Moral Psychology, Volume 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development (Bradford Books)

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field. The neuroscience of morality is in its infancy, with the first brain imaging studies of moral development undertaken only in 2001. The contributors to volume 3 sample the best work in this very new field, discussing a variety of approaches, including functional imaging, lesion studies, abnormal psychology, and developmental neuroscience. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, and a reply by the author(s) of the original essay. Topics include the neural basis of moral emotions and moral judgments as well as comparisons of normal adult moral judgments with those made by children, adolescents, and people with psychopathy, brain damage, and autism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of Philosophy and Hardy Professor of Legal Studies at Dartmouth College.Contributors Abigail Baird, William Casebeer, Cordelia Fine, Nathan Fox, Uta Frith, Jordan Grafman, Joshua Greene, Catherine Hynes, Fatima Azavedo Ignacio, Richard Joyce, Jerome Kagan, Leonard Katz, Kent Kiehl, Jeanette Kennett, Melanie Killen, Daniel Lapsley, Heidi Maibom, Victoria McGeer, John Mikhail, Jorge Moll, Shaun Nichols, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Adina Roskies, Jana Schaich Borg, Katrina Sifferd, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Michael Smith, Mark Timmons, Frederick de Vignemont, Paul Whalen, Roland Zahn Front Cover......Page 1 Title Page......Page 4 Copyright......Page 6 Dedication......Page 7 Contents......Page 8 Acknowledgments......Page 12 Introduction - Walter Sinnott-Armstrong......Page 14 1 The Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Emotions - Jorge Moll, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Roland Zahn, and Jordan Grafman......Page 22 1.1 Processes and Moral Emotions - William D. Casebeer......Page 40 1.2 Morality, Inhibition, and Propositional Content - Catherine A. Hynes......Page 46 1.3 Response to Casebeer and Hynes - Jorge Moll, Mirella L. M. F. Paiva, Roland Zahn, and Jordan Grafman......Page 52 2 The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul - Joshua D. Greene......Page 56 2.1 Moral Cognition and Computational Theory - John Mikhail......Page 102 2.2 Toward a Sentimentalist Deontology - Mark Timmons......Page 114 2.3 Reply to Mikhail and Timmons - Joshua D. Greene......Page 126 3 Without Morals: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Criminal Psychopaths - Kent A. Kiehl......Page 140 3.1 The Antisocials Amid Us - Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Fátima Azevedo Ignácio, and Jorge Moll......Page 172 3.2 Impaired Moral Reasoning in Psychopaths? Response to Kent Kiehl - Jana Schaich Borg......Page 180 3.3 A Reply to de Oliveira-Souza, Ignácio, and Moll and Schaich Borg - Kent A. Kiehl......Page 186 4 Internalism and the Evidence from Psychopaths and “Acquired Sociopaths” - Jeanette Kennett and Cordelia Fine......Page 194 4.1 Internalism and the Evidence from Pathology - Adina L. Roskies......Page 212 4.2 The Truth about Internalism - Michael Smith......Page 228 4.3 Could There Be an Empirical Test for Internalism? - Jeanette Kennett and Cordelia Fine......Page 238 5 Varieties of Moral Agency: Lessons from Autism (and Psychopathy) - Victoria McGeer......Page 248 5.1 Reasons, Reverence, and Value - Jeanette Kennett......Page 280 5.2 The Will to Conform - Heidi Maibom......Page 286 5.3 Autism, Morality, and Empathy - Frédérique de Vignemont and Uta Frith......Page 294 5.4 The Makings of a Moral Sensibility: Replies to Commentaries - Victoria McGeer......Page 302 6 Morality and Its Development - Jerome Kagan......Page 318 6.1 Morality, Culture, and the Brain: What Changes and What Stays the Same - Nathan A. Fox and Melanie Killen......Page 334 6.2 The Fabric of Our Moral Lives: A Comment on Kagan - Paul J. Whalen......Page 338 6.3 Reply to Fox and Killen and Whalen - Jerome Kagan......Page 342 7 Adolescent Moral Reasoning: The Integration of Emotion and Cognition - Abigail A. Baird......Page 344 7.1 Integrative Mechanisms and Implicit Moral Reasoning in Adolescence - Daniel K. Lapsley......Page 364 7.2 Can Baird’s View of Adolescent Morality Inform Adolescent Criminal Justice Policy? - Katrina L. Sifferd......Page 372 7.3 Reply to Sifferd and Lapsley - Abigail A. Baird......Page 382 8 What Neuroscience Can (and Cannot) Contribute to Metaethics - Richard Joyce......Page 392 8.1 Moral Rationalism and Empirical Immunity - Shaun Nichols......Page 416 8.2 Hedonic Reasons as Ultimately Justifying and the Relevance of Neuroscience - Leonard D. Katz......Page 430 8.3 Response to Nichols and Katz - Richard Joyce......Page 440 References......Page 448 Contributors......Page 504 Index to Volume 1......Page 506 Index to Volume 2......Page 534 Index to Volume 3......Page 564 026219564X,9780262195645,0262693550,9780262693554 The MIT Press Front Cover 1 Title Page 4 Copyright 6 Dedication 7 Contents 8 Acknowledgments 12 Introduction - Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 14 1 The Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Emotions - Jorge Moll, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Roland Zahn, and Jordan Grafman 22 1.1 Processes and Moral Emotions - William D. Casebeer 40 1.2 Morality, Inhibition, and Propositional Content - Catherine A. Hynes 46 1.3 Response to Casebeer and Hynes - Jorge Moll, Mirella L. M. F. Paiva, Roland Zahn, and Jordan Grafman 52 2 The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul - Joshua D. Greene 56 2.1 Moral Cognition and Computational Theory - John Mikhail 102 2.2 Toward a Sentimentalist Deontology - Mark Timmons 114 2.3 Reply to Mikhail and Timmons - Joshua D. Greene 126 3 Without Morals: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Criminal Psychopaths - Kent A. Kiehl 140 3.1 The Antisocials Amid Us - Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Fátima Azevedo Ignácio, and Jorge Moll 172 3.2 Impaired Moral Reasoning in Psychopaths? Response to Kent Kiehl - Jana Schaich Borg 180 3.3 A Reply to de Oliveira-Souza, Ignácio, and Moll and Schaich Borg - Kent A. Kiehl 186 4 Internalism and the Evidence from Psychopaths and “Acquired Sociopaths” - Jeanette Kennett and Cordelia Fine 194 4.1 Internalism and the Evidence from Pathology - Adina L. Roskies 212 4.2 The Truth about Internalism - Michael Smith 228 4.3 Could There Be an Empirical Test for Internalism? - Jeanette Kennett and Cordelia Fine 238 5 Varieties of Moral Agency: Lessons from Autism (and Psychopathy) - Victoria McGeer 248 5.1 Reasons, Reverence, and Value - Jeanette Kennett 280 5.2 The Will to Conform - Heidi Maibom 286 5.3 Autism, Morality, and Empathy - Frédérique de Vignemont and Uta Frith 294 5.4 The Makings of a Moral Sensibility: Replies to Commentaries - Victoria McGeer 302 6 Morality and Its Development - Jerome Kagan 318 6.1 Morality, Culture, and the Brain: What Changes and What Stays the Same - Nathan A. Fox and Melanie Killen 334 6.2 The Fabric of Our Moral Lives: A Comment on Kagan - Paul J. Whalen 338 6.3 Reply to Fox and Killen and Whalen - Jerome Kagan 342 7 Adolescent Moral Reasoning: The Integration of Emotion and Cognition - Abigail A. Baird 344 7.1 Integrative Mechanisms and Implicit Moral Reasoning in Adolescence - Daniel K. Lapsley 364 7.2 Can Baird’s View of Adolescent Morality Inform Adolescent Criminal Justice Policy? - Katrina L. Sifferd 372 7.3 Reply to Sifferd and Lapsley - Abigail A. Baird 382 8 What Neuroscience Can (and Cannot) Contribute to Metaethics - Richard Joyce 392 8.1 Moral Rationalism and Empirical Immunity - Shaun Nichols 416 8.2 Hedonic Reasons as Ultimately Justifying and the Relevance of Neuroscience - Leonard D. Katz 430 8.3 Response to Nichols and Katz - Richard Joyce 440 References 448 Contributors 504 Index to Volume 1 506 Index to Volume 2 534 Index to Volume 3 564 Annotation For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field. The neuroscience of morality is in its infancy, with the first brain imaging studies of moral development undertaken only in 2001. The contributors to volume 3 sample the best work in this very new field, discussing a variety of approaches, including functional imaging, lesion studies, abnormal psychology, and developmental neuroscience. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, and a reply by the author(s) of the original essay. Topics include the neural basis of moral emotions and moral judgments as well as comparisons of normal adult moral judgments with those made by children, adolescents, and people with psychopathy, brain damage, and autism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of Philosophy and Hardy Professor of Legal Studies at Dartmouth College.Contributors Abigail Baird, William Casebeer, Cordelia Fine, Nathan Fox, Uta Frith, Jordan Grafman, Joshua Greene, Catherine Hynes, Fatima Azavedo Ignacio, Richard Joyce, Jerome Kagan, Leonard Katz, Kent Kiehl, Jeanette Kennett, Melanie Killen, Daniel Lapsley, Heidi Maibom, Victoria McGeer, John Mikhail, Jorge Moll, Shaun Nichols, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Adina Roskies, Jana Schaich Borg, Katrina Sifferd, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Michael Smith, Mark Timmons, Frederick de Vignemont, Paul Whalen, Roland Zahn

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways.

In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field. The neuroscience of morality is in its infancy, with the first brain imaging studies of moral development undertaken only in 2001. The contributors to volume3 sample the best work in this very new field, discussing a variety of approaches, including functional imaging, lesion studies, abnormal psychology, and developmental neuroscience. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, and a reply by the author(s) of the original essay. Topics include the neural basis of moral emotions and moral judgments as well as comparisons of normal adult moral judgments with those made by children, adolescents, and people with psychopathy, brain damage, and autism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of Philosophy and Hardy Professor of Legal Studies at Dartmouth College.Contributors Abigail Baird, William Casebeer,Cordelia Fine, Nathan Fox, Uta Frith, Jordan Grafman, Joshua Greene, Catherine Hynes, Fatima Azavedo Ignacio, Richard Joyce, Jerome Kagan, Leonard Katz, Kent Kiehl, Jeanette Kennett, Melanie Killen,Daniel Lapsley, Heidi Maibom, Victoria McGeer, John Mikhail, Jorge Moll, Shaun Nichols, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Adina Roskies, Jana Schaich Borg, Katrina Sifferd, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Michael Smith, Mark Timmons, Frederick de Vignemont, Paul Whalen, Roland Zahn

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field. The neuroscience of morality is in its infancy, with the first brain imaging studies of moral development undertaken only in 2001. The contributors to volume 3 sample the best work in this very new field, discussing a variety of approaches, including functional imaging, lesion studies, abnormal psychology, and developmental neuroscience. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, and a reply by the author(s) of the original essay. Topics include the neural basis of moral emotions and moral judgments as well as comparisons of normal adult moral judgments with those made by children, adolescents, and people with psychopathy, brain damage, and autism. Contributors to Volume 3 Abigail Baird, William Casebeer, Cordelia Fine, Nathan Fox, Uta Frith, Jordan Grafman, Joshua Greene, Catherine Hynes, Fatima Azavedo Ignacio, Richard Joyce, Jerome Kagan, Leonard Katz, Kent Kiehl, Jeanette Kennett, Melanie Killen, Daniel Lapsley, Heidi Maibom, Victoria McGeer, John Mikhail, Jorge Moll, Shaun Nichols, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Adina Roskies, Jana Schaich Borg, Katrina Sifferd, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Michael Smith, Mark Timmons, Frederick de Vignemont, Paul Whalen, Roland Zahn V. 1. The Evolution Of Morality : Adaptations And Innateness -- V. 2. The Cognitive Science Of Morality : Intuition And Diversity -- V. 3. The Neuroscience Of Morality : Emotion, Disease, And Development -- V. 4. Free Will And Moral Responsibility -- V.5. Virtue And Character / Edited By Walter Sinnott-armstrong And Christian B. Miller. Edited By Walter Sinnott-armstrong. A Bradford Book. Includes Bibliographical References And Indexes.