Moral Reality

We typically assume that the standard for what is beautiful lies in the eye of the beholder. Yet this is not the case when we consider morality; what we deem morally good is not usually a matter of opinion. Such thoughts push us toward being realists about moral properties, but a cogent theory of moral realism has long been an elusive philosophical goal. Paul Bloomfield here offers a rigorous defense of moral realism, developing an ontology for morality that models the property of being morally good on the property of being physically healthy. The model is assembled systematically; it first presents the metaphysics of healthiness and goodness, then explains our epistemic access to properties such as these, adds a complementary analysis of the semantics and syntax of moral discourse, and finishes with a discussion of how we become motivated to act morally. Bloomfield closely attends to the traditional challenges facing moral realism, and the discussion nimbly ranges from modern medical theory to ancient theories of virtue, and from animal navigation to the nature of normativity. Maintaining a highly readable style throughout, Moral Reality yields one of the most compelling theories of moral realism to date and will appeal to philosophers working on issues in metaphysics or moral philosophy. ## Abstract The book is a work in metaethics, constituting a defense of moral realism. The book begins with what I call a “modest transcendental argument” for the existence of the property of moral goodness based on an acknowledgment of the possibility that personal moral failing may go forever undetected; as such this is an argument from error. The property of physical health, understood in terms of proper function, is used as a model for moral goodness. This anchors the moral ontology on foundations as solid as those found in the physical sciences. A moral epistemology is developed in which we may learn about goodness much in the way doctors and scientists may learn about healthiness. The semantics that emerges from this picture is multifaceted and nuanced enough to preserve complicated common sense semantic intuitions about how the word “good” is used in moral contexts. The position also implies a defense of an externalist theory about the relationship between the recognition of a moral consideration and motivation. The book closes with an appendix in which the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is questioned, and a nonreducible ontology for entropy is considered as an ontological model for both physical health and moral goodness. Throughout this book, the author offers a defense of moral realism by developing an ontology for morality which models being morally good on being physically healthy. He explains the metaphysics of moral properties and our access to them Paul Bloomfield. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 195-203) And Index.