Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in North Germany, 1813 (Campaigns and Commanders, 1)

At a time when Napoleon needed all his forces to reassert French dominance in Central Europe, why did he fixate on the Prussian capital of Berlin? Instead of concentrating his forces for a decisive showdown with the enemy, he repeatedly detached large numbers of troops, under ineffective commanders, toward the capture of Berlin. In Napoleon and Berlin, Michael V. Leggiere explores Napoleon's almost obsessive desire to capture Berlin and how this strategy ultimately lost him all of Germany.Napoleon's motives have remained a subject of controversy from his own day until ours. He may have hoped to deliver a tremendous blow to Prussia's war-making capacity and morale. Ironically, the heavy losses and strategic reverses sustained by the French left Napoleon's Grande Armee vulnerable to an Allied coalition that eventually drove Napoleon from Central Europe forever. At A Time When Napoleon Needed All His Forces To Reassert French Dominance In Central Europe, Why Did He Fixate On The Prussian Capital Of Berlin? On Four Separate Occasions During The Campaign Of 1813, Napoleon Unleashed French Armies Against Berlin, And Each Time His Efforts Ended In Failure. In Napoleon And Berlin, Michael V. Leggiere Explores Napoleon's Almost Obsessive Desire To Capture Berlin And How This Strategy Ultimately Cost Him All Of Germany. Napoleon's Motives Have Remained A Subject Of Controversy From His Own Day Until Ours. Instead Of Concentrating His Forces For A Decisive Showdown With The Enemy, He Repeatedly Detached Large Numbers Of Troops, Under Ineffective Commanders, Toward The Capture Of Berlin. Napoleon Hoped To Deliver A Tremendous Blow To Prussia's War-making Capacity And Morale. Leggiere Argues That Ironically The Heavy Losses And Strategic Reverses The French Sustained In This Questionable Undertaking Left Napoleon's Grande Armee Vulnerable To An Allied Coalition That Eventually Drove Napoleon From Central Europe Forever. Based On Research In Archives Throughout France And Germany, This Book Is The First English-language History Of Prussia's War Of Liberation And Of Its Mobilization And Use Of The Landwehr, The Prussian Militia. Most Works On Napoleon Mention The Defense Of Berlin Only In Passing. This Book Proves That Prussia's Victory Over The French Decisively Contributed To Napoleon's Defeat In 1813. Not Only Did The Prussians Change The Course Of The War, But Their Victories Made Future Prussian And German Armies The Envy Of The World.--jacket. France And Prussia -- The Sixth Coalition -- The Defense Of Berlin -- Luckau -- Muskets, Saddles, And Shoes -- Axes, Spades, And Water -- Plans And Preparations -- Opening Moves -- Gross Beeren -- The Politics Of Dissension -- Dennewitz -- At The Rubicon -- Crossing The Rubicon -- Leipzig. Michael V. Leggiere. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [357]-370) And Index. At a time when Napoleon needed all his forces to reassert French dominance in Central Europe, why did he fixate on the Prussian capital of Berlin? Instead of concentrating his forces for a decisive showdown with the enemy, he repeatedly detached large numbers of troops, under ineffective commanders, toward the capture of Berlin. In Napoleon and Berlin, Michael V. Leggiere explores Napoleons almost obsessive desire to capture Berlin and how this strategy ultimately lost him all of Germany. Napoleons motives have remained a subject of controversy from his own day until ours. He may have hoped to deliver a tremendous blow to Prussias war-making capacity and morale. Ironically, the heavy losses and strategic reverses sustained by the French left Napoleons Grande Armee vulnerable to an Allied coalition that eventually drove Napoleon from Central Europe forever. Forfatteren beskriver to af Napoleons slag i Nordtyskland i 1813, det ene øst for Elben, det andet nord for Dresden. Fokus er rettet mod to temaer:1) Napoleons overordnede plan, hvor han i stedet for at holde sin styrke samlet opsplitter den for at erobre Berlin og slå den preussisk-svenske hær under Bernadotte; 2)Den preussiske mobilisering fra marts til junivåbenstilstanden, samtidig med at preussiske styrker supplerede med russiske førte henholdende kamp overfor Napoleons fremrykkende styrkermod Berlin. Bülow, Blücher, Boyen, Tauentzien Napoleon's unhealthy obsession with capturing Berlin is highlighted here for the first time, with fascinating details of this frustrating and ultimately unsuccessful campaign. (Military History)