Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism, The: Neuroethics and Seeming States

"Covering moral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality, moral emotion and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the epistemology of moral intuitionism. His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based account of moral intuitionism as the most tenable one. The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines epistemological intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment. The book culminates in a convincing argument about the value of understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming and perceptual experience"-- Provided by publisher Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Contents Illustrations Acknowledgements Introduction Part I: Mind Chapter 1: Philosophical intuition’s mental ontology Chapter 2: Moral intuition’s mental ontology: Shifting from philosophical to moral intuition Chapter 3: The use of intuition as evidence Part II: Epistemology Chapter 4: Shaping classic moral intuitionism: An examination of H. A. Prichard’s and W. D. Ross’s ideas Chapter 5: Towards the new moderate intuitionism: Recent revivals of contemporary moral intuitionism Part III: Neuroethics Chapter 6: Scepticism about moral intuition: How my favoured account of intuition rebuts the neuroethicists’ position Chapter 7: Scepticism about moral intuitionism: How my favoured account of epistemological intuitionism rebuts Sinnott-Armstrong’s position Afterword Notes Bibliography Index "Covering moral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality, moral emotion, and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the epistemology of moral intuitionism. His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based account of moral intuitionism as the only tenable one. Expanding the literature on the seeming account of moral intuition and intuitionism, Dabbagh redefines all elements of moral intuitionism. The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines epistemological intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment. Culminating in a convincing argument about the value of understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming and perceptual experience."--