysis in Terms of Reasons Even Possible? How to Make a Positive Case for a Reason-Based CTA Analysis A First Hypothesis for a CTA Analysis Intentional Action and Action in General II. THE CHALLENGE OF AKRASIA Characterizing Weak-willed Action Are Weak-willed Actions a Real Possibility? How Akrasia Poses a Problem for a CTA Analysis How to Specify the Rationality Condition for a CTA Analysis: Davidson’s Notion of an Unconditional Practical Judgment Unconditional Practical Judgments Construed as Intentions An Independent Argument for Admitting Intentions The Possibility of Final Stage Akrasia Akrasia as a Problem for CTA’s Causal Condition NOTES 4 The challenge of causal deviance Causally Deviant Counterexamples to CTA-H How Deviant Cases Challenge CTA Match with the Action-Plan as Necessary for Nondeviant Action Making Precise the Condition of Match with the Action-Plan The Problem of Basic Deviance Excluding Basic Deviance: The Causal Chain Must Constitute Practical Reasoning Excluding Basic Deviance: Causation by Virtually Concurrent Intentions Excluding Basic Deviance: The Causal Immediacy Strategy Excluding Basic Deviance: Volitions May the Exclusion of Basic Deviance Be Left to Future Empirical Inquiry? NOTES 5 Coping with basic deviance I. THE PROMISE OF THE SENSITIVITY STRATEGY Counterfactual and Differential Explanation Versions of the Sensitivity Condition II. ALTERNATIVE VERSIONS OF THE SENSITIVITY STRATEGY The Frankfurt Examples Again The Reverse Behavioral Censor A Problem for the Differential Explanation Version? A Teleological Construal of the Sensitivity Condition III. ASSESSING THE SENSITIVITY STRATEGY Prosthetic Aids to Action Heteromesial Causal Chains Should a Sensitivity CTA Analysis Also Exclude Heteromesy? Heterogeneity Among the Heteromesial Cases Considerations About Responsibility as Reinforcing the Deviance of Preemptively Heteromesial Cases Implications of Preemptively Heteromesial Cases for a CTA Analysis A Consilience of Grounds for Rejecting a Sensitivity CTA Analysis IV. SENSITIVE AND SUSTAINED CAUSATION Sustained Causation Servosystems and Feedback Loops Preemptive Heteromesy Again Appeal to the Detailed Architecture of Feedback Loops The Final Breakthrough? NOTES 6 Limits for the causal theory of action I. DEALING WITH THE AGENT-CAUSATIONIST SYNDROME The Story So Far In What Sense Is Basic Action Primitive? Other Aspects of the Agent-Causationist Syndrome 1. Merely voluntary action 2. Final stage akrasia II. THE PLACE OF THE CAUSAL THEORY OF ACTION IN THE WIDER PROJECT OF RECONCILIATORY NATURALISM A Fundamental Problem Ignored? CTA-BI Solves the Problem of Natural Agency Only Given Natural Realism About Intentional States How Much of a Problem of Natural Moral Autonomy Remains Once CTA Resolves the Problem of Natural Agency? CTA and the Vindication of Moral Responsibility NOTES Bibliography Index