Military Threats : The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace

Is military power central in determining which states get their voice heard? Must states run a high risk of war to communicate credible intent? In this book, Slantchev shows that states can often obtain concessions without incurring higher risks when they use military threats. Unlike diplomatic forms of communication, physical military moves improve a state's expected performance in war. If the opponent believes the threat, it will be more likely to back down. Military moves are also inherently costly, so only resolved states are willing to pay these costs. Slantchev argues that powerful states can secure better peaceful outcomes and lower the risk of war, but the likelihood of war depends on the extent to which a state is prepared to use military threats to deter challenges to peace and compel concessions without fighting. The price of peace may therefore be large: states invest in military forces that are both costly and unused. Is Military Power Central In Determining Which States Get Their Voice Heard? Must States Run A High Risk Of War To Communicate Credible Intent? The Author Shows That States Can Often Obtain Concessions Without Incurring Higher Risks When They Use Military Threats. Unlike Diplomatic Forms Of Communication, Physical Military Moves Improve A State's Expected Performance In War. If The Opponent Believes The Threat, It Will Be More Likely To Back Down. Military Moves Are Also Inherently Costly, So Only Resolved States Are Willing To Pay These Costs. The Author Argues That Powerful States Can Secure Better Peaceful Outcomes And Lower The Risk Of War, But The Likelihood Of War Depends On The Extent To Which A State Is Prepared To Use Military Threats To Deter Challenges To Peace And Compel Concessions Without Fighting. The Price Of Peace May Therefore Be Large: States Invest In Military Forces That Are Both Costly And Unused. Part I. Coercion And Credibility: -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Commitment And Signaling In Coercive Bargaining: -- A Stylization Of A Crisis -- The Purely Informational Approach -- The Search For Credibility: Costly Signaling ; Constraining Future Choices ; Manipulating Incentives -- Conclusion -- Part Ii. A Theory Of Military Threats -- 3. A Model Of Military Threats: Characteristics Of A Military Threat: -- Military Moves Are Inherently Costly ; Military Moves Change The Distribution Of Power ; Military Moves Can Reveal Capability -- Modeling Military Threats: The Technology Of Conflict ; The Military Crisis Game -- Threats With Complete Information -- Threats Under Uncertainty -- Conclusion With An Aside On Reputation -- 4. Comparing The Instruments Of Coercion -- Stability And Expected Mobilization -- The Basic Simulation Setup -- Comparing Threat Instruments: Functions Of Coercive Instruments ; Escalation And Resistance -- Threats And Stability: Appeasement ; Escalation Stability ; Crisis Stability -- Gaining More By Risking Less: Power, Risk, And Gain In Crisis Bargaining ; Why Stronger Types Must Run Higher Risks ; Risk And Gain With Non-military Threats ; Risk And Gain With Military Threats -- Choosing The Instrument Of Coercion -- Typing The Knot Of War : A Conjecture -- Part Iii. Elements Of Militarized Deterrence: -- 5. Militarization And The Distribution Of Power And Interest -- Stability And Deterrence Failure -- System Militarization And Military Threats -- System Militarization And Deterrence --the Distribution Of Power And Interest -- The Sino-indian War Of 1962 -- 6. The Expansion Of The Korean War, 1950 -- An Outline Of The Argument -- Militarized Deterrence In Korea -- The Evolution Of Us War Aims And Chinese Signals : Liberation Without Unification ; Unification Becomes A Tempting Possibility ; The Closing Of The Window Of Opportunity ; The Chinese Make Up Their Minds -- Did The Us Irrationally Dismiss Clear Chinese Threats? -- Conclusion -- 7. The Price Of Peace And Military Threat Effectiveness -- The Paradoxical Burden Of Peace : Stability And The Costs Of War ; High War Costs And Aggressive Mobilization -- Do Audience Costs Improve The Prospects For Peace? -- Deterrent Efficacy Of Military Threats : Power Or Beliefs? -- Bluffs, Sham Crises, And Deterrence -- Part Iv. Conclusions: -- 8. Implications -- Appendix A : Formalities For Chapter 2 -- Appendix : Formalities For Chapter 3 -- Appendix C : Formalities For Chapter 4 -- Appendix D : Formalities For Chapter 5. Branislav L. Slantchev. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 288-302) And Index. Cover......Page 1 Frontmatter......Page 2 Contents......Page 8 List of figures......Page 11 List of tables......Page 12 Acknowledgements......Page 13 Part I - Coercion and Credibility......Page 16 1 - Introduction......Page 18 2 - Commitment and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining......Page 28 2.1 A Stylization of a Crisis......Page 29 2.2 The Purely Informational Approach......Page 33 2.3 The Search for Credibility......Page 44 2.4 Conclusion......Page 75 Part II - A Theory of Military Threats......Page 78 3.1 Characteristics of a Military Threat......Page 80 3.2 Modeling Military Threats......Page 95 3.3 Threats with Complete Information......Page 101 3.4 Threats under Uncertainty......Page 111 3.5 Conclusion with an Aside on Reputation......Page 131 4.1 Stability and Expected Mobilization......Page 134 4.2 The Basic Simulation Setup......Page 136 4.3 Comparing Threat Instruments......Page 138 4.4 Threats and Stability......Page 142 4.5 Gaining More by Risking Less......Page 150 4.6 Choosing the Instrument of Coercion......Page 162 4.7 Tying the Knot of War: A Conjecture......Page 165 Part III - Elements of Militarized Deterrence......Page 172 5 - Militarization and the Distribution of Power and Interests......Page 174 5.1 Stability and Deterrence Failure......Page 175 5.2 System Militarization and Military Threats......Page 178 5.3 System Militarization and Deterrence......Page 183 5.4 The Distribution of Power and Interests......Page 188 5.5 The Sino--Indian War of 1962......Page 193 6 - The Expansion of the Korean War, 1950......Page 206 6.1 An Outline of the Argument......Page 208 6.2 Militarized Deterrence in Korea......Page 210 6.3 The Evolution of US War Aims and Chinese Signals......Page 217 6.4 Did the US Irrationally Dismiss Clear Chinese Threats?......Page 229 6.5 Conclusion......Page 236 7 - The Price of Peace and Military Threat Effectiveness......Page 239 7.1 The Paradoxical Burden of Peace......Page 240 7.2 Do Audience Costs Improve the Prospects for Peace?......Page 247 7.3 Deterrent Efficacy of Military Threats: Power or Beliefs?......Page 253 7.4 Bluffs, Sham Crises, and Deterrence......Page 262 Part IV - Conclusions......Page 268 8 - Implications......Page 270 Appendix A - Formalities for Chapter 2......Page 274 Appendix B - Formalities for Chapter 3......Page 280 Appendix C - Formalities for Chapter 4......Page 297 Appendix D - Formalities for Chapter 5......Page 301 Bibliography......Page 303 Index......Page 318 Part I. Coercion and Credibility: 1. Introduction; 2. Commitment and signalling in coercive bargaining; Part II. A Theory of Military Threats: 3. A model of military threats; 4. Comparing the instruments of coercion; Part III. Elements of Militarized Deterrence: 5. Militarization and the distribution of power and interests; 6. The expansion of the Korean War, 1950; 7. The price of peace and military threat effectiveness; Part IV. Conclusions: 8. Implications; Appendix A. Formalities for Chapter 2; Appendix B. Formalities for Chapter 3; Appendix C. Formalities for Chapter 4; Appendix D. Formalities for Chapter 5. Is military power central in determining which states get their voice heard in international affairs? The exercise of force is costly, so states often have trouble persuading their opponents that they would resort to arms unless their demands are met. In this book, Slantchev examines just how effective military threats are.