Minding Time: A Philosophical and Theoretical Approach to the Psychology of Time (Supplements to the Study of Time)

Minding Time: A Philosophical and Theoretical Approach to the Psychology of Time offers an innovative philosophical account of the most fundamental kinds of time representation. Drawing on biological clocks, it explains how representations of duration and simultaneity relate to the consciously experienced present moment. I Introduction -- 1.1 Minding Time 1 -- 1.2 Time: The Most Primitive Representation 5 -- 1.3 Outline Of Proposals 8 -- Ii Periodic And Interval Clocks: The Uniformity Of Time And The Units Of Time 11 -- 2.1 Records Of Time 13 -- 2.2 Periodic Clocks 15 -- 2.3 Interval Clocks 18 -- 2.4 A Comparison Between Periodic And Interval Clocks 25 -- 2.4.1 Disadvantages Of Periodic Clocks 25 -- 2.4.2 Disadvantages Of Interval Clocks 28 -- 2.4.3 Hybrid And Semi-hybrid Clocks 32 -- 2.5 The Circadian Clock 35 -- 2.5.1 Entrainment 37 -- 2.5.2 Circadian Clock Representations 40 -- 2.6 The Stopwatch 46 -- Iii Sensory-motor Representations Of Time, The Outputs Of The Clocks And The Two Constraints On Motor Time Coordination 55 -- 3.1 Representation And Isomorphism 56 -- 3.2 Metric Structure 65 -- 3.2.1 The Metric Structure Of The Outputs Of The Circadian Clock 65 -- 3.2.2 The Metric Structure Of The Outputs Of The Stopwatch 69 -- 3.3 Analog Clock Representations 74 -- 3.3.1 First Criterion: Loss Of Information 76 -- 3.3.2 Second Criterion: Continuity And Density 79 -- 3.3.3 Third Criterion: Approximate Representation 81 -- 3.3.4 Fourth Criterion: Analog Misrepresentation 83 -- 3.3.5 Fifth Criterion: Cognitive Integration 87 -- Iv A Two-phase Model Of The Present (coordination And Experience) 93 -- 4.1 Simultaneity Windows And The Units Of Time: The Third Constraint On Coordination In Time 96 -- 4.1.1 Sense-specific Simultaneity Windows 97 -- 4.1.2 The Multi-sensory Integration Window 99 -- 4.1.3 The Multi-sensory Integration Window And The Clocks 102 -- 4.1.4 The Sensorial Present 105 -- 4.2 Meta-semantic Mechanisms And The Temporal Indexical 112 -- 4.2.1 The Need For Meta-semantic Mechanisms 114 -- 4.2.2 The Meta-semantic Mechanism For Temporal Demonstrative Representation 115 -- 4.3 The Phenomenal Present 118 -- 4.3.1 The Phenomenal Specious Present 121 -- 4.3.2 The Relation Responsible For Phenomenal Unification 127 -- 4.4 The Two-phase Model Of The Present 133. By Carlos Montemayor. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Minding Time: A Philosophical and Theoretical Approach to the Psychology of Time offers a theoretical account of the most fundamental kinds of time representation, drawing on philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and biology. Recent experimental findings on creatures from bees to scrub-jays to human beings have demonstrated the complex ¿́¿ and astoundingly reliable ¿́¿ functioning of biological clocks. These clocks, Carlos Montemayor argues, make possible representations of duration that are then anchored to representations of simultaneity, and they do so independently of conscious information or representations of the self. Montemayor offers an innovative philosophical explanation of how representations of duration and simultaneity relate to the consciously experienced present moment. No theory has integrated the research on representations of simultaneity and duration. Minding Time: A Philosophical and Theoretical Approach to the Psychology of Time provides such a theory, showing that the metric constraints on time measurements are not dependent on phenomenal consciousness