Mind Ascribed: An elaboration and defence of interpretivism (Advances in Consciousness Research)

'This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Mölder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed against interpretivism, the book provides a critical analysis of major alternative accounts of mental state possession as well as the interpretivist ideas originating from Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett. The viability of the approach is demonstrated by showing how one can treat mental causation as well as the faculties closely connected with consciousness – perception and the awareness of one's own mental states – in the interpretivist framework. (Series A)' Mind Ascribed......Page 2 Editorial page......Page 3 Title page......Page 4 LCC data......Page 5 Dedication......Page 6 Table of contents......Page 8 Acknowledgements......Page 12 1.1 Mind and content: First steps......Page 14 1.2 Truth and meaning......Page 23 1.3 A road map......Page 26 Part I. Towards interpretivism......Page 30 2.1 A general metaphysical scheme: Pleonastic properties and the natural basis......Page 32 2.2 Mind-body relations......Page 45 2.3 Supervenience......Page 47 2.4 Reduction and identity......Page 56 2.5 Realisation and functionalism......Page 70 2.6 Ascription theory and explanatory relations......Page 83 3.1 Varieties of interpretivism......Page 88 3.2 Donald Davidson and radical interpretation......Page 98 3.3 Daniel Dennett and the intentional stance......Page 115 3.4.1 Rationality......Page 131 3.4.2 The sources of evidence for interpretation......Page 134 3.4.3 Explaining meaning......Page 137 Part II. Elaborating and defending the ascription theory......Page 142 4.1 Common-sense functionalism and the meaning of mental terms......Page 144 4.2 Natural kinds and the reference of mental terms......Page 151 4.3 The role of folk psychology in the ascription theory......Page 158 5.1 Preliminaries......Page 164 5.2 The ascription sources......Page 172 5.3 Modelling the coherence......Page 178 5.4 The canonical ascription......Page 183 5.5 The indeterminacy and uncodifiability of the mental......Page 192 6.1.1 The circularity charge......Page 198 6.1.2 The regress objection......Page 200 6.1.3 Intrinsic intentionality......Page 202 6.1.4 Liberalism and chauvinism......Page 203 6.1.5 Observer-dependence......Page 209 6.2 Arguing for interpretivism......Page 210 6.2.1 The consideration from behavioural criteria......Page 211 6.2.2 The consideration from the publicity of meaning......Page 212 6.2.3 The consideration from folk psychology......Page 214 6.2.4 The consideration from stance-dependent patterns......Page 215 Part III. Extending the view......Page 218 7. Interpretivism and mental causation......Page 220 7.1 Davidson on mental causation......Page 221 7.2 Troubles with the causal role of the mental......Page 226 7.3 Causal explanation and causation......Page 232 7.4 Causal efficacy and causal relevance......Page 237 7.5 The relevance of mental causation......Page 241 8.1 The specificity of perception......Page 246 8.2 The factivity constraint......Page 248 8.3 The veridicality of perception......Page 250 8.4 The content of perceptual states......Page 253 8.5 Non-conceptual content in the ascription theory......Page 256 8.6 Phenomenology, non-conceptual content and protocontent......Page 260 9. Self-knowledge......Page 270 9.1 Approaches to self-knowledge......Page 271 9.2 Self-constitution......Page 273 9.3 First-person operationalism......Page 276 9.4 The idea of a mechanism......Page 280 9.5 The ascriptionist model of self-knowledge......Page 281 10. Conclusion......Page 288 References......Page 292 Index......Page 304 The series Advances in Consciousness Research......Page 307