Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy : Of Knights and Knaves, Pawns and Queens

## Abstract Can we rely on the public service ethos to deliver high quality public services? Are professionals such as doctors and teachers really public‐spirited altruists—knights—or self‐interested egoists—knaves? And how should the recipients of those services, patients, parents, and pupils, be treated? As passive recipients—pawns—or as active consumers—queens? This book offers answers to these questions. It argues that the original welfare state was designed on the assumptions that those who worked within it were basically altruists or knights and that the beneficiaries were passive recipients or pawns. In consequence, services were often of low quality, delivered in a patronising fashion and inequitable in outcome. However, services designed on an opposite set of assumptions—that public service professionals are knaves and that users should be queens—also face problems: exploitation by unscrupulous professionals, and overuse by demanding consumers, especially middle class ones. The book draws on evidence from Britain and abroad to show that, in fact, public policies designed on the basis that professionals are a mixture of knight and knave and recipients a mixture of pawn and queen deliver better quality and greater equity than policies based on more simplistic assumptions about motivation and agency. In particular, contrary to popular mythology, the book shows that policies that offer choice and competition within public services such as education and health care can deliver both excellence and equity. And policies aimed at building up individual assets and wealth ownership can empower the poor and powerless more effectively than those aimed simply at bolstering their current income. Can we rely on the altruism of professionals or the public service ethos to deliver good quality health and education services? And how should patients, parents, and pupils behave - as grateful recipients or active consumers? This book provides new answers to these questions - a milestone in the analysis and development of public policy, from one of the leading thinkers in the field. It provides a new perspective on policy design, emphasising the importance of analysing the motivation of professionals and others who work within the public sector, and both their and public service beneficiaries' capacity for agency or independent action. It argues that the conventional assumption that public sector professionals are public-spirited altruists or 'knights' is misplaced; but so is the alternative that they are all, in David Hume's terminology, 'knaves' or self-interested egoists. We also must not assume that individual citizens are passive recipients of public services (pawns); but nor can they be untrammelled sovereigns with unrestricted choices over services and resources (queens). Instead, policies must be designed so as to give the proper balance of motivation and agency. The book illustrates how this can be done by detailed empirical examination of recent policies in health services, education, social security and taxation. It puts forwards proposals for policy reform, several of which either originated with the author or with which he has been closely associated: universal capital or 'demogrants', discriminating vouchers, matching grants for pensions and for long-term care, and hypothecated taxes. "Can we rely on the altruism of professionals or the public service ethos to deliver good quality health and education services? And how should National Health Service Patients, and state school pupils and their parents behave - as grateful recipients or as active consumers? This book provides new answers to these questions - a milestone in the analysis and development of public policy from one of the leading thinkers in the field. It provides a new perspective on policy design, emphasising the importance of analysing the motivation of professionals and others who work within the public sector, and both their and public service beneficiaries' capacity for agency or independent action. It argues that the conventional assumption that public sector professionals are public-spirited altruists or 'knights' is misplaced; but so is the alternative that they are all, in David Hume's terminology, 'knaves' or self-interested egoists. We also must not assume that individual citizens are passive recipients of public services (Pawns); but nor can they be untrammelled sovereigns with unrestricted choices over services and resources (queens). Instead, policies must be designed so as to give the proper balance of motivation and agency"--Jacket This book considers the importance for policy design of realistic consideration of the motivation of both the public sector professional who will 'deliver' the policy and their (and their clients') capacity for independent action (agency). Assumptions concerning motivation and agency are key to both the design and implementation of public policy. Policy-makers routinely assume that both those who implement the policies and those expected to benefit from them will behave in certain ways - for example, that public sector professionals are either public-spirited altruists or 'knights', or self-interested egoists 'knaves'. Alternatively, individual citizens can be seen as passive recipients of public services (pawns) or untrammelled sovereigns with unrestricted choices over services and resources (queens). Both these extremes are false, of course, but getting the right mix of incentives and disincentives is tricky. Policies must be designed so as to give the proper balance of motivation and agency or risk failure Can we rely on the altruism of professionals or the public service ethos to deliver good quality health and education services? How should patients, parents and pupils behave - as grateful recipients or active consumers? The book provides new answers to these questions, and evaluates recent government policies in health services, education, social security and taxation, and puts forward proposals for policy reform: universal capital or 'demogrants', discriminating vouchers, matching grants for pensions and for long-term care and hypothecated taxes. Motivation, Agency, And Public Policy -- Knights And Knaves In The Public Sector: What Do We Mean And What Do We Know? -- Motivation And The Public Context -- Knight And Knave: A Theory Of Public Service Motivation -- Agency And Public Services -- Health Care -- School Education -- A Demogrant -- Partnership Savings -- Hypothecation -- Epilogue: Doux Commerce Publique Julian Le Grand. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.