Moral Sentiments And Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life (Economic Learning And Social Evolution Series)

Moral Sentiments and Material Interests presents an innovative synthesis of research in different disciplines to argue that cooperation stems not from the stereotypical selfish agent acting out of disguised self-interest but from the presence of "strong reciprocators" in a social group. Presenting an overview of research in economics, anthropology, evolutionary and human biology, social psychology, and sociology, the book deals with both the theoretical foundations and the policy implications of this explanation for cooperation. Chapter authors in the remaining parts of the book discuss the behavioral ecology of cooperation in humans and nonhuman primates, modeling and testing strong reciprocity in economic scenarios, and reciprocity and social policy. The evidence for strong reciprocity in the book includes experiments using the famous Ultimatum Game (in which two players must agree on how to split a certain amount of money or they both get nothing). Presenting An Overview Of Research In Economics, Anthropology, Evolutionary And Human Biology, Social Psychology, And Sociology, This Book Deals With Both The Theoretical Foundations And The Policy Implications Of Cooperation. I. Introduction -- Moral Sentiments And Material Interests: Origins, Evidence, And Consequences / Herbert Gintis ... [et Al.] -- Ii. The Behavioral Ecology Of Cooperation -- The Evolution Of Cooperation In Primate Groups / Joan B. Silk -- The Natural History Of Human Food Sharing And Cooperation: A Review And A New Multi-individual Approach To The Negotiation Of Norms / Hillard Kaplan, Michael Gurven -- Costly Signaling And Cooperative Behavior / Eric A. Smith, Rebecca Bliege Bird -- Iii. Modeling And Testing Strong Reciprocity -- The Economics Of Strong Reciprocity / Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher -- Modeling Strong Reciprocity / Armin Falk, Urs Fischbacher -- The Evolution Of Altruistic Punishment / Robert Boyd ... [et Al.] -- Norm Compliance And Strong Reciprocity / Rajiv Sethi, E. Somanathan -- Iv. Reciprocity And Social Policy -- Policies That Crowd Out Reciprocity And Collective Action / Elinor Ostrom -- Reciprocity And The Welfare State / Christina M. Fong ... [et Al.] -- Fairness, Reciprocity, And Wage Rigidity / Truman Bewley -- The Logic Of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, And Law / Dan M. Kahan -- Social Capital, Moral Sentiments, And Community Governance / Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis. Edited By Herbert Gintis ... [et Al.]. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.

Moral Sentiments and Material Interests presents an innovative synthesis of research in different disciplines to argue that cooperation stems not from the stereotypical selfish agent acting out of disguised self-interest but from the presence of "strong reciprocators" in a social group.Presenting an overview of research in economics, anthropology, evolutionary and human biology,social psychology, and sociology, the book deals with both the theoretical foundations and the policy implications of this explanation for cooperation. Chapter authors in the remaining parts of the book discuss the behavioral ecology of cooperation in humans and nonhuman primates, modeling and testing strong reciprocity in economic scenarios, and reciprocity and social policy. The evidence for strong reciprocity in the book includes experiments using the famous Ultimatum Game (in which two players must agree on how to split a certain amount of money or they both get nothing.)

Moral Sentiments and Material Interests presents an innovative synthesis of research in different disciplines to argue that cooperation stems not from the stereotypical selfish agent acting out of disguised self-interest but from the presence of "strong reciprocators" in a social group.Presenting an overview of research in economics, anthropology, evolutionary and human biology, social psychology, and sociology, the book deals with both the theoretical foundations and the policy implications of this explanation for cooperation. The evidence for strong reciprocity in the book includes experiments using the famous Ultimatum Game (in which two players must agree on how to split a certain amount of money or they both get nothing).Chapter authors in the remaining parts of the book discuss the behavioral ecology of cooperation in humans and nonhuman primates, modeling and testing strong reciprocity in economic scenarios, and reciprocity and social policy.