NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG : nuclear strategies and forces for Europe, 1949-2000

Containing the histories (from 1945 to the present) of the nuclear strategies of NATO, Britain and France, and of the defence preferences of the FRG (West Germany), this book shows how strategies were functions of a perceived Soviet threat and an American 'nuclear guarantee'. There were three options for West Europeans: a compromise with differing American needs in NATO, pursued by Britain and the FRG; national nuclear forces, developed by Britain and France; and projects for an independent European nuclear force. This book provides brief histories of the nuclear strategies of NATO as a whole, and of Britain and France, as well as the defence preferences of the FRG (West Germany), from the beginning of the Cold War. These are explained in relation to the perceived Soviet threat, and European perceptions of the reliability of the American 'nuclear guarantee'. Parallel and comparative analyses of these strategies show that once America was vulnerable to Soviet nuclear reprisals, American strategic preferences differed fundamentally from those of the Europeans, and that Britain and France mainly for this reason felt the need for nuclear forces of their own. This option was unavailable to the FRG, although it long pursued, together with the French and the Italians, the project of an independent European nuclear force. The convergence of European strategic needs is demonstrated, which accounts for other projects for and forms of European nuclear cooperation Front Matter....Pages i-xvii Western Europe between Soviet Threat and American Guarantee....Pages 1-25 NATO’s Nuclear Strategy: Compromises....Pages 26-62 British Strategy: Inter-Dependence....Pages 63-92 French Strategy: Independence....Pages 93-123 The Federal Republic of Germany: Consultation....Pages 124-147 Projects for a European Nuclear Force....Pages 148-172 Back Matter....Pages 173-256 This book provides brief histories of the nuclear strategies of NATO as a whole and of Britain and France, as well as the defense preference of the FRG (West Germany) from the beginning of the Cold War. Comparative analyses of these strategies show that once America was vulnerable to Soviet nuclear reprisals, American strategic preferences differed fundamentally from those of the Europeans.