Mind, Reason and Imagination: Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

Recent philosophy of mind has had a mistaken conception of the nature of psychological concepts. It has assumed too much similarity between psychological judgments and those of natural science and has thus overlooked the fact that other people are not just objects whose thoughts we may try to predict and control but fellow creatures with whom we talk and co-operate. In this collection of essays, Jane Heal argues that central to our ability to arrive at views about others' thoughts is not knowledge of some theory of the mind but rather an ability to imagine alternative worlds and how things appear from another person's point of view. She then applies this view to questions of how we represent others' thoughts, the shape of psychological concepts, the nature of rationality and the possibility of first person authority. This book should appeal to students and professionals in philosophy of mind and language. Half-title......Page 3 Series-title......Page 5 Title......Page 7 Copyright......Page 8 Contents......Page 9 Preface......Page 11 Sources......Page 13 1 Introduction......Page 17 Part One Mind, Theory and Imagination......Page 25 1. TWO STRATEGIES......Page 27 2. SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE REPLICATION HYPOTHESIS......Page 30 3. PROSPECTS FOR A RECONCILIATION......Page 34 4. COROLLARIES OF THE REPLICATION STRATEGY......Page 38 3 Understanding Other Minds from the Inside......Page 44 1. INTRODUCTION......Page 61 2. THE CENTRAL NOTIONS......Page 62 3. FOUR IMPORTANT FACTS ABOUT THINKING......Page 66 4. SIMULATION, RELEVANCE AND THE FRAME PROBLEM......Page 70 5. CONTENT AND NON-CONTENT......Page 75 1. INTRODUCTION......Page 79 2. THE STORY SO FAR......Page 80 3. COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY......Page 84 4. SIMULATION AND THE EXERCISE OF SKILL......Page 87 5. THE DOMAIN OF SIMULATION......Page 91 6. SOME WRONG PREDICTIONS AND WHY WE MAKE THEM......Page 98 Part Two Thought and Reason......Page 105 1. INTRODUCTION......Page 107 2. SOME BACKGROUND IDEAS AND THE TWO PROPOSALS......Page 109 3. THEORY THEORY AND THOUGHTS AS AN INDEPENDENT SUBJECT MATTER......Page 116 4. CONDITIONALS......Page 119 5. THE RELATION OF THE A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI CLAIMS......Page 124 6. RESPONSE TO STICH AND NICHOLS......Page 128 1. INTRODUCTION......Page 131 2. WHAT IS HOLISM?......Page 132 3. HOLISM AND BELIEF......Page 136 4. WHY THOUGHTS HANG TOGETHER......Page 138 5. WHY THOUGHTS COME IN GROUPS......Page 144 1. INTRODUCTION......Page 147 2. TWO CONSTRUALS OF CO-COGNITIVE REASONING......Page 148 Schema I......Page 150 Schema II......Page 151 3. THREE INCONCLUSIVE ARGUMENTS......Page 154 4. RATIONALITY......Page 158 5. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES......Page 160 AFTERNOTE: GOOD BAD REASONING......Page 163 Part Three Indexical Predicates and Their Applications......Page 167 1. INTRODUCTION......Page 169 2. REFERENCE, PREDICATION AND INDEXICALITY......Page 170 3. INDEXICAL PREDICATES......Page 175 4. PREDICATION AND LOGICAL FORM......Page 179 5. MORE ASPECTS OF INDEXICAL PREDICATION......Page 183 1. INTRODUCTION......Page 190 2. INDEXICAL PREDICATION......Page 191 3. SOME USES FOR INDEXICAL PREDICATIVE LOCUTIONS......Page 192 4. NOTATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS......Page 195 5. WAYS OF REPORTING SPEECH......Page 197 6. DIRECT SPEECH REPORTS......Page 198 7. REPORTING MEANING......Page 200 8. INDIRECT SPEECH REPORTS......Page 202 9. PROPOSITIONS AND FORMALISATION......Page 205 1. INTRODUCTION......Page 212 2. CONCEPTS......Page 215 3. A NON-STARTER?......Page 218 4. INDEXICAL PREDICATION AND LAGADONIAN KINDS......Page 221 5. REPRESENTING CONTENT......Page 227 6. REPRESENTING ATTITUDES......Page 232 7. CODA – THE NATURE OF THE MENTAL......Page 236 Part Four Thinking of Minds and Interacting with Persons......Page 239 1. INTRODUCTION......Page 241 2. RATIONALITY, PREDICTION AND ELIMINATIVISM......Page 243 3. AN AVENUE OF ESCAPE?......Page 247 4. ANOTHER ARGUMENT FOR ELIMINATIVISM......Page 250 5. A TWO-ELEMENT CONCEPTION OF RATIONALITY......Page 253 6. PREDICTION, DISCUSSION AND EXCUSE......Page 257 7. ELIMINATIVISM AGAIN......Page 261 1. INTRODUCTION......Page 266 2. TWO APPROACHES TO A SOLUTION......Page 267 3. MOORE’S ANSWER AND RELATIVES......Page 269 4. FUNCTIONALISM AND THE PARADOX......Page 275 5. WHY FUNCTIONALISM CANNOT RECOGNISE THE PARADOX......Page 281 6. A WITTGENSTEINIAN ACCOUNT AGAIN......Page 284 1. INTRODUCTION......Page 289 2. THE CONUNDRUM OF FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY......Page 290 3. PROMISING AND AUTHORITY......Page 293 4. PERFORMATIVES......Page 298 5. AVOWALS AND AUTHORITY......Page 300 References......Page 305 Index......Page 313 Half-title 3 Series-title 5 Title 7 Copyright 8 Contents 9 Preface 11 Sources 13 1 Introduction 17 Part One Mind, Theory and Imagination 25 2 Replication and Functionalism 27 1. TWO STRATEGIES 27 2. SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE REPLICATION HYPOTHESIS 30 3. PROSPECTS FOR A RECONCILIATION 34 4. COROLLARIES OF THE REPLICATION STRATEGY 38 3 Understanding Other Minds from the Inside 44 4 Simulation, Theory and Content 61 1. INTRODUCTION 61 2. THE CENTRAL NOTIONS 62 3. FOUR IMPORTANT FACTS ABOUT THINKING 66 4. SIMULATION, RELEVANCE AND THE FRAME PROBLEM 70 5. CONTENT AND NON-CONTENT 75 5 Simulation and Cognitive Penetrability 79 1. INTRODUCTION 79 2. THE STORY SO FAR 80 3. COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY 84 4. SIMULATION AND THE EXERCISE OF SKILL 87 5. THE DOMAIN OF SIMULATION 91 6. SOME WRONG PREDICTIONS AND WHY WE MAKE THEM 98 Part Two Thought and Reason 105 6 Co-Cognition and Off-Line Simulation: Two Ways of Understanding the Simulation Approach 107 1. INTRODUCTION 107 2. SOME BACKGROUND IDEAS AND THE TWO PROPOSALS 109 3. THEORY THEORY AND THOUGHTS AS AN INDEPENDENT SUBJECT MATTER 116 4. CONDITIONALS 119 5. THE RELATION OF THE A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI CLAIMS 124 6. RESPONSE TO STICH AND NICHOLS 128 7 Semantic Holism: Still a Good Buy 131 1. INTRODUCTION 131 2. WHAT IS HOLISM? 132 3. HOLISM AND BELIEF 136 4. WHY THOUGHTS HANG TOGETHER 138 5. WHY THOUGHTS COME IN GROUPS 144 8 Other Minds, Rationality and Analogy 147 1. INTRODUCTION 147 2. TWO CONSTRUALS OF CO-COGNITIVE REASONING 148 Schema I 150 Schema II 151 3. THREE INCONCLUSIVE ARGUMENTS 154 4. RATIONALITY 158 5. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 160 AFTERNOTE: GOOD BAD REASONING 163 Part Three Indexical Predicates and Their Applications 167 9 Indexical Predicates and Their Uses 169 1. INTRODUCTION 169 2. REFERENCE, PREDICATION AND INDEXICALITY 170 3. INDEXICAL PREDICATES 175 4. PREDICATION AND LOGICAL FORM 179 5. MORE ASPECTS OF INDEXICAL PREDICATION 183 10 On Speaking Thus: The Semantics of Indirect Discourse 190 1. INTRODUCTION 190 2. INDEXICAL PREDICATION 191 3. SOME USES FOR INDEXICAL PREDICATIVE LOCUTIONS 192 4. NOTATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 195 5. WAYS OF REPORTING SPEECH 197 6. DIRECT SPEECH REPORTS 198 7. REPORTING MEANING 200 8. INDIRECT SPEECH REPORTS 202 9. PROPOSITIONS AND FORMALISATION 205 11 Lagadonian Kinds and Psychological Concepts 212 1. INTRODUCTION 212 2. CONCEPTS 215 3. A NON-STARTER? 218 4. INDEXICAL PREDICATION AND LAGADONIAN KINDS 221 5. REPRESENTING CONTENT 227 6. REPRESENTING ATTITUDES 232 7. CODA – THE NATURE OF THE MENTAL 236 Part Four Thinking of Minds and Interacting with Persons 239 12 What Are Psychological Concepts For? 241 1. INTRODUCTION 241 2. RATIONALITY, PREDICTION AND ELIMINATIVISM 243 3. AN AVENUE OF ESCAPE? 247 4. ANOTHER ARGUMENT FOR ELIMINATIVISM 250 5. A TWO-ELEMENT CONCEPTION OF RATIONALITY 253 6. PREDICTION, DISCUSSION AND EXCUSE 257 7. ELIMINATIVISM AGAIN 261 13 Moore’s Paradox: A Wittgensteinian Approach 266 1. INTRODUCTION 266 2. TWO APPROACHES TO A SOLUTION 267 3. MOORE’S ANSWER AND RELATIVES 269 4. FUNCTIONALISM AND THE PARADOX 275 5. WHY FUNCTIONALISM CANNOT RECOGNISE THE PARADOX 281 6. A WITTGENSTEINIAN ACCOUNT AGAIN 284 14 On First-Person Authority 289 1. INTRODUCTION 289 2. THE CONUNDRUM OF FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY 290 3. PROMISING AND AUTHORITY 293 4. PERFORMATIVES 298 5. AVOWALS AND AUTHORITY 300 References 305 Index 313 This Book Should Appeal To Students And Professionals In Philosophy Of Mind And Philosophy Of Language.--jacket. 1. Introduction -- Pt. I. Mind, Theory And Imagination -- 2. Replication And Functionalism -- 3. Understanding Other Minds From The Inside -- 4. Simulation, Theory And Content -- 5. Simulation And Cognitive Penetrability -- Pt. Ii. Thought And Reason -- 6. Co-cognition And Off-line Simulation: Two Ways Of Understanding The Simulation Approach -- 7. Semantic Holism: Still A Good Buy -- 8. Other Minds, Rationality And Analogy -- Pt. Iii. Indexical Predicates And Their Applications -- 9. Indexical Predicates And Their Uses -- 10. On Speaking Thus: The Semantics Of Indirect Discourse -- 11. Lagadonian Kinds And Psychological Concepts -- Pt. Iv. Thinking Of Minds And Interacting With Persons. Jane Heal. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 289-295) And Index. Jane Heal argues that central to our ability to arrive at views about others' thoughts is not knowledge of some theory of the mind but rather an ability to imagine alternative worlds and how things appear from another person's point of view. She then applies this view to questions of how we represent others' thoughts, the shape of psychological concepts, the nature of rationality and the possibility of first person authority. This book is of interest to students and professionals in philosophy of mind and language. Much philosophy of mind in the analytic tradition, as practised in the last few decades, has been in the grip of a mistaken conception of the nature of psychological judgements and concepts.