Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and Mortality: From Frankfurt and MacIntyre to Kierkegaard (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy)

"In the last two decades, interest in narrative conceptions of identity has grown exponentially, though there is little agreement about what a "life-narrative" might be. In connecting Kierkegaard with virtue ethics, several scholars have recently argued that narrative models of selves and MacIntyre's concept of the unity of a life help make sense of Kierkegaard's existential stages and, in particular, explain the transition from "aesthetic" to "ethical" modes of life. But others have recently raised difficult questions both for these readings of Kierkegaard and for narrative accounts of identity that draw on the work of MacIntyre in general. While some of these objections concern a strong kind of unity or "wholeheartedness" among an agent's long-term goals or cares, the fundamental objection raised by critics is that personal identity cannot be a narrative, since stories are artifacts made by persons. In this book, Davenport defends the narrative approach to practical identity and autonomy in general, and to Kierkegaard's stages in particular."--Publisher's website Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and Mortality 6 Copyright 7 Contents 10 Acknowledgments 14 Sigla to Kierkegaard Works 18 1 Introduction: Autonomy, Practical Identity, Self, and Character 20 1 Existential Approaches to Personal Autonomy as Deep Responsibility 20 2 An Overview of Main Themes and the Structure of the Analysis 26 3 Practical Identity as the Issue: Parfit, Williams, Korsgaard, and Schechtman 29 4 Galen Strawson’s Episodic Self and Continuity of Consciousness 38 5 Finishing the Preliminaries: The Present Self and the Concept of Character 48 2 Narrative Realism about Practical Identity 57 1 Key Ontological and Practical Objections to Narrative Theories 57 2 Three Levels of Narrative Unity 60 2.1 Rudd and the Narrative Implications of Contemporary Action Theory 60 2.2 Levels 0 and 1: Consciousness and Planning Agency 64 3 Literature vs Life: the Hard Problem for Narrative Theories 68 3.1 Williams’ Flawed Critique of MacIntyre 68 3.2 Lippitt, Sartre, and the Logos Fallacy: Four Basic Theses of Narrative Realism 71 3.3 Constructivist Theories, Fictionalism, and the Logos Fallacy 78 4 The Defense of Narrative Realism: Towards a Viable Alternative 83 4.1 Carr and Ricoeur 83 4.2 Narravive, ‘Rosebud’ Elements, and Six Conditions of Narratival Connection 89 4.3 The Self-Deception Objection 102 5 Reflexive Additions: How Secondary Self-Narratives Enter into Our Narravive 104 3 Narrative Unity, Autonomy, and Kierkegaard’s Aesthetic-Ethical Distinction 110 1 Kierkegaard’s Contribution to Narrative Accounts of Practical Identity 110 1.1 The Debate since Kierkegaard After MacIntyre 110 1.2 A Summary of the Basic Narrative Realist Model of Practical Identity 113 1.3 Kierkegaardian Extensions of Narrative Realism 114 2 Narrative Unity-2 and Personal Autonomy: MacIntyre, Frankfurt, and Kierkegaard 119 2.1 Four Modifications to Initial Hierarchical Models of Formal Autonomy 119 2.2 How A and the Seducer fail the Integrity Requirement for Unity-2 125 3 From Unity-2 (Caring) to Unity-3 (Wholeheartedness) 129 3.1 Wholehearted Caring versus Essential and Instrumental Conflict 129 3.2 Wholeheartedness as a Regulative Good: Replies to Christman and Lippitt 133 4 The Aesthetic and Ethical Stages Restated 140 4.1 Kierkegaard’s Ethically Grounded Wholeheartedness 140 4.2 Strawson’s Aestheticism? 146 4 Kierkegaardian Wholeheartedness: Purity of Heart versus Doublemindedness 150 1 The Remaining Problems for a Narrative Realist Account of Personal Autonomy 150 2 Forms of Disunity in “Purity of Heart:” from Ethical to Religious Self-Unification 152 2.1 The PH Thesis and Narrative Identity 152 2.2 A Typology of Aesthetic and Ethical “Doublemindedness” 155 3 Infinite Resignation, Faith, and Jest: Further Levels of Narrative Unity 164 5 Selves in Time before Death: Kierkegaardian Religious Narrative Unity 169 1 The Problem of Mortality and the Ontology of Narrative Selves in Time 169 1.1 The Dilemma for Narrativist Realists 169 1.2 Existential Narrative Realism: Narravives as Freely Growing Blocks 172 2 Narrative Unity-3, Death, and Kierkegaardian Eschatological Faith 176 2.1 Three Versions of the Problem 176 2.2 Kierkegaard’s Answer 179 3 Conclusion I: from Unity-3 to Unity-4 (Existential Faith) 184 4 Conclusion II: The Next Steps 185 Notes 188 Bibliography 224 Index 236