Multi-Ethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

Incumbent leaders in African countries typically keep themselves in power, winning election after election, by using state resources to enlist the support of politicians from other ethnic groups. It is less evident how opposition politicians can form the electoral alliances needed to compete against these entrenched incumbents. This book explains how the business-state relationship can influence coalition bargaining among opposition politicians representing different ethnic groups. It combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls and institutions in order to prevent members of the business community — the main funders of parties in poor countries — from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to build multiethnic coalitions once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals. __Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa__ received the Best Book Award in 2013 from the African Politics Conference Group, an organized section of the American Political Science Association (APSA) and the African Studies Association (ASA). The book was also recognized in 2014 with an Honorable Mention for the Gregory Luebbert Prize for best book from the Comparative Politics section of the American Political Science Association (APSA). Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals. Dedication 3 Series Page 4 Title Page 6 Copyright 7 Table of Contents 8 List of Figures 9 List of Tables 11 Preface and Acknowledgments 12 List of Abbreviations 16 1 The Puzzle of Opposition Coordination 20 2 A Theory of Pecuniary Coalition Formation 46 3 The Emergence of Financial Reprisal Regimes 66 4 The Political Control of Banking 87 5 The Liberalization of Capital 120 6 The Political Alignment of Business 157 7 Opposition Bargaining across Ethnic Cleavages 197 8 Multiethnic Opposition Coalitions in African Elections 228 9 Democratic Consolidation in Africa 254 Appendix A: Commercial Banking Sector Size and Multiethnic Opposition Coalitions in Africa 270 Appendix B: Sources on Commodity Exports and Ethnic Production by Country 273 Appendix C: Variables: Dei nitions, Sources, and Summary Statistics 275 Appendix D: Multiethnic Opposition Coalitions in Africa, 1990–2005 280 References 288 Index 320 The Puzzle Of Opposition Coordination -- A Theory Of Pecuniary Coalition Formation -- The Emergence Of Financial Reprisal Regimes -- The Political Control Of Banking -- The Liberalization Of Capital -- The Political Alignment Of Business -- Opposition Bargaining Across Ethnic Cleavages -- Multiethnic Opposition Coalitions In African Elections -- Democratic Consolidation In Africa -- Appendix A: Commercial Banking Sector Size And Opposition Coalitions In Africa -- Appendix B: Sources On Commodity Exports And Ethnic Production By Country -- Appendix C: Variables: Definitions, Sources, And Summary Statistics -- Appendix D: Multiethnic Opposition Coalitions In Africa, 1990-2005. Leonardo R. Arriola. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 269-299) And Index. Many claim that Africa's long-ruling incumbents are able to stay in power because opposition politicians are ethnically divided. However, the main challenge for opposition politicians is securing the money needed to build electoral coalitions. Financial reforms enable businesspeople to start providing money to the opposition without fear of punishment.