Motor Cognition: What Actions Tell to the Self (Oxford Psychology Series, 42)

Our ability to acknowledge and recognise our own identity - our 'self' - is a characteristic doubtless unique to humans. Where does this feeling come from? How does the combination of neurophysiological processes coupled with our interaction with the outside world construct this coherent identity? We know that our social interactions contribute via the eyes, ears etc. However, our self is not only influenced by our senses. It is also influenced by the actions we perform and those we see others perform. Our brain anticipates the effects of our own actions and simulates the actions of others. In this way, we become able to understand ourselves and to understand the actions and emotions of others. This book is the first to describe the new field of 'Motor Cognition' - one to which the author's contribution has been seminal. Though motor actions have long been studied by neuroscientists and physiologists, it is only recently that scientists have considered the role of actions in building the self. How consciousness of action is part of self-consciousness, how one's own actions determine the sense of being an agent, how actions performed by others impact on ourselves for understanding others, differentiating ourselves from them and learning from them: these questions are raised and discussed throughout the book, drawing on experimental, clinical, and theoretical bases. The advent of new neuroscience techniques, like neuroimaging and direct electrical brain stimulation, together with a renewal of behavioral methods in cognitive psychology, provide new insights into this area. Mental imagery of action, self-recognition, consciousness of actions, imitation can be objectively studied using these new tools. The results of these investigations shed light on clinical disorders in neurology, psychiatry and in neuro-development. This is a major new work that will lay down the foundations for the field of motor cognition. Cover......Page 1 Title Page......Page 5 Foreword......Page 7 Acknowledgements......Page 10 Contents......Page 11 1.1.1 The prescriptive nature of action representations......Page 13 1.1.2 Action representations and intentions......Page 14 1.1.3 Conceptual and non-conceptual action......Page 16 1.2.1 The demise of the sensory-motor theory of action......Page 20 1.2.2 Central neural mechanisms for action representation......Page 22 1.2.3 Neuropsychological evidence for neural representations for action: apraxia......Page 24 1.3.1 Early conceptions of action regulation......Page 28 1.3.2 Disentangling self-produced versus externally produced changes in the world......Page 30 1.3.3 Action representations as internal forward models......Page 32 2 Imagined actions as a prototypical form of action representation......Page 35 2.1 The kinematic content of motor images......Page 36 2.1.2 The representation of programming rules......Page 37 2.1.3 The encoding of biomechanical constraints......Page 38 2.2 Dynamic changes in physiological parameters......Page 40 2.2.1 The encoding of simulated effort......Page 41 2.2.2 Changes in excitability of the motor pathways......Page 43 2.3.1 The premotor–parietal network during action representation and execution......Page 44 2.3.2 The controversy about the involvement of primary motor cortex in action representation......Page 45 2.3.2.1 Plastic changes in the motor cortex......Page 46 2.3.2.2 Cognitive functions of motor cortex......Page 47 2.3.3 The problem of motor inhibition during the representation of actions......Page 50 2.4.1 Mental training......Page 53 2.4.2 Coupling motor representations with neuroprosthetic devices......Page 55 3.1 Consciousness of actions......Page 57 3.1.1 Awareness of the goal of an automatic action......Page 58 3.1.2 Awareness of how an action is performed......Page 62 3.1.3 Factors that determine conscious access to actions......Page 65 3.1.4 Is consciousness of action an afferent or an efferent phenomenon?......Page 67 3.2 Consciousness of intentions......Page 70 3.2.1 Are we aware of our own motor intentions?......Page 71 3.2.2 The issue of volition and conscious will......Page 74 3.2.3 Neuroimagery of free will......Page 78 3.2.4 Disorders of volition......Page 79 4 The sense of agency and the self–other distinction......Page 83 4.1.1 The cues for self-identification......Page 84 4.1.2 The Nielsen paradigm for studying the recognition of self-generated actions......Page 87 4.1.3 Recent implementations of the Nielsen paradigm......Page 89 4.2.1 Experimental support for the Central Monitoring Theory......Page 94 4.2.2 Clinical support for the Central Monitoring Theory......Page 97 4.3.1 The concept of shared representations......Page 99 4.3.2 Perspective taking......Page 101 4.4 Failure of self-recognition/attribution mechanisms in pathological states......Page 103 4.4.1 Is there a failure of the action monitoring system in Schneiderian schizophrenic patients?......Page 104 4.4.2 A specific attribution deficit in schizophrenic patients......Page 106 4.4.3 The depth of misattribution in schizophrenic patients......Page 108 5.1.1 Face perception......Page 111 5.1.2 The perception of body parts......Page 113 5.2.1 Perceiving the distinctive features of biological movements......Page 115 5.3.1 How observed actions are represented......Page 118 5.3.2.1 The monkey premotor cortex and the discovery of mirror neurons......Page 121 5.3.2.2 Neuroimaging of the human mirror system......Page 124 5.3.2.3 Changes in activity in primary motor cortex during action observation......Page 126 5.4 Functional implications of the mirror system in motor cognition......Page 127 5.4.1 The dual processing of motor events......Page 128 5.4.2 Learning by observation......Page 130 5.4.3 The pathology of action understanding......Page 132 5.5 The role of the mirror system in action imitation......Page 133 5.5.1 Imitative mirroring versus true imitation......Page 134 5.5.2 The neural basis of imitation......Page 137 6 The simulation hypothesis of motor cognition......Page 141 6.1 Motor simulation: A hypothesis for explaining action representations......Page 142 6.1.1 Motor simulation as a rule-based process......Page 143 6.1.2 Motor simulation and the detection of intentions......Page 147 6.1.3 Simulation and action planning......Page 151 6.2 Motor simulation and social cognition......Page 155 6.2.1 The simulation of emotions......Page 156 6.2.2 Simulation and social communication......Page 159 6.3.1 Language as goal-directed action......Page 163 6.3.2 The functional anatomy of the language production–comprehension interface. The role of Broca’s area......Page 166 6.3.3 The role of Broca’s area in action representation......Page 171 Concluding remarks......Page 177 B......Page 185 C......Page 187 D......Page 188 F......Page 190 G......Page 192 H......Page 194 J......Page 196 K......Page 198 L......Page 199 M......Page 201 N......Page 202 P......Page 203 R......Page 205 S......Page 206 T......Page 208 W......Page 209 Z......Page 210 Author Index......Page 211 Subject Index......Page 219 Our ability to acknowledge and recognize our own identity -- our "self" -- is a characteristic doubtless unique to humans. Where does this feeling come from? How does the combination of neurophysiological processes coupled with our interaction with the outside world construct this coherent identity? We know that our social interactions contribute via the eyes, ears, etc. However, our self is not only influenced by our senses. It is also influenced by the actions we perform and those we see others perform. Our brain anticipates the effects of our own actions and simulates the actions of others. In this way, we become able to understand ourselves and to understand the actions and emotions of others. This book describes the new field of "Motor Cognition". Though motor actions have long been studied by neuroscientists and physiologists, it is only recently that scientists have considered the role of actions in building the self. How consciousness of action is part of self-consciousness, how one's own actions determine the sense of being an agent, how actions performed by others impact on ourselves for understanding others, differentiating ourselves from them and learning from them: these questions are raised and discussed throughout the book, drawing on experimental, clinical, and theoretical bases. The advent of new neuroscience techniques, such as neuroimaging and direct electrical brain stimulation, together with a renewal of behavioral methods in cognitive psychology, provide new insights into this area. Mental imagery of action, self-recognition, consciousness of actions, imitation can be objectively studied using these new tools. The results of these investigations shed light on clinical disorders in neurology, psychiatry, and in neuro-development Representations For Actions -- Imagined Actions As A Prototypical Form Of Action Representation -- Consciousness Of Self-produced Actions And Intentions -- The Sense Of Agency And The Self-other Distinction -- How Do We Perceive And Understand The Actions Of Others -- The Simulation Hypothesis Of Motor Cognition. Marc Jeannerod. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [173]-198) And Indexes. "Motor Cognition' describes the field of motor cognition - one to which the author's contribution has been seminal. The book examines how the motor actions we perform and watch others perform play a pivotal role in the construction of the 'self"--Our ability to acknowledge and recognise our own identity